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DEATH DENIES DUE PROCESS: EVALUATING DUE
PROCESS CHALLENGES TO THE FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY ACT

Who was it? A friend? A good man? Someone who sympathized?
Someone who wanted to help? Was it one person only? Or was it
mankind? Was help at hand? Were there arguments in his favor that
had been overlooked? Of course there must be. Logic is doubtless
unshakable, but it cannot withstand a man who wants to go on living. Where was the Judge whom he had never seen? Where was the
high Court, to which he had never penetrated? He raised his hands
and spread out all his fingers.
1
-Franz Kafka, The Trial
INTRODUCTION

In a three-month span in 2002, two district courts declared the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) unconstitutional. 2 United States v.
Quinones3 and United States v. Fell4 each held that the FDPA fails to
protect the due process rights of federal capital defendants. While the
conclusions in Quinones and Fell are noteworthy, the cases are especially significant because each used the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment 5 rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 6 Each case applied the Due Process Clause as "a guarantee of legality itself, legality not of the formal
or superficial kind, but of the fundamental, inherent form."' 7 These
decisions emphasize that the fundamental interests at stake in capital
cases are individual human lives.
Quinones and Fell both used the Due Process Clause, but each decision presented a distinct analysis. Quinones, which preceded Fell,
1. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 228 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 1956) (1937).

2. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (2000).
3. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Quinones,
205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
4. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002), rev'd United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d
135 (2d Cir. 2004).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7. RODNEY L. Mor-r, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF
THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOLLOWED BY COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT
OF THE "LAW OF THE LAND"

604 (2d ed. 1973).
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used a substantive due process analysis when it considered the constitutionality of the FDPA in light of evidence that death penalty systems
have failed to distinguish the innocent from the guilty.8 The compelling evidence before the Quinones court included over one hundred
death row exonerees, some of whom came within hours of execution
for crimes they did not commit. 9 Fell applied a procedural due process analysis and examined the validity of the relaxed evidentiary
standard at the FDPA sentencing hearing. 10 Despite these distinct focuses, an overriding concern for heightened reliability binds Quinones
and Fell to each other and to the body of death penalty jurisprudence.
By concluding that the FDPA condones lowered reliability,'1 Quinones and Fell provide substance to the language of death penalty ju2
risprudence that is too often aspirational rhetoric.'
The discomfort with the current administration of the death penalty
that Quinones and Fell voice does not exist in a vacuum. The etiology
of that unease does not reveal a single source. Each decision is both
emblematic and a product of the sea change that marks America's
attitude toward the death penalty. The decisions do not, however,
merely mirror public opinion polls or encapsulate a cause cdhlbre.
Both opinions potentially represent significant legal developments in
death penalty jurisprudence.
This Comment submits that the Due Process Clause presents viable
grounds for challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment.
As Quinones and Fell show, a due process challenge has a flexibility
that the traditional Eighth Amendment challenge lacks. Also, by focusing on the individual rights at stake, due process challenges rephrase the critical inquiry from institutional concerns to individual
rights. This Comment first considers a broad range of perspectives in
order to understand the context and implications of Quinones and
8. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
9. Id. at 265.
10. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 490-91.
11. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 268; Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
12. See Adam Thurschwell, Federal Courts, the Death Penalty, and the Due Process Clause:

The OriginalUnderstandingof the "Heightened Reliability" of Capital Trials, 14 FED. SENT. R. 14
(2001). Thurschwell notes that the Supreme Court's admonishments for heightened reliability
and increased accuracy in capital cases
have for the most part remained mere rhetoric, as the special protections theoretically
afforded to capital defendants under the Eighth Amendment have turned out to be
almost valueless in practice. The tendency among academics and defense lawyers has
been to bewail this phenomenon as judicial hypocrisy. Whatever the merits of that
view as a matter of individual judicial psychology or politics, it has deeper roots in an
underlying conceptual weakness in the Court's attempt to use the Eighth Amendment
as the primary vehicle for guaranteeing the heightened reliability of capital procedures.
Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
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Fell. Subpart II(A) discusses current attitudes toward the death penalty.1 3 That section surveys how the general public and federal and
state legislatures have reacted to the increasing evidence of the rates
of error, indications of racial bias, and other important issues involving capital punishment.
Subpart 11(B) discusses wrongful convictions and the studies that
attempt to discover why they occur. 14 In subpart II(C), the focus
switches to the United States Supreme Court's position on the death
penalty, which includes a brief summary of the seminal cases and
more recent decisions.1 5 Current and developing attitudes toward
capital punishment and the Supreme Court's stance on the issue create the conflict that surges through Quinones and Fell. After introducing this conflict, subpart II(D) discusses the FDPA by providing a
general outline of that statute's history, an explanation of its critical
provisions, and a brief sample of cases interpreting it. 1 6 After discussing the FDPA, Quinones17 and Fell18 are examined.
Subpart III(A) discusses briefly the role of the Due Process Clause
in capital punishment jurisprudence.1 9 That section shows that the
Due Process Clause is available for challenging death sentences, but it
has historically been used in a relatively limited capacity. Subpart
III(B) then turns to Quinones.20 The central topics of this analysis
include: identifying the underlying concerns that motivated the decisions, examining the Supreme Court's position on the role of innocence in capital cases as represented in Herrerav. Collins,2 1 answering
why the district court applied the Due Process Clause instead of the
Eighth Amendment, and discussing how the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit erred by misreading Herrera and failing to address the district court's due process analysis. Subpart III(C)
discusses Fell.22 Similar to the Quinones analysis, the discussion of
Fell examines the issues that motivated the district court to hold the
FDPA unconstitutional. That section discusses the role of the "elements rule" that Apprendi v. New Jersey2 3 announced and Ring v. Ari13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra notes 28-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 91-133 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 134-179 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 180-239 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 240-326 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 327-381 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 384-422 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 423-583 and accompanying text.
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
See infra notes 584-766 and accompanying text.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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zona2 4 extended to capital cases. Subpart III(C) contends that the

Second Circuit erred when it reversed Fell because it did not view the
FDPA sentencing hearing as a distinct trial and also because it construed the requirement for heightened reliability in a manner that
threatens the reliability of federal capital sentencing hearings. Subpart III(C) also submits that the rules of evidence should be applied
unilaterally to the Government at the sentencing stage, which would
increase the reliability of evidence at sentencing and also enable the
sentencer to make individualized sentencing determinations. 25 Part
IV discusses the impact of Quinones and Fell.26 That section evaluates
the importance of the due process analyses applied in Quinones and
Fell. That section also discusses how reform efforts may normalize
underlying causes of error while giving the false impression of a
"fixed" FDPA. Part V concludes with a brief summary. 27
II.

BACKGROUND

Quinones and Fell exist in a context of contrasting and turbulent
forces. This section provides an overview of death penalty moratoriums, state and federal legislation, and studies of capital punishment.
After that overview, this section discusses the seminal death penalty
cases. Subsequent to an examination of the relevant provisions of the
FDPA and cases interpreting the statute, the Quinones holdings, Fell,
and the Second Circuit's reversals of these decisions are explained.
A.

America's Death Penalty

Capital punishment in the United States is under intense scrutiny. 28
Critical examination of capital punishment has revealed that serious
24. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
25. See infra notes 702-766 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 767-821 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 822-828 and accompanying text.
28. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000) (noting
that the incentives of both prodeath penalty and antideath penalty actors are skewed and heavily
influenced by extrinsic forces, such as political prestige, from the beginning of trial through the
postconviction process); James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got To
Do with It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2002) [hereinafter Liebman, What's DNA Got
To Do with It?] ("The nation is engaged in the most intensive discussion of the death penalty in
decades."); Jacob Cairns, The Decline of Due Process in Capital Sentencing: Ramdass v.
Angelone, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 193 (2002) (noting the increasing scrutiny of the death penalty);
Douglas A. Berman, Addressing Capital Punishment Through Statutory Reform, 63 OHIo ST.
L.J. 1, 8 (2002) ("[T]here is a consensus that the modem death penalty system is badly broken
despite the Supreme Court's considerable regulatory efforts."); Death Penalty Doubts, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, at 14A (noting how recent decisions reflect a "growing discomfort" with the implementation of the death penalty); Thalia Assuras, Death Penalty Under
Increasing Scrutiny (CBS News: Evening News, June 23, 2001), available at 2001 WL 9861483
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and systemic flaws plague it, which have in turn precipitated additional scrutiny. 29 Criticism of capital punishment is not a new topic of
debate in America, 30 but never before has public discourse been so
concerned and critical about its reliability and fairness. 3'
The current capital punishment debate is not isolated to specific
groups; rather, examination of capital punishment is transpiring on a
national level. 32 Even Supreme Court Justices have voiced concern
over the lack of fairness in capital punishment. In a recent speech,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted: "After 20 years on the high
court, I have to acknowledge that serious questions are being raised
(discussing reasons why the death penalty is under increasing scrutiny); Eric Siegel, Death
Row-Despite a Lack of Evidence; Justice: A Judge Says a Man Sentenced to Die 12 Years Ago
Might Be Innocent, but the State Resists Freeing Kevin Wiggins, BALT. SUN, Oct. 14, 2001, at IA
(noting that reversal of murder conviction and invalidation of death sentence came when "the
death penalty is undergoing increasing scrutiny in Maryland and elsewhere"); Lyle Denniston,
Rulings Reflect High Court's Uncertainty in Capital Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 2002, at A6
(noting that the death penalty is under attack throughout the nation and under intensified scrutiny.); Why This Execution? TIMES UNION, Aug. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24804962 (noting
the death penalty is undergoing an intense and critical scrutiny at a national level).
29. See generally Joan Biskupic, Door Open to Death-Penalty Limits; Court Willing To Take a
Look at Exceptions, USA TODAY, June 21, 2002, at A3 (noting that concerns in flaws of the
death penalty rules and exonerations have led to further questions about the integrity of the
death penalty); Stuart Pfeifer, California Courts Sentencing Fewer Killers to Death Row Justice;
The Decline Comes as Violent Crime Falls, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Al (noting that wrongful convictions and allegations of racial bias have led to increased scrutiny).
30. See Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265,
1266 (2001) (Abolition was a topic of major concern in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.).
31. Id. at 1265-68 (noting that the focus on the reliability of capital punishment rather than its
morality is unique in the history of the capital punishment debate); see also Wayne A. Logan,
Casting New Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism for a New Millennium, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (2002) (reviewing AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION (2001)) (noting that the "palpable concern" over
the use of capital punishment is as pronounced as it was in 1972 when the Court invalidated the
death penalty); Thomas P. Sullivan, Crime and Punishment: The Death Penalty Becomes a HighProfile Issue, 49 FED. LAW. 34 (2002) (noting that public support is at a twenty-year low and that
the death penalty debate has shifted "from the question of whether the death penalty is right in
theory to whether it is fair in practice"). Even conservative death penalty supporters, such as
George Will and Reverend Pat Robertson have commented on the unreliability of capital punishment systems. See James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1843-44 (2000).
32. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative "Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417 (2002). The authors note:
For the first time in several decades, across the United States, we stand at a moment of
critical appraisal of our practice of capital punishment. Suddenly, in the past few years,
concern and caution about the use of the death penalty have moved from the fringes to
the center of public discourse.
Id.; see also Berman, supra note 28 at 4 (Both the "elected politicians and the general public...
have been closely scrutinizing and significantly questioning our criminal justice system's embrace
of this ultimate punishment.").

1782

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1777

about whether the death penalty is being fairly administered in this
country. ' ' 33 Numerous states have taken steps to study their death
penalties. Several states have ceased all executions and declared

moratoriums in response to perceived inequity and unreliability in
their death penalty systems.
1.

Increased Scrutiny at the State Level

In 1999, Nebraska came close to declaring a moratorium on executions. On a 27-21 vote, the Nebraska legislature approved a bill that
would have stopped executions while the fairness of the Nebraska

capital punishment system was studied. 34 Despite the veto of the
bill,35 the Nebraska legislature appropriated money for the proposed
study.36 That study discovered that economic status of the victim,
rather than race of the accused, determined the likelihood of a defen37
dant receiving the death penalty.

In January 2000, former Illinois Governor George Ryan declared a
moratorium on executions after the number of death row exonerations exceeded the number of executions. 38 As of April 2004, seventeen 3 9 individuals have been exonerated and twelve have been
executed since the 1997 reinstatement of the death penalty in Illi33. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, O'Connor Questions Fairnessof Death Penalty;Justice Rethinking Laws She Shaped, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 4, 2001, at N1.

34. America's Nebraska Puts a Stay on Executions, BBC Online Network (May 21, 1999), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/349171.stm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
35. American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Nebraska Says Study Still Needed Despite Governor's Veto of Death Penalty Moratorium (May 26, 1999), at http://www.aclu.org/DeathPenalty/
DeathPenalty.cfm?ID=8551&c=67 (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
36. See Liebman et al., supra note 31, at 1841.
37. John Fulwider, Study Says Money, Not Race, Makes a Difference in Death Penalty Cases,
NEB. STATE PAPER (Aug. 2, 2001), at http://nebraska.statepaper.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2001/
08/02/3b6709bd55784?inarchive=1 (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). The study found that it was almost twice as difficult to avoid the death penalty when the victim was from an urban county.
The history and mission statement of the Governor's Crime Control Commission is available at
http://www.nol.org/home/crimecom (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
38. See Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Commission To
Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000) at http://www.state.il.us/govlpress/00/Jan/
morat.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium].
39. At the time Governor Ryan declared the moratorium, there had been thirteen exonerations. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Justices Challenge Old Death Penalties; 2 Jurists Say
They Should Be Voided, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 4119625. The "original"
thirteen death row exonerees are: Joseph Burrows, Perry Cobb, Rolando Cruz, Gary Gauger,
Alejandro Hernandez, Venereal Jimerson, Ronald Jones, Carl Lawson, Steven Manning,
Anthony Porter, Steven Smith, Darby Tillis, and Dennis Williams. See Illinois Death Penalty
Exonerations, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/deptslclinic/wrongful/exonerations/lllinois.
htm (last visited, Apr. 2, 2004). The number seventeen takes into account the four pardons
Governor Ryan issued on January 10, 2003. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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nois. 4 0 The risk of executing an innocent person was the most significant factor behind Governor Ryan's decision. 41 After declaring the
moratorium, Governor Ryan assembled a "blue ribbon" group to examine the Illinois death penalty and to make recommendations to reduce the high rates of error.4 2 The commission proposed eighty-five
reforms in April 2002. 43 Illinois continued to be a cynosure of the
national death penalty debate after public clemency hearings were
held.

44

On January 10, 2003, Governor Ryan granted full pardons to former
death row inmates Madison Hobley, Stanley Howard, Aaron Patterson, and LeRoy Orange. 45 In discussing the cases of each of these
exonerees, Governor Ryan detailed the police brutality that led to co-

erced confessions. 46 For Governor Ryan, each of these cases represented a "manifest injustice" 47 and each pardon represented an
"extraordinary action to correct manifest wrongs."' 48 On January 11,
2003, Governor Ryan concluded that "the Illinois capital punishment
system is broken" and commuted the death sentences of all inmates
40. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium, supra note 38 (quoting Governor Ryan
stating: "I now favor a moratorium, because I have grave concerns about our state's shameful
record of convicting innocent people and putting them on death row"); Dolores Kennedy, Illinois Moratorium on Executions Commands World's Attention, at http://wwwjusticedenied.org/
illinois.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). As Governor Ryan said:
We have now freed more people than we have put to death under our system-13
people have been exonerated and 12 have been put to death. There is a flaw in the
system, without question, and it needs to be studied .... I will not approve any more
executions in this state until I have the opportunity to review the recommendations of
the commission that I will establish.
Id.
42. See Executive Orderas Issued by Former Governor George Ryan Creatingthe Commission
on Capital Punishment, at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/executiveorder.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2004).
43. The Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment is available at http://
www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2004). The study has been described as a "road map of how to approach the problems of the death penalty." Henry Weinstein, Illinois Panel Proposes Broad Reforms in Capital Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002,
at A14.
44. Eric Slater, In Illinois, Sweeping Review of Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at
Al; Lois Romano, On Trial in Illinois: The Death Penalty, WASH. POST., Oct. 16, 2002, at Al.
45. Oliver Burkeman, Illinois Pardons Four on Death Row: Governor "Plans To Commute
Most Sentences," GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 11, 2003, at 16.
46. Governor George Ryan, Speech at DePaul University College of Law 12 (Jan. 10, 2003)
(on file with DePaul Law Review). Governor Ryan discussed how each of these men were
beaten and forced to confess to Chicago Police officers working under the command of former
Lieutenant John Burge. Id. at 5-10.
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 17.
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on death row to life without parole. 49 Governor Ryan reiterated the
unreliability and arbitrary nature of the Illinois capital punishment

system and also its propensity for wrongful convictions.5 0 Governor
Ryan's decisions are unparalleled in scope. 5 1
In May 2002, former Maryland Governor Parris Glendening ordered a moratorium on executions in Maryland and ordered a study of

his state's capital punishment system to determine whether Maryland's death penalty was racially discriminatory.5 2 Wrongful convictions were not the primary motivating factors behind the
moratorium,5 3 despite knowledge of a wrongful capital conviction in
Maryland.5 4 The study found that race and geography affected capital
punishment in Maryland. 55 The study found that sixty-seven percent
of Maryland's death row is black, even though twenty-eight percent of
Maryland's total population is black. 56 The study also found that one
49. Governor George Ryan, Speech at Northwestern University College of Law (Jan. 11,
2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com12003101/11/national/l1CND-RTEX.html?pagewanted=print&position=top (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Northwestern Speech].
50. Id.
51. See Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation
To Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REv. 311, 347-48 (1996) (noting that
"twenty to twenty-five percent of death penalties were commuted" during the early- and mid1940s but that "[i]n the last quarter century, there has been a dramatic decline in death penalty
commutations-so much so that some say the clemency power is now defunct"). Other governors have commuted the sentences of all the death row inmates on their states' death row. In
1970, Winthrop Rockefeller, Governor of Arkansas, commuted the death sentences of fifteen
inmates, who comprised Arkansas's entire death row. An Open Letter to Governor Ryan 2 (Dec.
30, 2002), available at http:/www.law.northwestern.eduldepts/clinic/wrongfulldocuments/LawProfLetl.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). In 1986, Tony Anaya, Governor of New Mexico, did the
same, sparing the lives of five men, as did Robert Holmes, Governor of Oregon. Id. Lee Cruce,
Governor of Oklahoma, commuted twenty-two death sentences from 1911-1915. Id. In 1991,
Ohio Governor Richard Celeste commuted the death sentences of four men and four women on
Ohio's death row. Id.: see also Alyse Bertenthal et al., Clemency Petitions Show Deep Flaws in
Death Penalty, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at 23.

52. See Richard Willing, Md. Governor Halts Executions, USA TODAY, May 9, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 4725723; Maryland's Governor Issues Death Penalty Moratorium (May 14, 2002),
available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/05/09/maryland.death.penalty (last visited Apr. 3,
2004); Francis X. Clines, Death Penalty Is Suspended in Maryland, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at
A20.
53. Lori Montgomery, Maryland Suspends Death Penalty, WASH. POST, May 10, 2002, at Al.
54. Kirk Bloodsworth was convicted of capital murder and spent nine years in prison but was
exonerated in 1993 oi. the strength of DNA evidence. See Sullivan, supra note 31, at 34-35.
55. The study was released on January 7, 2003. The executive summary of the study is available at http://www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/exec.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) and the
complete study is available at http://www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/finalrep.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). See also Susan Levine & Lori Montgomery, Large Racial DisparityFound in
Study of Maryland Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2003, at Al.
56. Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), Maryland Study Finds That Race and Geography Play Key Roles in Death Penalty (Jan. 7, 2003), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/PRDPICMarylandStudy.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
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hundred percent of the victims of death row inmates were white. 57

Governor Robert Ehrlich, who succeeded Governor Glendening,
lifted the moratorium when he took office in January 2003.58
Many death penalty states have contemplated and continue to consider major reform efforts. 59 In 2001, eighteen states had pending
moratorium legislation. 60 In 2003, bills to abolish the death penalty
were introduced in fourteen state legislatures. 6t Both houses of the
Texas State Legislature approved a two-year moratorium, but the
measure ultimately failed. 62 In addition to the above mentioned stateinitiated studies, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, New
Jersey, Nevada, and Virginia have commissioned studies to examine
aspects of their death penalties. 63 In Indiana, former Governor Frank

O'Bannon requested that existing safeguards be scrutinized to ensure
that they protect against wrongful convictions. 64 Other reform efforts
included bills signed in Arizona, Connecticut, Missouri, North Carolina, and Tennessee that called for excluding mentally retarded individuals from the death penalty. 65 Similar bills were passed in the
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas Legislatures, but were vetoed
by those states' governors. 66 Currently, more than thirty-five states
provide some type of postconviction DNA testing. 67 New Hamp57. Id. at 2.
58. Stephen Manning, Maryland Court Puts Off Execution, CH. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2003, at 13N.
59. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 43-48 (2002). See generally the homepage of
the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, available at http://www.ncadp.org/legislativeaction.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) (providing updated links to state legislation involving
capital punishment reform).
60. See Legislative Update for 2001, at http://www.quixote.org/ej/archives/updates/legislativeupdate_2001.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
61. See United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 86 (D. Mass. 2003).
62. Marego Athans, Death Penalty's Foes Lie Low: Protesters Take Quiet Approach, BALT.
SUN, June 12, 2001, at 1A.
63. DPIC, Changes in Death Penalty Laws Around the U.S., 2000-2003, at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=236&scid=40 (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). For other resources providing
updated information on death penalty related legislation, see The Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project of the American Bar Association, at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium
(last visited Jan. 15, 2004); Criminal Justice Reform Education Fund, State Legislation Database,
available at http://justice.policy.net/cjreform/stateleg (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
Criminal Justice Reform Education Fund].
64. A.B.A., TOWARD A GREATER AWARENESS: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CALL
FOR A MORATORIUM ON EXECUTIONS GAINS GROUND:

A SUMMARY OF MORATORIUM RESO-

LUTION IMPACTS FROM JANUARY 2000 THROUGH JULY 2001 4 (2001), available at http://www.

abanet.org/irr/finalreport.doc (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
65. See generally Criminal Justice Reform Education Fund, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. See Nina Morrison, Innocence Project, Memorandum, at http://innocenceproject.org/docs/

IP LegislationMemorandum.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2004). However, all fifty states require
the collection of DNA samples from specific classes of criminals and the maintenance of DNA
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shire's state legislature voted to abolish the death penalty but Gover68
nor.Jeanne Shaheen vetoed the bill.
2.

Scrutiny at the Federal Level

Critical examination of capital punishment is not only a matter for
the states. After consideration, Attorney General Janet Reno rejected a federal death penalty moratorium in 2000.69 Bills that address concerns similar to those taken up by state legislatures, such as
moratorium bills, have been proposed in the United States House of
71
Representatives 70 and Senate.

Senator Patrick Leahy proposed the Innocence Protection Act
(IPA), 72 spurred by the recognition that "there are death penalty
problems across the nation, and as a nation we need to pay attention
to what is happening.

' 73

The language of the IPA explicitly states that

executing an innocent person and denying capital inmates access to
exculpatory scientific evidence present grave moral and constitutional

issues. 74 Central reforms of the IPA include minimum standards for
databases. See also Jean Coleman Blackerby, Life After Death Row: Preventing Wrongful Capital Convictions and Restoring Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179, 1211-12
(2003).
68. Rachel M. Collins, N.H. Death Penalty Repeal Fails,BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2001, at B2.
69. That rejection was based on several grounds:
(1) defendants in federal capital cases are competently represented ...(2) there is no
issue of federal capital convicts being innocent of the crimes for which they have been
sentenced to death, (3) the evidence and the law have justified the decisions in all cases
to seek capital punishment, and (4) the study's findings did not show bias-as opposed
to disparities which could result from non-invidious factors-in federal capital cases.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM:

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA,

ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW AT Part (1iB) (2001), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2004) [hereinafter 2001 DEP'T OF JUSTICE STUDY].

70. See Accuracy in Judicial Administration Act of 2001, H.R. 321, 107th Cong. (2001); National Moratorium Act of 2001, H.R. 1038, 107th Cong. (2001).
71. See also National Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2001, S. 233, 107th Cong. (2001);
Federal Death Penalty Abolition Act of 2001, S. 191, 107th Cong. (2001). Commenting on the
proposed National Death Penalty Moratorium Act, Senator Russell Feingold urged, "[L]et us
pause to be certain we do not kill a single innocent person. This is not too much to ask of a
civilized society." A.B.A., supra note 64, at 13.
72. Innocence Protection Act (IPA) of 2001, S.486, 107th Cong. (2001). General information
regarding the IPA, including its history, remarks by its sponsors in the House and Senate, testimony and letters of support, and the text of the IPA and the current status of the bills is available
at http://justice.policy.net/cjreform/ipa (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
73. Senator Patrick Leahy, The Innocence Protection Act of 2001, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113
(2001).
74. "It shocks the conscience and offends social standards of fairness and decency to execute
innocent persons or to deny inmates the opportunity to present persuasive evidence of their
innocence." IPA § 104(a)(14) (quoted in Leahy, supra note 73, at 1126). Executing an innocent
person is an "irremediable constitutional harm." Id. § 104(a)(16).
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court-appointed defense counsel, increasing the availability of DNA

testing, and preventing states from prohibiting capital inmates' access

to DNA testing if such testing could lead to exculpatory evidence. 75
Congressman William Delahunt introduced the House companion bill

to the IPA. 76 The House of Representatives passed the Innocence

Protection Act, which was included in a bill entitled the "Advancing
Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003," ' 77 on November 5,
2003.78

In September 2000, the United States Department of Justice released a study of the federal death penalty. 79 In addition to finding
geographical disparities, the study revealed that U.S. Attorneys rec-

ommend the death penalty more often for minority defendants. 80 To
explain the causes of the disproportionate amount of minorities in
federal capital cases, former Attorney General Reno ordered a supplemental study. 81 That study, which was released on June 6, 2001,
acknowledged racial disparities 8 2 but found no racial or ethnic bias. 83
Despite that conclusion, the study proposed several changes "to pro-

mote public confidence in the process's fairness and to improve its
efficiency. 84
75. See Leahy, supra note 73, at 1115.
76. Innocence Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill closely tracks
the language and purpose of the Senate bill.
77. H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (2003).
78. See The Innocence Protection Act in the 108th Congress, available at http://justice.policy.
net/cjreform/ipa (last visited at Jan. 16, 2004). For a section-by-section summary of the IPA, see
http://justice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=35262&PROACTIVE-1D=cecfc7d
ccc6ccc6cbc5cecfcfcfc5cececcc8c9cdcec6c9c5cf (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
79. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL STUDY,

1988-2000 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html (last visited Jan.
5, 2004) [hereinafter 2000 DEP'T OF JUSTICE STUDY].
80. Id. at 6. Of the fifty-two individuals the government sought the death penalty against
from 1988 to 1994, 75% (thirty-nine) were African-American and 10% (five) were Hispanic.
During this period, seven, or 13%, of the federal capital defendants were white. Of the 682
individuals the government sought the death penalty against from 1995 to 2000, 48% (324) were
African-American and 29% (195) were Hispanic. During this period, 134, or 20% of the total
federal capital defendants were white.
81. See 2001 DEP'T OF JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 69.
82. The report acknowledged that "the proportion of minority defendants in federal capital
cases exceeds the proportion of minority individuals in the general population." Id.
83. The study attributes the disproportion to the increased prosecution of crimes where minority groups are represented in greater proportions, such as drug trafficking and related criminal and gang violence. Id.
84. These changes include: requiring U.S. attorneys to fill out more forms even in potential
capital cases where the U.S. attorney does not recommend seeking the federal death penalty;
these forms will contain more detailed information regarding the race, gender, and ethnicity of
the defendant; and providing an expedited process that gives the Attorney General more discretion and removes defense counsel participation in the review process if the U.S. Attorney does
not recommend seeking the death penalty. Id.
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Public Scrutiny of Capital Punishment

The majority of the American public still supports the death penalty; however, at sixty-four percent, public support for the death penalty is at a twenty-year low. 8 5 The decline in public support coincides
with the willingness of states to take affirmative steps to examine their
death penalties.8 6 Forty-five percent of Americans support life with87
out the possibility of parole as an alternative to the death penalty.
Eighty-two percent of Americans oppose the death penalty for the
mentally retarded and seventy-three percent oppose the death penalty
for the mentally ill.88 Sixty-nine percent of Americans oppose the
death penalty for juveniles. 89 The conduct of juries is another indicator of public opinion. As of August 14, 2003, juries in federal capital
cases had rejected the death penalty in twenty out of twenty-one
cases. 90
B.

Evidence of Error: Wrongful Capital Convictions

Wrongful capital convictions are a significant cause of the nationwide reevaluation of capital punishment. 9 1 Since 1973, one hundred
85. Polls conducted by Gallup and Pew Research Center both find support for the death penalty at 64%. A Fox News poll finds support at 69%. See DPIC, NationalPolls: Public Support
for Death Penalty Drops to 25 Year Low, at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php
?scid=23&did=210#gallup200310 (last visited Jan. 16, 2004). See also Harris Poll #41 (Aug. 2,
2000), at http://www.harrisinteractive.comlharris-poll/index.asp?PID=101 (last visited Jan. 5,
2004). See also Liebman, supra note 31, at 1839-40.
86. As 100th Person Freed from Death Row, Amnesty InternationalCalls On State Governors
To Halt All Executions, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4576170 (noting that
there is "a growing nationwide trend that shows US states scrutinizing the application of the
death sentence while US voters' support for the death penalty is holding at a 20-year low");
Death Penalty Roulette: Serious Flaws Demand State Scrutiny, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 12666999 (arguing that the numerous flaws in the Florida capital punishment system that lead to many death row exonerations call for a moratorium, review, and
reforms).
87. See DPIC, National Poll: Public Opinion Split on Preferred Punishment, at http://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=210#ABCNewsWashPost2403 (last visited Jan.
16, 2004).
88. See DPIC, National Poll: Gallup Poll Probes National Opinion on the Death Penalty, at
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=210#ABCNewsWashPostl2403
(last visited, Jan. 16, 2004).
89. Id.
90. See Capital Defense Network, Recent Developments, at http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/
contents/recentdev/recent-developments.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
91. See Athans, supra note 62 (Even though popular support for the death penalty is still
high, "the death penalty is under increasing scrutiny, especially because of the chance that innocent people might be put to death."); Berman, supra note 28, at 11 (observing that the "political
climate surrounding the death penalty has shifted dramatically over the past few years as a result
of greater public awareness of the problems plaguing the administration of capital punishment,
particularly the problem of wrongful convictions"). The risk of executing the innocent has led
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thirteen innocent individuals have been exonerated from death rows
in twenty-five states. 92 Wrongful convictions and the "risk of executing an innocent person pose[ ] a serious, perhaps unanswerable challenge to retributive justifications for capital punishment. ' 93 Justice
William Brennan considered wrongful convictions to be the "bleakest
fact" of all of capital punishment's flaws. 94 In addition to the incredible trauma the wrongfully convicted individual suffers, 95 wrongful
96
convictions exert tremendous strains on the victims' families.
Wrongful capital convictions also mean that the true murderer es-

traditional death penalty supporters to question the reliability of the death penalty. See
Kirchmeier, supra note 59, at 42 (observing that concerns about executing the innocent and
recent advances in DNA technology "have been the keystone of the rising conservative support
for a moratorium on executions"); Restoring Confidence in the CriminalJustice System, 86 JUDICATURE 64 (2002) ("Convictions of innocent persons have damaged... trust and confidence [in
the justice system], and a response is necessary to repair and rebuild them."); Liebman, What's
DNA Got To Do with It?, supra note 28, at 547 (DNA exposes our systems as "flawed, unreliable, and untrustworthy" and "most powerfully motivates our national doubts about the current
application of the death penalty.").
92. DPIC, Innocence and the Death Penalty: Exonerations by State, at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.phpdid=412&scid+6#state (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) (The number
of exonerations as of April 3, 2004 per state were as follows: Florida, 23; Illinois, 17; Oklahoma,
7; Texas, 7; Georgia, 6; Arizona, 6; Louisiana, 6; Pennsylvania, 5; New Mexico, 4; Ohio, 4; Alabama, 3; California, 3; Missouri, 3; North Carolina, 4; South Carolina, 3; Indiana, 2, Massachusetts, 2; Idaho, 1; Kentucky, 1; Maryland, 1; Mississippi, 1; Nebraska, 1; Nevada, 1; Washington,
1; and Virginia, 1).
93. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF.L. REV. 469, 471 (1996). In his article, Professor Gross suggested that erroneous convictions occur more often because of "factors that are common or inevitable in capital
prosecutions, but that occur in other cases as well ... [and] [b]ecause of consequences that flow
from the demand for the death penalty itself." Id. at 475. See also Alan W. Clarke et al., Executing the Innocent: The Next Step in the Marshall Hypotheses, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
309, 323-24 (2000).
94. William J. Brennan, Jr., Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 4 (1994).
95. The 113 individuals exonerated from death row spent an average of nine years in prison.
See DPIC, Innocence: Freed from Death Row, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php
?scid=6&did=110 (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). James Richardson spent twenty-one years in a Florida prison, falsely convicted of killing one of his children, before being exonerated. DPIC,Cases
of Innocence: 1973-Present, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=109
(last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
96. DPIC, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1975, A Summary of the Columbia University Study by Prof. James S. Liebman, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.
php?scid=19&did=256 (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
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capes prosecution. 97 Wrongful convictions occur more frequently in
98
capital as opposed to noncapital cases.

The increasing number of wrongful convictions and subsequent
death row exonerations 99 challenge the public's confidence in the
death penalty's reliability and fairness. 1°° Wrongful capital convic-

tions and the attendant risk of executing an innocent person have
drawn the attention of several Supreme Court Justices. Justice
O'Connor conceded the somber fact that "if statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be
executed." 10 1 Justice John Paul Stevens also recognized the problems

of wrongful convictions: "[R]ecent development of reliable scientific
evidentiary methods has made it possible to establish conclusively that
a disturbing number of persons who had been sentenced to death
were actually innocent. ' 10 2 Influenced by the pervasive role ineffec-

tive assistance of counsel plays in leading to wrongful convictions, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg publicly supported the Maryland death
10 3
penalty moratorium.
Several recent studies conducted by a team led by Professor James

Liebman support the revelations of capital punishment's fallibility.
Professor Liebman's studies, A Broken System: ErrorRates in Capital
97. See Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, § 4, at 16; Ian Ith & Ken Armstrong, Seattle Police Are Considering Videotaping All Interrogations; Photo Lineups Already
Changed To Reduce Risk of Mistakes, SEAT[LE TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at Al; Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Police, ProsecutorsCling to Original Theories, Seldom Pursue New Leads, Suspects,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66438055.
98. See Gross, supra note 93, at 474-97.
99. Over the past decade, the average number of exonerations per year (five), is nearly double
that of the previous twenty years (2.75). See DPIC, supra note 92.
100. See Clarke et al., supra note 93, at 337 (concluding that "dissemination of information on
the innocence issue reduces support for the death penalty" at a greater rate than promulgation
of the death penalty's failure to deter crime achieves). See also Gross, supra note 93, at 470 (The
"optimistic view" that the capital punishment system was reliable and that wrongful convictions
never occurred "has become increasingly implausible.").
101. Associated Press, O'Connor Questions Death Penalty (July 3, 2001), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/07/03/supremecourt/main299592.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). Justice
O'Connor made this observation in a speech to the Minnesota Women Lawyers Association. See
also Armstrong & Mills, supra note 33. Significantly, Justice O'Connor acknowledges that innocent persons have not only been convicted, but that the system has so entirely failed them that
they have indeed been executed. Id.
102. Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrera
v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 490 n.13 (quoting Justice Stevens Criticizes Election of Judges,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at A14).

103. Recognizing that competent counsel could mean the difference between life and death,
Justice Ginsburg said, "I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme
Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was well-represented at
trial ....
People who are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty." AP, Death
Penalty Moratorium Backed, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3012470.
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Cases, 1973-1995,104 and A Broken System Part II: Why There is So
Much Errorin Capital Cases and What Can be Done About It, 10 5 have
changed the tenor of the death penalty debate by exposing the lack of
reliability in capital punishment as a whole and the "resulting risk that
people have been, and will continue to be, executed for crimes they
did not commit or ones for which the law does not allow the death
106
penalty.,

Professor Liebman and a team of researchers completed a major
statistical study of modern American capital appeals in A Broken System. 107 Research began in 1991 at the request of Senator Joseph F.
Biden, then Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 0 8 The researchers examined over 4,578 of the 5,760 death sentences imposed
in the United States from 1973 through 1995.10 9 Overall, between
1973 and 1995, sixty-eight percent of all death sentences were overturned due to serious, reversible error. 110 Of this sixty-eight percent,
courts found that the defendants deserved a sentence less than death

in eighty-two percent of the cases."' Seven percent of the individuals
whose death sentences were reversed due to serious error were held

to be actually innocent of the crimes for which they were sentenced to
death.11 2 These high rates of reversal due to serious error are not endemic to a specific jurisdiction; rather, high error rates are prevalent
104. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: ErrorRates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (June
12, 2000), at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman (last visited Jan. 19,
2004).
105. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System Part H: Why There Is So Much Error in
Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About It (Feb. 11, 2002), at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
brokensystem2/index2.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
106. Id. at 10.
107. A Broken System was not the first comprehensive study of the death penalty system. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). At issue in McCleskey was the significance of the
"Baldus Study," which was "actually two sophisticated statistical studies that examine[d] over
2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970's." Id. at 286. The study concluded
"that black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of
receiving the death penalty." Id. at 287. The Court rejected this argument and held the Baldus
Study only showed a "discrepancy" and thus "[did] not demonstrate a constitutionally significant
risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process." Id. at 313. Unlike the
Baldus Study, which only concentrated on a single significant aspect in examining the fairness of
the Georgia capital sentencing process, A Broken System examined the overall reliability of capital punishment systems on a national scale.
108. Liebman et al., supra note 105, at 24.
109. Liebman et al., supra note 31, at 1847.
110. Liebman et al., supra note 104, at 5. Liebman defines "serious error" as: error that
substantially undermines the reliability of the guilt finding or death sentence imposed at trial."
Liebman, supra note 31, at 1850.
111. Liebman et al., supra note 104, at ii.
112. Id.
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in every state that has a death penalty. 113 Due to the high rate of
error and the relatively few executions, 1 4 Professor Liebman ob-

served that the "death penalty system [is] collapsing under the weight
of its own mistakes"'1 5 and that courts "inevitably must fail to catch
11 6
and correct some amount of the error that has flooded the system."
A Broken System II identifies and analyzes the factors that contribute to the rates of error exposed in A Broken System. 117 A Broken
System II also discusses the ramifications that reversible error has on

the judicial system, the defendant, and the public. 8 Four factors contribute to eighty percent of the serious error at the postconviction
stage: 119 "egregiously incompetent lawyering"; 120 prosecutorial or po-

lice misconduct, including withholding exculpatory evidence;1 2 1 improper jury instructions; 122 and judge or juror bias.1 23 The four errors

at federal habeas are similar to those at the postconviction stage: improper jury instructions; 2 4 "egregiously ineffective assistance of counsel"; 125 prosecutorial or police misconduct, including withholding
113. See id. at 8. Ninety-two percent of all states that have death penalties have error rates of
at least 52%; 85% have error rates of at least 60%; and 61% have error rates of at least 70%. Id.
114. Only 313 of the 5,760 death sentences have resulted in executions. Id. at 4.
115. Leibman et al., supra note 104, at i.
116. Id. at 116 (emphasis omitted). Professor Liebman noted that the conclusions of A Broken
System were corroborated by a Department of Justice study. See id. at 15-16. This study examined the final dispositions of the 263 death sentences that were imposed in 1989. Id. By 1998,
the year of the study, 76% of the cases had been overturned. Id. Sixty-one percent of the cases
were still under review in 1998. Id. This study also found that four times as many capital defendants received clemency or had their sentences overturned than those executed between 1973 and
1999. Leibman et al., supra note 104, at 15-16.
117. See Leibman et al., supra note 105, at 423 ("The central object of this study is to discover
information of use in answering two questions. Why is there so much error in capital cases? Can
anything be done to solve the problem or at least to moderate the amount of serious error?")
(emphasis omitted).
118. Id. Reversible error,
nearly always undermines the reliability of the verdict that the defendant committed a
crime that was aggravated enough to warrant death as a punishment; often risks the
execution of people who are innocent of the crime or at least of the death penalty; and
always frustrates the demands and expectations of the public who adopted the death
penalty, the taxpayers who pay for it and the victims who directly rely on it.
Id.
119. Id. at 41.
120. See Leibman et al., supra note 105, at 41. (Incompetent lawyers contribute to 39% of
serious error.).
121. Id. (Prosecutorial or police misconduct contribute to 19% of serious error.).
122. Id. (Improper jury instructions contribute to 19% of serious error.).
123. Id. (Judge or juror bias contributes to 4% of serious error.).
124. Id. (Improper jury instructions contribute to 39% of serious error.).
125. Id. (Ineffective assistance of counsel contributes to 27% of serious error.).
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exculpatory evidence; 26 and judge or jury bias or striking African
Americans as prospective jurors. 127 A Broken System II also finds

that the more often a jurisdiction uses the death penalty, the higher
the rate of serious error in capital cases within that jurisdiction. 128 Error rates are especially high when cases with low levels of aggravation
are made capital cases in jurisdictions with low capital sentencing
29
thresholds.
A Broken System II also explores why reform efforts are inhib-

ited.130 The study suggests ten reform options'131 and warns against
approaches that would increase error rates. 132 The study observes

that high error rates will cause the public to be "increasingly aware
that, as currently imposed, the [death] penalty is a costly failure that
126. Liebman et al., supra note 105, at 41. (Prosecutorial or police misconduct contributes to
18% of serious error.).
127. Id. (Judge or jury bias or striking jurors based on race contributes to 7% of serious
error.).
128. Id. at 425.
129. See generally id. at 339-51. Low capital sentencing thresholds and low levels of aggravation combine to expose more individuals to capital punishment and lead to death penalties for
crimes that are not highly aggravated, or the "worst of the worst." Id. at 340 (emphasis omitted).
130. The study observes that the more threatened the politically influential members of the
community feel, the more susceptible to pressure judges will be, and the more common serious,
reversible errors will be. Id. at 354-56. Reducing high error rates would also require many
policymakers, who worked to enact capital sentencing statutes, to reverse their positions on the
death penalty. Leibman et al., supra note 105, at 426.
131. Id. at 427. See generally id. at 395-417. These ten "policy options" are:
[Rjequiring proof beyond any doubt that the defendant committed the capital crime;
requiring that aggravating factors substantially outweigh mitigating ones before a death
sentence may be imposed; barring the death penalty for defendants with inherently
extenuating conditions-mentally retarded persons, juveniles, severely mentally ill defendants; making life imprisonment without parole an alternative to the death penalty
and clearly informing juries of the option; abolishing judge overrides of jury verdicts
imposing life sentences; using comparative review of murder sentences to identify what
counts as 'the worst of the worst' in the state, and overturning outlying death verdicts;
basing charging decisions in potentially capital cases on full and informed deliberations;
making all police and prosecution evidence bearing on guilt vs. innocence, and on aggravation vs. mitigation available to the jury at trial; insulating capital-sentencing and
appellate judges from political pressure; and identifying, appointing and compensating
capital defense counsel in ways that attract an adequate number of well-qualified lawyers to do the work.
Id. at 427.
132. See id. at 427. See generally id. at 418-21. Steps that would increase serious error are:
[C]utting back further on the scope of review of capital verdicts, which would likely
increase the ill-effects of chronic error and invite more error; making piecemeal additions to the list of qualifying aggravating circumstances; shifting to the state the full
costs of local capital prosecutions; and, most importantly, doing nothing.
Liebman et al., supra note 105, at 427.

1794

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1777

does not serve the purposes for which it was established and risks tak133
ing the lives of innocent people."
C. A Brief Introduction to the Seminal Death Penalty Cases
The recent shift from support to critical examination of the fairness
and reliability of capital punishment systems and challenges to the
constitutionality of capital punishment has occurred despite the
United States Supreme Court's position that the death penalty is not
per se unconstitutional.
1.

The Death Penalty is Not Per Se Unconstitutional

In Furman v. Georgia134 the Court invalidated all the death penalty
statutes in the country in a brief per curiam opinion. 135 Through five
concurring opinions, the Court held that the death penalty violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it was "so wantonly
138
and so freakishly imposed" 13 6 and risked arbitrary1 37 and capricious
imposition of the death penalty. The Court invalidated the death penalty statutes because they lacked the effective procedural safeguards,
1 39
not because the death penalty was per se unconstitutional.
In Gregg v. Georgia1 40 the Court affirmed death penalty statutes
that provided adequate direction and guidelines, safeguarded against
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, and thus did not violate
the Eighth Amendment. 141 The Court emphasized that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional. 142 That conclusion was supported
1 43
by the apparent acceptance of the death penalty by the framers.
The Court balanced the penological interests against the severity of
133. Id. at 422.
134. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
135. Id. at 239-40. ("The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
136. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 276-77, 291-92 (Brennan, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
139. "I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se or that there is
no system of capital punishment that would comport with the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 310-11
(White, J., concurring); "Today the Court has not ruled that capital punishment is per se violative
of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
140. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
141. Id. at 206-07.
142. Id. at 169. See also id. at 187 ("We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of
the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision
to impose it.").
143. Id. at 177-78.
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the penalty to conclude that the death penalty comported with basic
concepts of human dignity. 144 Bifurcating, or dividing capital proceedings into guilt or innocence and sentencing phases provided discretion and guidance. 1 45 Requiring that the jury find at least one
statutory aggravating factor to exist narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants. 146 Mandatory expedited appellate review of all capital
cases provided additional safeguards against arbitrary, excessive, or
disproportionate sentences that were imposed on discriminatory
grounds. 147 Gregg thus delineated the procedures necessary for a constitutional capital punishment system. Similar adequate procedural
1 48
and Jurek v. Texas. 149 But
safeguards existed in Proffitt v. Florida
1 50
in
those procedures were absent in Woodson v. North Carolina,
which the Court invalidated North Carolina's death penalty statute
because it made the death penalty mandatory after a conviction of
capital murder. 151 That mandatory sentencing scheme failed to address the requirement that adequate procedures guide the sentencer's
discretion, and it prevented the sentencer from considering
152
mitigation.
2.

The Role of the Eighth Amendment

Furman and Gregg established the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment as the norm for challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty. Gregg instructs that the Eighth
Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' 153 When assessing contemporary values to determine if a sanction violates the
Eighth Amendment, the Court looks to "objective indicia that reflect
144. Id. at 182-88. The penological interests cited were deterrence of crime by future offenders and retribution.
145. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-93.
146. Id. at 196-97.
147. Id. at 198, 204-06.
148. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
149. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
150. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
151. The North Carolina capital sentencing scheme represented the path some states chose to
pursue post-Furman. Instead of limiting the sentencer's discretion, as in Gregg, the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme removed all discretion in enacting a mandatory death penalty
statute. Id. at 300.
152. The Court also invalidated Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute in Roberts v.
Louisiana, because it prevented the jury from considering mitigating factors. 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
153. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the public attitude toward a given sanction. 1 54 The Eighth Amendment also requires that the punishment "accord with the dignity of
1 55

man."
After Furman, thirty-five states enacted death penalty statutes that
attempted to adhere to the Court's holding. 156 According to Gregg,
this "legislative response"' 57 was an objective indication that the public accepted and desired the death penalty. 158 Gregg also held that the

conduct of juries was an objective indication that showed the death
1 59
penalty was not so offensive as to render it unconstitutional.
More recently, in Atkins v. Virginia,160 the Court held that executing a mentally retarded person violates the Eighth Amendment. In so
holding, the Court overturned Penry v. Lynaugh,16a which in 1989
stated: "[A]t present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital
offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.' 62 Atkins demonstrates how the meaning of
cruel and unusual punishment can change dramatically over a short

period of time 163 and that the Eighth Amendment must be reinter1 64
preted according to current standards of decency.
Soon after the Court decided Atkins, it refused to reconsider

whether executing juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. Stan154. Id. at 173.
155. Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 179-80.
157. Id. at 179.
158. "At the time of Furman,fifty-seven percent of Americans favored the death penalty. By
the time Gregg was decided, this number had risen to sixty-five percent." Christopher Q. Cutler,
Death Resurrected: The Reimplementation of the Federal Death Penalty, 23 SEATrLE U. L. REV.
1189, 1198 (2000).
159. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181-82. The Court cited the spike in death sentences given by juries
post-Furman. Id.
160. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
161. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
162. Id. at 335.
163. Sharp reversals in death penalty jurisprudence are not new. Neither is the Penry-Atkins
reversal the most extreme. In 1971, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty
in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reversed its position in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), and then reversed its position again in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
164. The Court considered legislative action as objective evidence that capital punishment for
the mentally retarded was excessive in light of prevailing standards of decency. At the time
Penry was decided, only Georgia and Maryland barred executions of the mentally retarded.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 334. The Court concluded that these two states, even when combined with the
fourteen states that had no death penalty statutes, did not amount to a national consensus
against the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. Noting that since Penry, a number of states
have consistently enacted legislation barring the execution of the mentally retarded, the Court
concluded that the sanction was contrary to evolving standards of decency. Atkins, 536 U.S. at
304-06.
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ford v. Kentucky 16 5 upheld the use of the death penalty for defendants
who were sixteen and seventeen at the time they committed capital
crimes. In refusing to grant either a writ of certiorari 166 or the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus 167 filed by Kevin Stanford, the Court declined to follow the example set by Atkins. Dissenting from the denial
of the petition, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer,
Ginsburg, and David Souter, argued that in light of the national consensus regarding the execution of juveniles, denying the petition was
inconsistent with Atkins. 68 The Court also refused to consider
whether it was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment for in69
mates to languish on death row for decades in Foster v. Florida.
Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer argued that the
twenty-seven years Charles Foster spent on death row in Florida was
"unusual by any standard" 170 and deserved consideration by the
Court. Thus, Atkins should not be interpreted as a signal of the
Court's greater willingness to apply the Eighth Amendment to a wide
17 1
range of capital cases.
3.

Ring v. Arizona: A Challenge Not Based on the Eighth
Amendment

Ring v. Arizona 172 shows that the Eighth Amendment is not the
exclusive means of challenging a death penalty statute. In Ring, the
Court held that Arizona's death penalty statute violated the Sixth and
165. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
166. Stanford v. Parker, 537 U.S. 831 (2002).
167. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
168. Twenty-eight states prevent the execution of juveniles, while thirty states prevent the
execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 968-69.
169. 537 U.S. 990 (2002).
170. Id. at 992.
171. But see Roper v. Simmons, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review a Missouri Supreme Court decision, State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d
397 (Mo. 2003), in which the court held that executing individuals who were under eighteen
years of age at the time the capital crime was committed violated the Eighth Amendment. The
Missouri Supreme Court expressly relied on Atkins:
Applying the approach taken in Atkins, this Court finds that, in the fourteen years since
Stanford was decided, a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders, as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states now bar such executions for juveniles, that twelve other states bar executions altogether, that no state has
lowered its age of execution below 18 since Stanford, that five states have legislatively
or by case law raised or established the minimum age at 18, and that the imposition of
the juvenile death penalty has become truly unusual over the last decade. Accordingly,
this Court finds the Supreme Court would today hold such executions are prohibited by
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 399-400 (footnote omitted).
172. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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Fourteenth Amendments. 73 The Arizona law that Ring invalidated
required at least one aggravating factor to be found before the death
penalty could be imposed. 174 The law allowed the judge, sitting alone,
to find that aggravating factor and thus trigger the death penalty. 175
Prior to a judge's finding of an aggravating factor, the maximum penalty the defendant could receive was life in prison. Following Apprendi v. New Jersey,1 76 the Court held that capital defendants "are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."1 77 The Court
looked to the effect of the fact at sentencing, rather than its form. 178
Because an aggravating factor raised the maximum penalty, it was the
functional equivalent of an element of the crime. Directing part of his
concurrence at Justice Breyer, Justice Antonin Scalia emphasized that
the Eighth Amendment was not relevant to the holding because the
Eighth Amendment does not mandate jury sentencing. 179 Justice
Scalia's concurrence underlines that it is possible to successfully challenge a death penalty statute without going through the Eighth
Amendment.
D.

The FDPA

1. A General Overview of the Statute
The federal death penalty has a long yet piecemeal legacy in American history. 180 The first federal execution occurred in 1790.181 As of
March 1, 2004, three hundred thirty-six men and four women have
been executed under federal jurisdiction. 182 The federal death penalty
173. In doing so, the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
174. Ring, 536 U.S. at 593.
175. Id. at 588.
176. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
177. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
178. Id. at 602. As Justice Scalia colorfully points out in his concurrence,
I believe that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing
factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
180. See John P. Cunnigham, Comment, Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations and Realities of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 942-45 (1998).
181. On June 25, 1790, Thomas Bird was hanged in Maine for murder. Id. DPIC, Federal
Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=147#statutes (last
visited Apr. 2, 2004).
182. Id. There have been thirty-four federal executions from 1927 to 1963. Cutler, supra note
158, at 1196. The last pre-FDPA execution occurred on March 15, 1963. Id. Victor Feguer was
hanged for kidnapping and murder. Id. There have been three executions under the FDPA.
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experienced significant reform in 1897 when the death penalty was
repealed for all federal offenses, save five, and imposing the death
I8 3
sentence became a discretionary, instead of a mandatory, decision.
After Furman, the federal government did not attempt to revive the
federal death penalty until 1988,184 when it enacted the Drug Kingpin
1 85
Act.
A direct product of the "war on drugs,"'1 86 the Drug Kingpin Act
created a death sentence for a homicide committed during a violation
of drug control or enforcement laws. 187 "Drug Kingpin" is a misleading title because anyone involved in a drug conspiracy who is convicted of a murder that resulted from drug activity is death-eligible,
not just "kingpins.' 88 In 1994, Congress enacted the FDPA as part of
an omnibus crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.189 Congress enacted the FDPA to increase the
number of federal capital crimes and to provide an expanded federal
system to impose the death penalty. 190 The FDPA expanded the
death penalty to sixty' 91 different crimes, 192 but this does not mean
that the FDPA created sixty crimes. 193 One way to consider the effect
the FDPA has on existing substantive criminal law is that it "merely
applies its procedural provisions to these crimes, making them death
Timothy McVeigh was executed on July 11, 2001; Juan Raul Garza was executed on June 19,
2001; Louis Jones, Jr., was executed on March 18, 2003. See DPIC, Federal Executions, 19272003, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=149 (last visited Jan. 17,
2004).
183. See Rory K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHio N.U. L. REV. 529
(2000).
184. Charles C. Boettcher, Testing the FederalDeath Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-98
(1994): United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998), 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1047
(1998). See id. at 1053-57 for background of the political environment during the drafting of the
Drug Kingpin Act and the FDPA.
185. Drug Kingpin Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
186. Cutler, supra note 158, at 1201.
187. See generally id. at 1201-08.
188. Boettcher, supra note 184, at 1054-55.
189. See generally id. at 1053-60 for background on the political atmosphere preceding and
during the enactment of the FDPA.
190. Cutler, supra note 158, at 1209.
191. These crimes can be divided into three categories: "(1) crimes involving risky activity
resulting in a homicide, such as the kidnapping or hostage-taking resulting in death; (2) crimes
involving direct homicide, such as the murder of governmental officials; and (3) non homicide
crimes like espionage and treason." Id. at 1210.
192. See DPIC, Federal Laws Providingfor the Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?scid=29&did=192 (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
193. The FDPA only created twenty crimes. Two of these crimes are written into
§ 3591(b)(1)-(2) and eighteen of them are interspersed throughout Chapter 18 of the United
States Code. Boettcher, supra note 184, at 1059.
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eligible. ' 194 For example, the FDPA transformed carjacking into a
capital crime by adding the death penalty as the maximum punish195
ment and not by changing the elements of carjacking.
The statutory scheme of the FDPA expands the scope of the federal
196
death penalty and provides the procedure for death penalty cases.
Before the Government may proceed with a capital case, several
threshold conditions must exist. The crime must be one described in
18 U.S.C. §§ 794,197 2381,198 or 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1), 199 or "any other
offense for which a sentence of death is provided. ' 200 Also, the requisite level of intent must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 1 If the
threshold requirements are met, the Government must provide the
20 2
defendant with notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.
Section 3593(b) sets forth the procedures for the trial. 20 3 That section requires a bifurcated proceeding, which means that the sentencing hearing is distinct from the guilt or innocence stage. 20 4 Section
3593 also provides procedures for the use of aggravating and mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. 20 5 At the sentencing hearing,
"information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor permitted or re194. Id.
195. See George Kannar, Federalizing Death, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 328 (1996).
196. "Prior to the enactment of the FDPA, the death penalty could not be imposed even
where it previously had been approved because Congress had not established procedures for its
imposition that were consistent with the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. The
FDPA filled this gap." United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1) (2000).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1)-(2).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D). The provision states:
(A) intentionally killed the victim; (B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that
resulted in the death of the victim; (C) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used
in connection with a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, and the
victim died as a direct result of the act; or (D) intentionally and specifically engaged in
an act of violence, knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other
than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in the act constituted
a reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a direct result of the act.
Id. These threshold requirements serve to narrow the class of death eligible defendants.
202. Notice to proceed as a capital case must be provided within "a reasonable time before
the trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000). This
notice must state that the circumstances of the crime justify a death sentence and that the government will seek the death sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(1). The notice must also provide the
aggravating factors that the government will prove at sentencing if the defendant is convicted.
18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(2)(A)-(D).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b).
205. Id.
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quired to be considered under Section 3592."206 The jury may

consider nonstatutory aggravating factors, as long as the Government
provides the defendant with notice of its intent to prove such factors. 20 7 To meet its burden, the Government must prove aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt 20 8 to a unanimous jury.2 0 9 If no
2 10
aggravating factor is found, the death penalty may not be imposed.

The defendant must prove mitigating factors by a preponderance of
the information. 21' Only one juror is required to find a mitigating factor in order to establish it.212 A relaxed evidentiary standard applies
to both parties at the sentencing hearing. 213 The sentencer must balance the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors before it
can impose a death sentence. 2 14 The sentencer must refrain from considering race, color, gender, religious beliefs, or national origin of the
215
defendant or of a victim during its sentencing deliberations.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). The defendant may present any information that is relevant to a
mitigating factor, but the government is limited to presenting aggravating factors as to which it
gave defendant notice. Id.
207. "The use of such nonstatutory factors is encouraged to tailor the prosecution to the facts
of the case." Cutler, supra note 158, at 1212.
208. Id.
209. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d).
210. Id.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
212. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1)-(8) lists mitigating factors that the defendant
can present to the sentencer to militate against a sentence of death. The list is by no means
exclusive, as the eighth enumerated factor is open-ended. The eighth factor enables the defendant to present "[o]ther factors in the defendant's background, record, or character or any other
circumstance of the offense that mitigate against imposition of the death sentence." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3592(a)(8) (2000).
213. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) states: "Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under
the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, or misleading the jury." In United States v. Jones, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted the impact of the relaxed evidentiary standard in these terms: "[Tihe defendant and
the government may introduce any relevant information during the sentencing hearing limited
by the caveat that such information be relevant, reliable, and its probative value must outweigh
the danger of unfair prejudice." United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 241 (5th Cit. 1998). The
evidentiary standard resembles the standard from FED. R. EVID. 403, except that Rule 403 provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by the
danger of unfair prejudice, whereas the FDPA does not include the "substantially" qualification.
214. The statute requires the sentencer to
consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death, or,
in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are
sufficient to justify a sentence of death.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(e)(3).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f). One provision that did not make it into the FDPA was the Racial
Justice Act. The Racial Justice Act did not garner enough legislative support to be written into
the language of the FDPA. The Racial Justice Act
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The FDPA in the Courts

Aside from Quinones and Fell, courts have ubiquitously affirmed
the constitutionality of the FDPA. What follows is a brief survey of
those decisions. In Jones v. United States2 16 the Supreme Court upheld a federal capital defendant's conviction and death sentence by
holding that a defendant in a federal death penalty case was not entitled to an instruction regarding the consequences of jury deadlock and
that the Eighth Amendment did not require the jury to be instructed
as to its failure to come to a unanimous decision. 2 17 Further, a plurality of the Court rejected the defendant's claims that certain nonstatu2 18
tory aggravating factors were vague, overbroad, and duplicative.
The scope of the Court's review was relatively narrow, but in affirming the death sentence, the Court implicitly upheld the constitu219
tionality of the statute.
Lower federal courts have considered challenges to the FDPA beyond the issues presented in Jones. Many challenges to the FDPA and
sentences imposed under it question the validity of nonstatutory and
statutory aggravating factors. Nonstatutory aggravating factors do not
would have required a statistical inquiry into the implementation of the death penalty,
focusing on any disparity in the number of members of a particular race who are executed compared to the race of all defendants. The amendment would have allowed an
inference of discrimination to be established by showing disparity, which would have
then shifted the burden to the government to show nonracial factors to explain the
disparities.
Cutler, supra note 158, at 1215-16.
216. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
217. Id. at 376, 381-82.
218. Id. at 395-402. The defendant claimed that two nonstatutory aggravating factors were
unconstitutionally duplicative. These factors were: "Tracie Joy McBride's young age, her slight
stature, her background, and her unfamiliarity with San Angelo, Texas" and "Tracie Joy McBride's personal characteristics and the effect of the instant offense on Tracie Joy McBride's
family." See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 250 (5th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court held
that the phrase "personal characteristics" from the latter nonstatutory aggravating factor does
not necessarily include those characteristics enumerated in the former nonstatutory aggravating
factor. Jones, 527 U.S. at 398-99. Any risk of a skewed weighing process was cured by the
district court's limiting instruction. Id. at 399-400. The Court held that the district court improperly concluded that the factors at issue were vague. Id. at 400. Applying a deferential standard,
the Court construed an understandable "core meaning" in the factors, which passed constitutional muster. Id. The nonstatutory aggravating factors were not overbroad because the specific
evidence that the government elicited to support them was unique to the case. Id. at 401-02.
219. Certiorari was granted on three questions:
[W]hether petitioner was entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock;
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was led to believe that petitioner
would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that
they could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation; and whether the submission to the jury of two allegedly duplicative, vague, and overbroad nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless error.
Id. at 375-76.
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violate the Ex Post Facto Clause 220 of the U.S. Constitution. 221 Courts
have denied challenges alleging that nonstatutory aggravating factors
violate the nondelegation doctrine. 222 Related to the nondelegation
issue, courts have concluded that nonstatutory aggravating factors do
not involve unbridled and unconstitutional exercises of prosecutorial
discretion. 223 Courts have generally upheld specific nonstatutory aggravating factors against arguments that they are unconstitutionally
vague, 224 but have also struck nonstatutory aggravating factors that
lack specificity or reliability. 225 Courts have also upheld specific statutory aggravating factors against challenges that they are unconstitutionally vague. 226 Claims of duplication or potential duplication of
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
221. United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v. Glover, 43 F.
Supp. 2d 1217, 1229-30 (D. Kan. 1999); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1486 (D. Colo. 1996); United States v.
Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1537-38 (D. Kan. 1996); United States v. Davis, No 01-282 SECTION "R"(1), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5745, at *43-45 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 2003).
222. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States..."); Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 266-67; Glover, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1229;
United States v. Cuff, 38 F. Supp. 2d 282, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Minerd, 176 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 430-31 (W.D. Pa. 2001); United States v. O'Driscoll, 203 F. Supp. 2d 334, 346
(M.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 98-102 (D. Mass. 2003).
223. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 100; Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
224. United States v. Kee, No S1 98 CR 778 (DLC), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8785 at *17
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2000) (nonstatutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness is not invalid
per se); O'Driscoll,203 F. Supp. 2d at 339, 345 (nonstatutory aggravating factors of victim impact
statements and "future dangerousness" are appropriate for the jury to consider); United States
v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670-71 (E.D. Va. 2002) (nonstatutory aggravating factor "[o]ther
offenses and threatened offenses" is not unconstitutionally overbroad); Sampson, 275 F. Supp.
2d at 108-09 (nonstatutory aggravating factor involving future dangerousness of the defendant is
not unconstitutionally vague).
225. Cuff, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (The government may not use the use of a firearm as a
nonstatutory aggravating factor because "[u]se of a firearm in connection with a homicide does
not meet that predicate for the simple reason that use of a firearm does not, in any rational
sense, make a homicide worse, whether one looks at it from the standpoint of the crime, the
victim, or the perpetrator."); United States v. Friend, 92 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Va. 2000) (The
district court struck a nonstatutory aggravating factor, which concerned a threat to kill a witness
that the incarcerated defendant allegedly made that was overheard by another inmate, because it
failed to meet relevance and heightened reliability requirements.); Glover, 43 F. Supp. 2d at
1224-27 (Nonstatutory aggravating factor that included the phrases "serious physical and emotional injury," "permanent harm to the family" of a victim, "substantial" as a modifier of "premeditation," and "lack of remorse," was not unconstitutionally vague, yet required further
specificity.); United States v. Gilbert. 120 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150-55 (D. Mass. 2000) (Using a threeprong standard, which requires nonstatutory aggravating factors to be reliable, relevant, and
more probative than prejudicial, the court examined each of the government's proposed "other
acts" and barred some on the grounds that they lacked reliability or the requisite gravity for a
capital case; the court allowed other acts. The court also determined that the government's future danger arguments were irrelevant and lacked sufficient gravity.).
226. Kee, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8785, at *16-17 (aggravating factor of substantial planning
and mediation is not unconstitutionally vague.); Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (Section
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aggravating factors and elements of the underlying crime have gener22 7
ally been denied.
Courts have consistently denied claims that the FDPA does not
comport with the Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence.
Courts have held that the FDPA does not unconstitutionally limit the
presentation of mitigating evidence. 228 Courts have also held that the
FDPA genuinely narrows the class of death-eligible capital defendants22 9 and that it does not violate the Indictment Clause 230 in light of
3592(c)(6) (2000), a factor that covers offenses committed in an "especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim" is not
vague.); accord Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1533-34; Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 277; United States v.
Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 354-57 (5th Cir. 1998); Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (concerning
§ 3592(c)(9), "the defendant committed the offense after substantial planning and premeditation
to cause the death of a person" is not vague.); accord Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 278; McVeigh, 944
F. Supp. at 1490; O'Driscoll, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 344-45; United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803,
819 (4th Cir. 2000) (language, "grave risk," the statutory aggravating factor from § 3592(c)(5), is
not unconstitutionally vague.); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 148 (N.D.N.Y,
2002) (Section 3592(c)(8) does not need to be interpreted in a manner "only to apply to murder
for hire or murder to gain an inheritance or life insurance proceeds"; the term "substantial" from
§ 3592(c)(9) is not unconstitutionally vague; the language "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved
manner" is not unconstitutionally vague when "cured by the limitation in the statute that the
offense involve torture or serious physical abuse."); Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 103-04 (Statutory aggravating factors involving the "heinous, cruel, or depraved manner" of the crime; "substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person"; and the age and
vulnerability of the victim are not unconstitutionally vague.).
227. Kee, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8785, at *35-36 (intent factors of § 3591(a)(2) do not present
prejudicial duplication); Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 440-41 (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231, 246 (1988), which establishes that narrowing of the death eligible class can occur at either
the guilt/innocence or penalty phase); Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 669-70 (statutory aggravating
factor under § 3591(c)(1), "[death] occurred during the commission of another crime," does not
duplicate elements of the underling kidnapping offense); United States v. Johnson, 136 F. Supp.
2d 553, 559 (W.D.Va. 2001); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 301 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). But see McVeigh, 944 F. Supp at 1489-90 (The government is prohibited from introducing
"those offenses as aggravating factors that duplicate the crimes charged in the indictment. To
allow the jury to weigh as an aggravating factor a crime already proved in a guilty verdict would
unfairly skew the weighing process in favor of death."); Glover, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-23 (The
government could not use as a statutory aggravating factor that the defendant "knowingly created a grave risk of death to more than one person" (§ 3592(c)(16)) and the statutory aggravating factor "the defendant attempted to kill more than one person." (§ 3592(c)(5)). The district
court also struck the government's first nonstatutory aggravating factor, which it found to be
impermissibly duplicative of the first two statutory aggravating factors dealing with mental
state.).
228. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 101-02; United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 355-56 (5th Cir.
1998) (noting that "the guillotine must be as color-blind as is the Constitution" and that precluding the consideration of "race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or
of any victim" as a mitigating factor (§ 3593(f)) does not invalidate the FDPA because, under the
Equal Protection Clause, race cannot be considered as a mitigating nor an aggravating factor).
229. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 95-97; Cuff, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 287; Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d at
437-38.
230. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.").
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Ring.2 3 1 The FDPA appellate review procedures have passed scrutiny.232 The FDPA is not so incomprehensible that it prevents jurors
from making reasoned sentencing decisions. 233 The weighing provision of § 3593(e) is not unconstitutional. 234 Challenges based on
claims of selective prosecution have failed. 235 Further, courts have
generally rejected defendants' attempts to force the Government to
disclose details of its decision-making processes.2 36 There is, however,
no consensus on the defendant's right to allocution under the
FDPA. 237 Courts have held that the relaxed evidentiary standard of
§ 3593(c) is consistent with the Supreme Court's position that a sentencing jury should receive as much evidence as possible in order to
make an individual sentencing determination. 238 Further, the lack of
231. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 103-04 (The FDPA does not violate the indictment clause by
allowing the government to give notice of the intent element rather than the grand jury charging
the intent element in an indictment.); Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (The FDPA is not unconstitutional because it does not "expressly state that the aggravating factors are elements of the
offense to be charged by the Grand Jury."); United States v. Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d 327, 338
(D. Mass. 2003) (Ring does not invalidate the FDPA; "it only requires that the grand jury perform its traditional function concerning facts that are now deemed to be elements, or the functional equivalent of elements, of offenses for which Congress has decided the death penalty can
be imposed.").
232. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 98-100; Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 270; Cuff, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 28586 (lack of mandatory appellate review is not unconstitutional); O'Driscoll, 203 F. Supp. 2d at
342-43 (A weighing statute can use nonstatutory aggravating factors without providing for
mandatory comparative proportionality review.); Glover, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1230-31 (no requirement for proportionality review); United States v. Hammer, 226 F.3d 229, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2000)
(FDPA does not require a mandatory appeal and it is within a court's discretion to grant or deny
a defendant's motion to dismiss an appeal.).
233. Kee, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8785, at *8; United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 444,
450 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
234. Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 436-37.
235. Id. at 443; United States v. Minerd, 182 F. Supp. 2d 459 (W.D. Pa. 2002); O'Driscoll.203
F. Supp. 2d at 341.
236. Kee, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8785, at *10-11, 12-13 (The court did, however, order an in
camera review of documents, which allegedly showed that the defendant did not personally commit the murder. The defendant claimed that these documents were not submitted to the Attorney General.); Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 283-84; Minerd, 182 F. Supp. 2d 459; United States v. Bass,
536 U.S. 862 (2002) (reversing Sixth Circuit decision (266 F. 3d 532 (6th Cir. 2001)) granting
discovery into the government's capital charging practices).
237. United States v. Gabrion, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1379, at *3-6 (W.D. Mi. Jan. 25, 2002)
(It is better practice to allow a capital defendant to allocate before a jury, without holding that a
capital defendant has a right to allocution. However, allocution is limited to pleas for mercy or
expressions of remorse and is not permitted for presenting disputed factual issues.).
238. See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2004); Jones, 132 F.3d at 241-42
(citing Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238-39; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204). United States v. Allen held that
the relaxed evidentiary standard worked to the defendant's favor and that the standard prevented the introduction of overly prejudicial evidence. United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 75960 (8th Cir. 2001), vacated by 536 U.S. 953 (2002).

1806

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1777

explicit standards governing the exclusion of evidence does not render
239
the FDPA unconstitutional.
E. Holding the FDPA Unconstitutional: United States v. Quinones
and United States v. Fell
In holding the FDPA unconstitutional, Quinones and Fell embody
the conflict created by the increased awareness of flaws in capital punishment systems and the Court's position that the death penalty is not
per se unconstitutional. This section summarizes Quinones and Fell.
1. United States v. Quinones
Alan Quinones and Diego B. Rodriguez are two alleged heroin
dealers who were accused of killing Edwin Santiago, a government
informant. 240 Quinones and Rodriguez are the only two of eight defendants who were charged under the FDPA. 241 Unlike their eight
codefendants, Quinones and Rodriguez did not plead guilty. 242 The
Government's case rested heavily on the testimony of several accomplices. 24 3 The local U.S. Attorney did not initially recommend seeking
the death penalty against Quinones and Rodriguez. However, Attorney General John Ashcroft "ordered the local prosecutors to seek the
24 4
death penalty against both defendants."
At a pretrial motions conference, Judge Jed S. Rakoff requested the
parties brief him on the issue of whether a "form of penalty that precludes forever rectification of errors that go to actual innocence [is] a
form of penalty that accords with the Constitution. '245 Judge Rakoff
asked the parties to consider the issue of wrongful capital convictions
in light of the "common knowledge" of the number of wrongful capital convictions and subsequent exonerations. 246 Judge Rakoff observed that this issue, once "a fairly remote hypothetical," was
"neither a hypothetical nor so remote. '2 47
239. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1212 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gabrion,
No. 1:99-CR-76, 2002, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1379, at *4-6 (W.D. Mi. Jan. 25, 2002).
240. See Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2002); Devlin Barrett, New York FederalCourt
Declares Death Penalty Unconstitutional,at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0701-07.
htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
241. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
242. Id.
243. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 260 n.14.
244. Brief for Appellant at 14, Quinones, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1403(L)), available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/OuinonesBrief.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2004).
245. See Quinones, 313 F.3d at 53.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 54.
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In a pretrial motion, the defendants argued that the FDPA is unconstitutional because, in light of the high number of wrongful convictions, it violates due process by terminating a person's ability to
establish his or her actual innocence. 248 Citing high rates of wrongful
convictions and the significant number of death row exonerations, the
defendants argued that capital punishment is prone to error.
a.

The Preliminary Order

On April 25, 2002, Judge Rakoff indicated that he would hold the
FDPA unconstitutional. 249 He emphasized that executing an innocent
person and thus eliminating that person's ability to establish his or her
innocence is unconstitutional.25 0 To support that conclusion, Judge
Rakoff cited Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Herrera v.
Collins:
I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution. Regardless of
the verbal formula employed-contrary to contemporary standards
of decency, shocking to the conscience, or offensive to a principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental-the execution of a legally and factually
25 1
innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.
Judge Rakoff acknowledged the dramatic changes in the general perception of the fairness and reliability of capital punishment.2 52 According to Judge Rakoff, Herrera's assumption that the high burdens
of proof, procedural protections, judicial review, postconviction remedies, and executive clemency make the execution of an innocent person unlikely was no longer tenable. 253 For the court, one of the most
important developments that undermined Herrera's assumption that
the system did not convict innocent people was DNA testing. 254 Since
Herrera,Judge Rakoff observed, twelve death row inmates, "some of
whom came within days of being executed," 255 were exonerated due
248. Judge Rakoff emphasized that his request for briefs was not an invitation for motions:
I want to stress again, I am not inviting any motion, and I am certainly not indicating
any view of the court as to any particular point of view or argument. I just simply raised
that because the court, like counsel, would benefit from being educated as to everything that is relevant to a death penalty case.
Id.
249. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21.
250. Id. at 416.
251. Id. at 416-17 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993)) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. Id. at 417.
253. Id.
254. Id.

255. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
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to DNA evidence that established their innocence. Judge Rakoff observed that DNA is not a panacea to the problem of wrongful convictions. 256 In the vast majority of cases, DNA testing is not available
because of the absence of testable biological material. 257 Still, Judge
Rakoff was so persuaded by the DNA exonerations that he asserted
there is an inevitable inference that "numerous innocent people have
been executed whose innocence might otherwise have been similarly
established, whether by newly-developed scientific techniques, newlydiscovered evidence, or simply renewed attention to their cases. ' 258
The Government contended that Herrera foreclosed the defendants' argument. Judge Rakoff rejected that claim.2 59 Because the defendants challenged the FDPA in a pretrial motion, they still carried
the presumption of innocence, unlike Leonel Herrera, who had been
convicted and had challenged his death sentence through a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. After distinguishing Herrera, Judge
Rakoff identified language from the majority opinion, which asserted
that while a stand-alone claim of actual innocence is not sufficient to
warrant habeas relief, the Court assumed arguendo "that in a capital
case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after
trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional. 2 60
That recognition of the value of a showing of actual innocence, albeit
a truly persuasive showing, combined with the language of Justice
O'Connor's crucial concurring opinion, diminished the persuasiveness
of the assertion that a stand alone-claim of actual innocence is not a
constitutional claim. 26 1 Thus, according to Judge Rakoff, Herreradid
not control because it was procedurally distinct and also because the
substantive assumption that innocent people were not convicted and
sentenced to death was no longer valid.2 62 Judge Rakoff concluded
that executing innocent persons without providing them the ability to
prove their innocence violates due process. 263 After concluding that
capital punishment systems have failed to distinguish the innocent
from the guilty, that the risk of executing innocents was too substantial, and that eliminating such persons' rights to prove their innocence
constituted a due process violation, Judge Rakoff offered the Govern256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 418.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Id. (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417).
Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
Id. at 420.
Id.
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ment an opportunity to address the court's views on this "matter of
264
such importance.
b.

The Final Order

The Government filed additional briefs to persuade Judge Rakoff
that the FDPA was not unconstitutional. 265 After considering those
arguments, Judge Rakoff rejected the Government's positions and,
consistent with his preliminary order, held that the FDPA unconstitutionally violated due process. Judge Rakoff observed that two conditions make it "fully foreseeable ' 266 that innocent people will be
executed. First, recent findings demonstrate that innocent people are
frequently sentenced to death. Second, evidence establishing the innocence of these wrongfully convicted persons does not emerge until
long after the convictions. 267 Judge Rakoff opined that due process is
not a static concept; instead, it "must be interpreted in light of evolving standards of fairness and ordered liberty. '2 68 Because a meaningful number of innocent people will be executed who would thus be
deprived of the opportunity to prove their innocence, the "implementation of the Federal Death Penalty Act not only deprives innocent
people of a significant opportunity to prove their innocence, and
thereby violates procedural due process, but also creates an undue
risk of executing innocent people, and thereby violates substantive
' 269
due process.
After clarifying the grounds of the decision, Judge Rakoff addressed the Government's arguments. The Government first argued
that the case was not ripe for adjudication because the defendants had
264. Id. at 420-21.
265. In its brief the Government argued:
(1) [T]he constitutionality of the death penalty was not ripe for adjudication prior to
trial because, should the jury fail to convict the defendants or decline to impose the
death penalty, no question of the FDPA's constitutionality would present itself; (2) the
Supreme Court's decision in Herrerav. Collins, which held that a claim of actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence is not a ground for federal habeas relief
absent an allegation of some constitutional error, foreclosed the District Court's proposed holding; and (3) the District Court's proposed determination that a substantial
number of innocent persons will be executed under the FDPA is wrong because (a) the
defendants adduced no evidence that innocent people have been, or are likely to be,
executed under the federal death penalty system, and (b) the advent of DNA testing
has significantly reduced the risk of erroneous convictions in the future.
Quinones, 313 F.3d at 54-55 (internal citation omitted).
266. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
267. Id. at 257.
268. Id. at 260. To support this view of the Due Process Clause, Judge Rakoff cited Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992) and Rochin v. California,342 U.S. 165, 171-72
(1952).
269. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
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not been sentenced, much less convicted of a capital crime. 270 Judge

Rakoff found the case ripe for review based on the consequences that
a capital charge creates. 271 One significant consequence is that the
Government has greater latitude to "shape the jury to its preference
than would otherwise be the case" because jurors in capital cases must
be death qualified. 2 72 According to Judge Rakoff, any postponement
'273
would cause "material prejudice to the defendants.

In its second point, the Government argued that due process was
not violated because the framers, Congress, and the Supreme Court

"all accepted the constitutionality of administering capital punishment
despite the inherent fallibility of the judicial system. '27 4 Judge Rakoff
countered that the plain language of the Due Process Clause 27 5 only

indicated that the framers intended to extend the guarantee of due
process to all proceedings, not that they endorsed a specific depriva-

tion, such as the death penalty. 276 Further, there is no indication that
the framers accepted the execution of a meaningful number of inno27
cent people.

7

Judge Rakoff wrote that Congress did not consider the risk of sentencing innocents to death when it enacted the FDPA in 1994, contrary to the Government's contention. 278 In any event, Judge Rakoff
opined, even if Congress believed that the value of deterrence outweighed the interests of innocent people wrongfully convicted and executed, such an act is beyond Congress's power. 279 An innocent
person has a substantial liberty interest in avoiding conviction and ex-

ecution and that liberty interest includes the "right of an innocent person not to be deprived, by execution, of the opportunity to
270. Id. at 257.
271. Id. at 258.
272. Id. The composition of the jury in a capital case is fundamentally different from that of a
jury in a noncapital case. Potential jurors who are opposed to the death penalty or hold views
that would substantially impair imposing a death sentence may be excused for cause. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The Government can afford to strike potential jurors that
express even the slightest reservation about the death penalty because it is guaranteed at least
twenty peremptory challenges. In noncapital cases, the government only has six peremptory
challenges. The pending death penalty ensures that people who would be qualified to sit on a
noncapital jury would not be impaneled on a capital jury.
273. Id. at 259.
274. Id.
275. No person "shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

276.
277.
278.
279.

Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
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demonstrate his innocence. 2 80 Absent a compelling governmental in281
terest, Judge Rakoff wrote, Congress cannot violate that interest.
Judge Rakoff then turned to the Government's contention that Herrera is "fatal to defendants' motion. ' 2 2 Consistent with the preliminary order, Judge Rakoff interpreted the core holding of Herrera to
assert "a belated or successive habeas petitioner must make a persuasive showing of actual innocence to warrant habeas relief. ' 283 The
high threshold for this showing does not apply to a pretrial motion
because the interest of finality is absent. 28 4 Further, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's assertion that "a truly persuasive demonstration
of actual innocence made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional" was supported by the concurring opinions
of Justice O'Connor 2 5 and Justice Byron White. 286 Judge Rakoff asserted that Herrera ultimately established that "executing the innocent is forbidden by the Constitution" 28 7 and thus supported, instead
2 88
of foreclosed, the FDPA's unconstitutionality.
In its third argument, the Government claimed that the evidence
upon which Judge Rakoff based his holding was "either unreliable,
irrelevant, or both. ' 289 The Government argued that evidence of exonerations does not apply to the FDPA because there have been no
exonerations from federal death row. 290 Judge Rakoff explained that
the Government's argument lacked merit because the number of defendants sentenced to death under the FDPA is much smaller than the
number of capital defendants sentenced to death under state statutes.2 9' More importantly, an average period from seven to ten years
elapsed between conviction and exoneration for each individual exon280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
283. Id. at 263.
284. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417-18 (1993) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 327
U.S. 106, 112 (1946)) (considering the affidavits presented by defendant and asserting that "defendants often abuse new trial motions as a method of delaying enforcement of just sentences")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
285. Id. "The execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally
intolerable event." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
286. "I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial, even though
made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered
evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case." Herrera, 506
U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
287. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
288. Id. at 264.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 266.
291. Id. At the time of the opinion, there were 31 defendants sentenced to death under the
FDPA and a pool of 800 to 3,700 defendants sentenced to death under state statutes. Id.
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erated from death row; therefore, it was too early for exonerations

292
from federal death row to occur.
Judge Rakoff also rejected the Government's argument that the
FDPA will prevent wrongful convictions. Due to several federal practices, Judge Rakoff argued that wrongful convictions under the FDPA

293
may be even more likely than under state death penalty regimes.

Judge Rakoff opined that the availability of pretrial DNA testing may

reduce some mistaken convictions, but this does not change the reality
that there is a "remarkable degree of fallibility in the basic fact-finding

processes on which we rely in criminal cases. ' 294 Judge Rakoff observed that at least twenty death row exonerations were due to reasons other than DNA. 295
Judge Rakoff concluded by acknowledging that his decision would
be "critically scrutinized. '296 Still, he reiterated that the high rate of

wrongful convictions, combined with long delays before errors are revealed, "compels the conclusion that execution under the Federal

Death Penalty Act, by cutting off the opportunity for exoneration, denies due process and, indeed, is tantamount to foreseeable, state-sponsored murder of innocent human beings."2 97

c. The Second Circuit Reverses
Despite Judge Rakoff's emphatic conclusion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed his decision. 298 The
Second Circuit found the challenge to the FDPA ripe for review because it was a pure question of law 299 and because the defendants
292. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
293. Judge Rakoff observed that federal practice allows for capital convictions based on uncorroborated accomplice or co-operator testimony, but many states do not permit conviction
based on this testimony. Id. Similarly, federal practice "treats circumstantial evidence identically to direct evidence and permits conviction based solely on such evidence," but most states
do not. Id. at 267. Also, federal courts give more deference than state courts to eyewitness
testimony, a leading cause of wrongful convictions. Id. In Sampson, Judge Wolf disagreed with
the Government's position that findings of error in state court proceedings were inapposite to
the FDPA. See United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 78-81 (2003). He emphasized that
federal judges and jurors were just as fallible as their state counterparts and also discussed federal cases involving wrongful convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct. Id.
294. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
295. Id. at 265.
296. Id. at 268.
297. Id.
298. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 52-53.
299. Id. at 59.
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would suffer hardship if judicial review were to be withheld. 30 0 The
court emphasized that Supreme Court precedent, in particular Gregg
and Herrera, foreclosed the defendants' claims. 30 1 Because it held
that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional, Gregg mooted
all Eighth Amendment-based arguments to the contrary. 30 2 Further,
"the language of the Due Process Clause itself recognizes the possibil30 3
ity of capital punishment," which foreclosed the due process claims.
The Second Circuit concluded that only the Supreme Court was au30 4
thorized to make any changes in this area of the law.
Based on the plain language of the Due Process Clause, the Second
Circuit rejected the district court's due process analysis. 305 The court
then asserted that the district court erred when it used the "evolving
standards" basis to discern the meaning of due process. 30 6 According
to the Second Circuit, the "evolving standards" test applies only to the
30 7
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The court posited that the proper due process analysis was the fundamental rights standard. 30 8 Under that standard, a law is unconstitutional only when it violates a fundamental right. 30 9 "[H]istorical
practice" determines if a claimed right is fundamental. 310 The court
interpreted the defendants' argument to be that "the continued opportunity to exonerate oneself throughout the natural course of one's
life" was fundamental. 311 The court held that this argument expressed
no fundamental right; thus, the FDPA did not violate due process. 3 12
The most important indication that the defendants' claim was not fundamental was that the Supreme Court had upheld capital punishment
300. Id. In addition to the potential hardship that stems from a death-qualified jury, the court
observed that the death penalty exerts extra pressures on defendants to secure plea agreements.
Id.
301. Id. at 53.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 69.
305. Id. The court recognized that the defendants' due process argument sounded in substantive due process because it contended, "constitutional error lies in the act of execution itself." Id.
at 61 n.9.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 52.
309. The court used language set forth in Rochin v. California to delimit the scope of fundamental rights. A fundamental right is defined as "some principle of justice 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Quinones, 313 F.3d at
62 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952)).
310. Id. (quoting Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 52.
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statutes "despite a clear recognition of the possibility that ... innocent
people might be executed and, therefore, lose any opportunity for exoneration. '3 13 The court interpreted the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall in Furman so that they denied
the existence of a fundamental right "to the opportunity for exonera'314
tion during one's natural life.
The Second Circuit also disagreed with Judge Rakoff's position that
the defendants presented an issue of first impression. It stated that
precedent and historical acceptance of capital punishment squarely
controlled the issue that the defendants presented.31 5 The "theoretical possibility that a defendant might be innocent" did not provide the
grounds necessary to invalidate the FDPA. 31 6 Contrary to the district
court's conclusion, the Second Circuit asserted that Herrera'sassumption that "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'...
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional" was not
essential to the holding,31 7 and that in declining habeas relief, Herrera
essentially asserted "that there is no fundamental right to the opportunity for exoneration even before one's execution date, much less during the entire course of one's natural lifetime. ' 318 In dictum, the
Second Circuit asserted that even if Furman, Gregg, and Herrera did
not control the issue presented, Chapman v. United States319 foreclosed the defendants' fundamental right argument. 320 Because the
Supreme Court held that capital punishment was not per se unconstitutional and because the defendants did not contend that the FDPA
made arbitrary distinctions or was arbitrarily applied, Chapman dictated that the FDPA could not constitute a per se due process
32 1
violation.

313. Id. at 65.
314. Id. at 67.
315. According to the court, nations that have accepted capital punishment have also accepted the risk of executing innocent people. The Court cited a range of authorities that recognized that innocent people have been executed. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 62-66. Congress, prior to
enacting the FDPA, heard "extensive evidence in support of the argument that innocent individuals might be executed." Id. at 64. The Court interpreted Congress's enactment of the FDPA as
further support that the continued right to prove one's innocence was not fundamental. Id. at
64-65.
316. Id. at 69.
317. Id. at 68.
318. Id. at 69.
319. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
320. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 69-70.
321. Id.

2004]

DEATH DENIES DUE PROCESS

1815

The Second Circuit also issued a brief opinion denying the defendants' petition for a rehearing. 322 The defendants argued that a panel
rehearing was necessary because the court had failed to understand
their argument, the district court's opinions, and controlling Supreme
Court cases. 323 The Second Circuit clarified the analysis it used to
reverse the district court and disagreed with the defendants' criticisms
of its opinion. 324 According to the Second Circuit, the district court
did not invalidate the FDPA because of any specific unconstitutional
procedure and, therefore, the district court essentially declared that
the death penalty was per se unconstitutional, in direct contravention
of Supreme Court precedent. 325 The court also defended its interpretation of the defendants' argument, which it construed as a request to
326
declare the death penalty unconstitutional per se.
2.

United States v. Fell

a.

The District Court's Decision

Before Quinones was reversed, another district court in the Second
327
Circuit held the FDPA unconstitutional. Judge William K. Sessions
declared the FDPA unconstitutional on grounds entirely distinct from
those that Judge Rakoff adopted. Judge Sessions held that the FDPA
was unconstitutional because it allowed for the imposition of a death
sentence based on aggravating factors that were not subject to the
guarantees of confrontation and cross-examination, which violated the
328
Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
Before Donald Fell was indicted for the abduction and murder of
Teresca King, 329 he and federal prosecutors agreed to a tentative plea
322. United States v. Quinones, 317 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003). The defendants petitioned for
panel rehearing on December 24, 2002. Id. at 88.
323. Id. at 89-90.
324. The defendants contended that the Court of Appeals "misunderstood their argument, the
opinion of the District Court, and various controlling Supreme Court cases." Id. at 88.
325. Specifically, the Court of Appeals interpreted the district court's opinions to hold that
the "authorization of capital punishment for certain crimes" was unconstitutional. Id. at 88.
Also contributing to this conclusion was the fact that the district court's analysis was framed in
terms of the "death penalty," rather than the FDPA. Id.
326. Id. at 91. According to the Court, by not arguing that any "particular terms or procedures of the FDPA" were constitutionally infirm, the defendants essentially argued that capital
punishment was unconstitutional per se.
327. Interestingly, Judge Sessions is a member of the National Committee to Prevent Wrongful Executions. Austin Sarat, The "New Abolitionism" and the Possibilitiesof Legislative Action:
The New Hampshire Experience, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 343, 348 (2002).
328. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. Vt. 2002).
329. Counts 1 and 2 of a four count indictment charged Fell with carjacking and kidnapping,
both with death resulting. Id. at 473.
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agreement. 330 But in January 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft ordered the local prosecutors to abandon the plea agreement and to

seek the death penalty against Fell. 331 On January 30, 2002, the Government filed its "Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty." On

July 8, 2002, the grand jury returned a superceding indictment that

found that the requisite threshold criteria were met. 332 On the same
day as the grand jury's superceding indictment, the government filed a
"Supplemental Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty," which gave

notice of the four nonstatutory aggravating factors it intended to

prove. 333 In a pretrial motion, Fell motioned the court to declare the
FDPA unconstitutional on twelve separate grounds. 334 On July 23,
330. See Sullivan, supra note 31, at 39-40. Under the plea agreement, Fell would have served
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 39. The plea agreement was based on
mitigating factors including, "Fell's remorse, his age, his history of drug problems, his lack of
criminal activity, and his willingness to cooperate by leading officials to the victim's body." Id. at
40.
331. Id.
332. The grand jury found the "intentional" requirement from § 3591(a)(2) was met. The
grand jury also found three statutory aggravating factors: (1) § 3592(c)(1) the death occurred
during the commission of the crime of kidnapping; (2) § 3592(c)(6) Fell's behavior was especially
heinous, cruel or depraved that it involved serious physical abuse to the victim; and (3)
§ 3592(c)(16) Fell intentionally killed or attempted to kill more than one person in a single criminal episode. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
333. These nonstatutory aggravating factors were:
(1) Fell participated in King's abduction to facilitate his escape from the area in which
he and an accomplice had committed a double murder; (2) that he participated in
King's murder to prevent her from reporting the kidnapping and carjacking; (3) that
King's murder was part of substantial premeditation involved in committing the crime
of carjacking; and (4) that Fell caused loss, injury and harm to King and her family.
Id.
334. Fell sought to declare the FDPA unconstitutional because:
(1) [lI]t fails to avoid sentences of death for the factually and legally innocent; (2) the
FDPA's sentencing scheme is incomprehensible to a jury, in violation of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments; (3) the FDPA fails to narrow adequately the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (4) the relaxed evidentiary standard applicable to the penalty phase of trial renders any findings
unconstitutional; (5) the indictment fails to charge a capital crime; (6) a jury's consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors permits the arbitrary and capricious imposition of a sentence of death, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (7)
the FDPA's delegation to the government of the power to define aggravating factors
violates separation of powers principles and the non-delegation doctrine, in violation of
Article I, § 1; (8) its delegation to the government of the power to define non-statutory
aggravating factors after the crime but before trial violates the ex post facto clause; (9)
the FDPA is internally inconsistent, precluding the use of non-statutory factors; (10)
the use of non-statutory aggravating factors without providing for proportionality review is unconstitutional; (11) the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (12) the death penalty violates binding international law.
Id. at 473-74.
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2002, after the Supreme Court decided Ring, Fell filed a supplemental
335
motion and argued that Ring rendered the FDPA unconstitutional.
Judge Sessions acknowledged that the Bill of Rights established
capital punishment as an acceptable form of punishment. 336 But, accompanying that recognition is "the need for more rigorous or scrupulous procedure," which is a direct result of the fact that death is a
unique form of punishment. 337 Citing Gardner v. Florida,338 Judge
Sessions asserted that if the procedures of a death penalty statute reduce the reliability of the sentence, a court may strike the statute
down on due process grounds. 339 Judge Sessions continued and stated
that while the Supreme Court has never held that all procedural rights
are required at capital sentencing, capital sentencing procedures must
be reevaluated "against evolving standards of procedural fairness in a
'340
civilized society.
After establishing that the Due Process Clause requires heightened
reliability in capital sentencing provisions, Judge Sessions analyzed the
validity of the FDPA in light of § 3593(c), which abrogates the rules of
evidence at the sentencing hearing.34 1 He first detailed the stages of a
capital proceeding, and then explained the meaning of the Jones, Apprendi, and Ring line of cases and its affect on the FDPA. The central
proposition of these cases is:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury,
342
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
That rule applies when the fact at issue is an element of a crime, rather
than a sentencing factor. Sentencing factors do not need to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt; neither must they be heard in a manner
consistent with the rules of evidence. 343 In Apprendi, the Court held
that any fact that increases the sentence beyond that authorized by a
jury "is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense
335. Id. at 490.
336. Id. at 474.
337. Id.
338. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
339. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d. at 476.
340. Id. at 477 (quoting Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357) (internal quotation marks omitted).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 480 (quoting United States v. Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 233 n.6 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
343. Id. at 478-79.
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than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. ' 344 Such a fact "fits
'345
squarely within the usual definition of an element of the offense.
Judge Sessions then looked at the structure of the FDPA. He noted
that the FDPA "authorizes both features of a traditional trial and features of a traditional sentencing. ' 346 The FDPA requires sentencing
hearings to follow procedures from trial, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt; however, it specifically renounces the rules of evi347
dence, which draws it closer to a traditional sentencing hearing.
According to Judge Sessions, the FDPA looks like a sentencing statute
with sentencing factors, but these factors also resemble elements of a
separate capital offense. 348 If either the aggravating factor or the
mental state is not found, then the jury is only authorized to impose
life in prison. Judge Sessions emphasized that the statutory aggravating factors "expose[d] Fell to a punishment (the death penalty)
greater than that otherwise legally prescribed (life imprisonment)"
349
and were thus the functional equivalents of elements.
Judge Sessions argued that the controlling question is not one of
form, but rather one of effect. Instead of asking what trial rights are
required at sentencing, the inquiry should be, "what rights are required at a proceeding at which facts are found that equate to offense
elements? ' 350 By phrasing the question in that manner, Judge Sessions navigated past the principle that due process rights have limited
352
application at sentencing. 351 Due to the trial procedures present
and the elements rule, Judge Sessions contended that the FDPA sentencing hearing had features of a trial and a sentencing hearing. 353
Judge Sessions relied on Specht v. Patterson354 and Bullington v. Missouri355 to support his argument that the FDPA sentencing hearing is
essentially a distinct trial. 356 Ultimately, Judge Sessions observed, the
"FDPA's procedure for determining death eligibility defies labeling
344. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 483.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 482.
349. Id. at 483.
350. Fell, 217 F. Supp 2d. at 486.
351. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
352. These features included the Government having the burden to prove an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the requirement that a unanimous jury must find an aggravating factor.
353. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 482-83.
354. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
355. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
356. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 486-89.
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either as sentencing or as trial"; 357 but because at the sentencing hearing "the penalty of life imprisonment can be converted to a death sentence" 358 after facts that are the functional equivalents of elements of
the offense are found, therefore, due process requires "procedural
rights that will ensure the highest degree of reliability in the fact-find'359
ing process.
Judge Sessions concluded that the relaxed evidentiary standard of
§ 3593(c) is inconsistent with the requirement for heightened reliability in capital cases. 360 The evidence the Government intended to use
against Fell to prove the statutory aggravating factors included a statement allegedly made by Fell's deceased codefendant. 361 Had the
FDPA not abrogated the rules of evidence, this statement would have
been inadmissible hearsay. 36 2 Judge Sessions dismissed the Government's argument that the rules of evidence were not required at the
sentencing hearing on the grounds that adopting such an argument
"would approve death eligibility as the federal criminal justice system's sole exception to the practice of requiring that offense elements
be proven by admissible evidence comporting with due process and
fair trial guarantees. '363 Admitting this evidence would also violate
Fell's Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-examination. 364 Because the FDPA's procedures allowed for less reliability
when the Constitution requires heightened reliability in capital sentencing, Judge Sessions held the statute unconstitutional. 365 In an emphatic manner similar to that of Judge Rakoff in the second Quinones
opinion, Judge Sessions concluded with the observation: "Capital pun' 366
ishment is under siege.
b.

The Second Circuit Reverses

On March 2, 2004, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court decision. 367 The validity of the § 3593(c) evidentiary
standard was the core issue before the court. 368 Prior to reaching that
357. Id. at 487.
358. Id. at 488.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 485.
361. Id.
362. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
363. Id. at 488.
364. Judge Sessions argued that the Sixth Amendment's right to confrontation applies at sentencing because the language of the Amendment refers to "all criminal prosecutions." Id. at 486.
365. Id. at 489.
366. Id. at 490.
367. United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
368. Id. at 137.
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concern, the court raised the issue of the ripeness of Fell's chal370
lenge. 369 Neither Fell nor the Government addressed that issue.
Quoting extensively from its discussion of ripeness in Quinones, the
37 1
court concluded that, as in Quinones, Fell's challenge was ripe.
Unlike the district court's analysis, the Second Circuit limited the
reach of the Jones, Apprendi, and Ring line of cases. The court observed that the FDPA was in "literal compliance with the mandates of
Ring and Apprendi" because it required a jury to consider if aggravating factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 372 The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that capital cases must meet
standards of heightened reliability. 373 But it disagreed with the district court's conclusion that imposing the rules of evidence was necessary to attain those standards. 3 74 According to the Second Circuit, "in
order to achieve such "heightened reliability," more evidence, not
less, should be admitted on the presence of aggravating and mitigating
factors. '3 75 The court cited Gregg and Williams v. New York to support the position that sentencing bodies require as much information
as possible about the defendant. 37 6 Because the FDPA's relaxed evidentiary standard admitted more evidence, the Second Circuit concluded that the FDPA promoted heightened reliability rather than
undermined it, as Fell and the district court contended. By admitting
more evidence, the FDPA facilitated "an individualized determination
on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of
'377
the crime.
The Second Circuit also found that the district court erred by effectively equating the rules of evidence with personal constitutional
rights. 378 The court emphasized that there is no constitutional right to
the rules of evidence. 379 Further, the court found that the § 3593(c)
evidentiary standard adequately ensured fair trials and was constitutional, particularly "given that the balancing test set forth in the
FDPA is ...more stringent than its counterpart in the FRE." 380 Finally, the Second Circuit emphasized that trial judges retain the func369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 142.
Fell, 360 F.3d at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id. (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994)).
Id.
Fell, 360 F.3d at 144.
Id. at 145.
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tion of gatekeepers "to ensure that unconstitutional evidence
otherwise admissible under applicable evidentiary rules is excluded
'38
from trial." '
III.

ANALYSIS

Prior to analyzing how Quinones and Fell apply the Due Process
Clause, subpart 111(A) provides a brief overview of the historical ap38 2
plication of the Due Process Clause in capital cases. Subpart III(B)
defends the district court's Quinones decisions and analyzes the application of substantive due process in the context of capital punishment.
That section analyzes the significance of innocence in capital cases and
also argues that the Second Circuit erred. Subpart III(C) 383 argues
that Fell is decided correctly because it properly applies the "elements
rule" in the context of the FDPA sentencing hearing, which is in essence a distinct criminal prosecution. That section discusses how the
Second Circuit failed to view the sentencing stage as a trial on the
issue of capital guilt.
A.

Due Process Challenges to the Death Penalty

The vast majority of challenges to capital punishment statutes are
based on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 384 Quinones and Fell do not follow this set route and
instead apply the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to declare the FDPA unconstitutional. But, like cases based on the Eighth
Amendment, Quinones and Fell recognize that death is different and
observe the mandate that capital punishment proceedings maintain a
heightened degree of reliability.
Quinones and Fell also interpret the meaning of due process in a
manner that resembles the hallmark Eighth Amendment "evolving
3 85
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"
standard. Quinones and Fell view due process as a flexible concept,
which is not a new perspective.38 6 Gardner v. Florida instructs that
courts analyzing capital sentencing statutes for procedural infirmities
381. Id. To illustrate this point, the Second Circuit described how the district court would be
obligated exclude the statements made by Fell's codefendant upon a finding that those statements would "unfairly prejudice Fell." Id.
382. See infra notes 423-581 and accompanying text.
383. See infra notes 584-766 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 153-171 and accompanying text.
385. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop V. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 101
(1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
386. Indeed, widening of due process protections in all contexts has been described as "one of
the great features of its development." Morr, supra note 7, at 604.
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have the "obligation to re-examine capital sentencing procedures
against evolving standards of procedural fairness in a civilized society. ' 38 7 Thus, the due process evolving standards paradigm ensures
procedural fairness and the Eighth Amendment standard determines
if a particular punishment offends contemporary standards of decency. The analyses may have different goals, but they overlap and
reject the notion that the meanings of the clauses are inflexible and
impervious to reinterpretation. A brief overview of several United
States Supreme Court decisions in which the Due Process Clause is
used to challenge the death penalty sketches the origins of Quinones
and Fell.
Prior to Furman, the Due Process Clause was applied in large part
because the Court refused to entertain arguments that the death penalty violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 388 In
Furman, the Court used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to
the states. 389 The Court used the Due Process Clause in the same
387. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
388. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("In McGautha
the Court dealt with claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. We expressly declined in that case to consider claims under the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments.") (internal citation omitted). In
McGautha v. California,the Court held that standardless jury sentencing did not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 402 U.S. 183, 221-22 (1971). Subsequent cases
applying the Due Process Clause show that McGautha did not foreclose the use of the Due
Process Clause to invalidate death sentences or capital punishment systems. Instead of closely
scrutinizing what due process required, the Court has reviewed the historical treatment of jury
discretion in capital cases to arrive at its conclusion, which Furman substantially undercut. Similarly, McGautha's companion case, reported sub nom Crampton v. Ohio, held that a unitary
proceeding did not violate due process of law. Gregg essentially invalidated that conclusion.
The McGautha dissent criticized the majority for misapprehending the petitioner's due process
argument. Id. at 248-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that due process could
allow for flexible sentencing procedures and respect individual rights. Id. at 254-55 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The majority failed to factor the Due Process Clause's concern with individual
rights. That is the essential notion that drives the application of due process in Quinones and
Fell. Further, "McGautha only addressed-and explored the history relevant to-the due process limits on jury discretion in making the ultimate sentencing decision, not the due process
limitations on judicial discretion in fashioning and interpreting the guilt and sentencing phase
procedures leading up to that decision." Thurschwell, supra note 12, at 17. Earlier due process
challenges to capital punishment similarly failed. See, e.g., Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
(1947) (no due process violation to attempt to execute a defendant after the first execution failed
due to a mechanical malfunction of the electric chair).
389. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. The Court granted the three petitions for certiorari "limited to the question whether the imposition of the execution of the death penalty constitute cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the States
by the Fourteenth." Id. (Douglas, J., concurring). "That the requirements of due process ban
cruel and unusual punishment is now settled." Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring). "The Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause is fully applicable to the States through the Due Process

2004]

DEATH DENIES DUE PROCESS

1823

manner in Woodson v. North Carolina390 and Roberts v. Louisiana.3 91
While not insignificant, the application of the Due Process Clause in
these early cases was limited.
The Court has applied the Due Process Clause to vacate individual
death sentences when procedural errors deny fair trials. Many due
process challenges to death sentences relate to conduct at trial that
prevents capital defendants from confronting, denying, or explaining
information presented by the prosecution or considered by the judge.
The seminal case on this issue is Gardner v. Florida.3 92
In Gardner,the jury found that mitigating evidence outweighed aggravating evidence and suggested life imprisonment; however, the
trial judge relied on information from a confidential presentence investigation to override the jury and sentence the defendant to
death. 393 The Supreme Court held the "petitioner was denied due
process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part,
on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or
explain. '394 The Court emphasized that procedural due process concerns controlled: "We conclude the procedure does not satisfy the
constitutional command that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law."'3 95 The due process violation reduced the reliClause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 251 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Beth S.
Brinkman, Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Pointfor a Due ProcessAnalysis of CapitalSentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351, 354 (1984).
390. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 n.8 (1976) ("The Eighth Amendment's
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments has been held to be applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted). The precise role of due process in
Woodson is not entirely clear. The majority specified that the issue "involves the procedure
employed by the State to select persons for the unique and irreversible penalty of death." Id. at
287. The emphasis on "procedure" sounds like due process. However, in Gardner,Justice White
explained that Woodson "expressly rested" on the "Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments," rather than the Due Process Clause. See Gardner,430 U.S. at 363-64 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment). In his Woodson dissent, then Justice Rehnquist criticized the
Court's application of due process in addition to the Eighth Amendment:
What the plurality opinion has actually done is to import into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment what it conceives to be desirable procedural guarantees
where the punishment of death, concededly not cruel and unusual for the crime of
which the defendant was convicted, is to be imposed. This is squarely contrary to McGautha, and unsupported by any other decision of this Court.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's observation verifies
that due process had an identifiable role in the holding.
391. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S 325, 336 (1976) ("Accordingly, we find that the death
sentence imposed upon the petitioner under Louisiana's mandatory death sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and must be set aside.").
392. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
393. Id. at 351-52.
394. Id. at 362.
395. Id. at 351.
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ability at trial, an intolerable occurrence in capital proceedings. 396
Gardner established a new role for due process in capital cases, one
that blends the Eighth Amendment concerns for heightened reliability
with due process concerns for procedural fairness.
In Skipper v. South Carolina,a due process violation occurred when
the jury was prevented from considering relevant mitigating evidence;
that violation led the Court to overturn a death sentence. 397 In Skipper, the prosecution argued that the death sentence was appropriate
because of the defendant's future dangerousness. 398 To rebut this argument, the defendant attempted to introduce the mitigating testimony of two jailers and a regular visitor to the jail.399 Believing that
such testimony was "irrelevant and hence inadmissible," the trial
40 0
court prevented the defendant from introducing that testimony.
Relying on Lockett v. Ohio40 1 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,40 2 the Supreme Court held that the trial court "impeded the sentencing jury's
ability to carry out its task of considering all relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender. '40 3 Justice Byron
White emphasized that due process functioned in tandem with Lockett
and Eddings:
Where the prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of future
dangerousness in asking for the death penalty, it is not only the rule
of Lockett and Eddings that requires that the defendant be afforded
an opportunity to introduce evidence on this point; it is also the
elemental due process requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to death on the basis
of information which he had no oppor40 4
tunity to deny or explain.
Thus, Gardner'sconcern for due process played as much a role in invalidating the death sentence as did Lockett and Eddings. The concurring Justices agreed that the exclusion of testimony violated due
process; 40 5 however, they faulted the use of Lockett and Eddings and
396. In addressing the state's argument that disclosing information in the confidential report
would hamper future presentence investigations, the Court observed: "[O]n the other hand, if
[the sentencing report] is the basis for a death sentence, the interest in reliability plainly outweighs the state's interest in preserving the availability of comparable information into their
cases." Id. at 359.
397. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
398. Id. at 3.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
402. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
403. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8.
404. Id. at 5 n.1 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
405. Id. at 10 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
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thus the Eighth Amendment, because those cases required that all rel-

evant mitigating evidence pertaining to the crime or the character of
time of the crime be considered, but not behavior
the defendant at the
6
40

following arrest.
In Simmons v. South Carolina,40 7 the Court vacated a death sentence because it was based on information that the defendant was prevented from denying or explaining. 40 8 The trial judge prevented the
defendant from instructing the jury that he was parole ineligible because of South Carolina's "three strikes rule. '40 9 The defendant

wanted to use this instruction to rebut the prosecution's argument that
the jury should consider his future dangerousness when setting the
punishment. 410 The Court agreed with the defendant's argument and
held that when the prosecution puts the defendant's future dangerousness at issue, "and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that
the defendant is parole ineligible. '4 11 The Court analogized the defendant's inability to confront the prosecution's future dangerousness
argument with the situations in Gardnerand Skipper.412 In Gardner,
Skipper, and Simmons, specific trial procedures prevented the capital
defendants from presenting crucial evidence, which violated due process. The Eighth Amendment played only a peripheral role in these
413
cases.
406. Id. at 13-15 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
407. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
408. Id. at 161.
409. The defendant was thus prevented from explaining to the jury that if it sentenced him to
life imprisonment instead of imposing the death penalty, there was no chance that he would ever
leave prison. Id. at 159-60.
410. Id. at 157. The defendant was also wary that the jury could misconstrue life imprisonment to signify that the defendant could sometime be eligible for parole. Id. at 158.
411. Id. at 156. The Simmons due process analysis is still a viable method to attack individual
death sentences. Simmons has been affirmed in subsequent cases. See Shafer v. South Carolina,
532 U.S. 36 (2001); Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002). However, the scope of Simmons' applicability has been narrowed in O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) (holding that
Simmons is a "new" court-made rule and is not retroactive) and Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S.
156 (2000) (holding that habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief under Simmons because at
the time the jury considered his sentence, he was eligible for parole).
412. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 164-65.
413. Concurring in Simmons, Justices Souter argued that the Eighth Amendment should have
taken a more prevalent role in the decision. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172-74 (Souter, J., concurring). That argument highlights a perceived intersection between the Eight Amendment and due
process guarantees for a fair trial. Justice Souter opined that "[t]he Eighth Amendment entitles
a defendant to a jury capable of a reasoned moral judgment about whether death, rather than
some lesser sentence, ought to be imposed." Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring). That argument
also stems from the Eighth Amendment's mandate that there be a "heightened standard for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Id.
(quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Amend-
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The Due Process Clause is not relegated only to challenges involv-

ing the ability to present specific information in capital cases. In
Lankford v. Idaho, the lack of notice rose to the level of a due process
violation and warranted that the death sentence be vacated. 4 14 In
Presnell v. Georgia, the Court vacated a death sentence when the

jury's sentence was based on underlying charges that the jury had not
properly convicted the defendant of committing. 415 In Green v. Georgia, the trial judge violated due process when he excluded hearsay evi-

dence that would have established that the defendant was not the
actual murderer. 4 16 In Beck v. Alabama, the Court once again drew
a
on Gardner and held that withholding from the jury instructions on4 17
process.
due
violated
case
capital
a
in
charge
lesser-included offense
In Morgan v. Illinois418 the due process right to have an impartial jury
vacated a death sentence when the trial judge prevented the defendant from questioning the venire if they would impose the death pen419
alty regardless of the facts of the case.
These cases demonstrate that the Due Process Clause has been used
to challenge death sentences and also show the limits of the applicabil-

ity of the clause. Never has the Court declared an entire capital punment also requires "accurate sentencing information" that "invalidates procedural rules that
tend to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination." Id. (quoting Beck v. Alabama
447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the jury is prevented from
hearing information essential for making a choice between sentencing alternatives, the death
sentence "should be vacated as having been arbitrarily or discriminatorily and wantonly and
freakishly imposed." Simmons, 512 U.S. at 173 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249
(1972)) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
414. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991). In both Gardner and Lankford, the death sentence was based on information that was essentially kept secret from the defense. Id. at 126. In
Lankford, the prosecution advised the defendant and the court that the death penalty would not
be sought. Id. at 111. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge imposed the death penalty. The
prosecution and judge's silence as to the death penalty during the trial deprived the defendant of
notice that the death penalty would be imposed.
415. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 15 (1978). The Court explicitly applied the rule of Gardner: "These fundamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at the penalty
phase of a trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determining phase of any criminal trial."
Id. at 16.
416. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
417. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980). The Court concluded that refusing to
instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense essentially transformed the statute into a
mandatory death sentence that Woodson and Roberts proscribe. Id. at 630. Here the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause intersect; the procedural infirmity of the statute creates an Eighth Amendment violation. Conversely, when due process is not violated here, neither
is the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of mandatory death sentences.
418. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
419. In Morgan, the due process violation at voir dire poisoned the entire trial because the
presence of aggravating and mitigating factors is irrelevant to a "juror [who] has already formed
an opinion on the merits." Id. at 729. The Court found "decisions dealing with capital sentencing juries . . . most analogous" to the issue before it. Id. at 728.
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ishment statute unconstitutional based solely on due process grounds.
Invalidating statutes and declaring classes of people ineligible for the
death penalty is the province of the Eighth Amendment. 42 0 Even
though the application of due process in the capital context is relatively limited, as the cases above illustrate, due process imports the
central tenets of the Eighth Amendment, namely the concern for
heightened reliability in capital sentencing and the evolving standards
analysis.
As with each case discussed above, Quinones and Fell exemplify a
Due Process Clause that is not fixed, frozen, or inflexible, but is instead reexamined in light of evolving standards of procedural fairness. 421 That flexible application of the Due Process Clause is a
necessary step in effectuating the Clause's original meaning as a check
on governmental authority, a purpose one author has described as
such:
There is no doubt that the Fifth Amendment was expected to limit
arbitrary abuses of the powers of government from whatever source
abuse might come, and it is a perfectly tenable hypothesis that the
420. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Executing a defendant for an offense
less than murder violates the Eighth Amendment.); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(Executing a defendant who was under sixteen at the time the offense was committed violates
the Eighth Amendment.); Ford v. Wainwright 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Executing an insane person
violates the Eighth Amendment.); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Executing a mentally
retarded person violates the Eighth Amendment.).
421. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment):
[D]ue process is, perhaps the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to
history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society.
But neither the unfolding content of due process nor the particularized safeguards of
the Bill of Rights disregard procedural ways that reflect a national historic policy.
Id.; see also Lankford, 500 U.S. at 121 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 at 162-63 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
The requirement of "due process" is not a fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be
respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens.
But "due process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate
analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been
evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization,
"due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly
between the individual and government, "due process" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic
faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the
exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of
the process.
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due process provision was intended to serve as a general limitation
422
to check tyranny in any kind of case in which it should arise.
Quinones and Fell broaden the scope of the Due Process Clause in the
capital setting by applying it as a safeguard against the risks of an
arbitrary sentencing scheme, instead of only as the foundation to an
objection of an individual death sentence.
B.

Quinones

The significant number of wrongly convicted individuals exonerated
from death row served as a factual basis for the defendants' due process argument. They argued, that, based on the wrongful capital convictions, the FDPA cannot distinguish between the innocent and the
guilty and thus created a substantial risk of wrongful convictions and
executions. The Second Circuit ignored that factual basis when it rephrased the defendants' argument as one that advocates for a "fundamental right to a continued opportunity for exoneration throughout
the course of one's natural life '42 3 and a declaration that the death
penalty was unconstitutional per se. 424 According to the Second Circuit, even if there were problems with capital punishment, precedent
prevents courts from declaring it unconstitutional. 42 5 That conclusion
422. Morr, supra note 7, at 159.
423. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2002).
424. Id. at 89.
425. The sharply opposed majority and dissenting opinions in People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824
(I11.
1998). present an interesting analogue to the disagreement between the district court and
the Second Circuit. In Bull, a capital defendant sentenced to death raised a series of issues, one
of which was a facial challenge to the Illinois death penalty statute. Id. at 832. The defendant
argued that the Illinois death penalty statute was unconstitutional because of the inevitability of
wrongful convictions and the irreversibility of the punishment. Id. at 839. The majority noted
that capital punishment is fallible because it is operated by humans; however, it cited Gregg and
asserted that capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 840. In response to the
state's position that adequate procedural safeguards existed, the defendant contended that "no
amount of procedural due process can prevent all of the errors that can result in an innocent
person being convicted of a capital crime." Id. at 841. The majority interpreted this claim to be
a "strident protest" against the criminal trial "as a means of determining the guilt or innocence
of an accused." Id at 840. This protest was unanswerable because mistakes have, and will continue to be made, and American criminal law "provides the maximum protection necessary to
guard against mistakes being made." Bull, 705 N.E.2d at 842. Further, the majority observed
that legislative judgments were due deference and that the defendant's argument was "emphatically a question for the legislature." Id. at 847. Justice Moses W. Harrison II dissented from the
decision to uphold the defendant's death sentence. He argued that the Illinois death penalty
system "is not working." Id. at 847 (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Harrison argued that the number of exonerations (at the time the case was decided there
were nine exonerations in Illinois) evidenced the unreliability and thus unconstitutionality of the
Illinois death penalty statute. Id. Wrongful convictions and executions are inevitable, Justice
Harrison argued. Id. at 848. Unlike Judge Rakoff, Justice Harrison merely concluded that
wrongful convictions violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
and article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution without providing any analysis. Id. The man-
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is incorrect because, as another district court considering the constitutionality of the FDPA observed, "[T]he Supreme Court has never decided whether the risk of executing innocent individuals renders the
'42 6
death penalty unconstitutional.
The purpose of a criminal justice system is to determine guilt and to
punish the guilty. 427 In light of the disturbing number of wrongful
convictions and subsequent exonerations, death penalty systems have
failed to make that essential distinction. As Quinones contends,
wrongful capital convictions serve as compelling and undeniable evidence that the death penalty is prone to error. Further, the constitutional mandate for heightened reliability and the guarantees of due
process render this system, as currently administered,
unconstitutional.
1.

Due Process in Quinones

A fundamental concern for protecting the innocent is at the core of
the district court's opinions. 428 The district court's reliance on both
procedural and substantive due process 429 appears to distinguish between legal and actual innocence, but this is not the case. The substantive due process violation occurs when an innocent person is
executed, regardless if he or she was legally or factually innocent. The
procedural due process violation is twofold: ineffective procedural
safeguards exist to prevent wrongful convictions, and the nature of the
ner in which the majority in Bull and the Second Circuit addressed the challenges based in large
part on the substantial risk of wrongful executions is similar. Both courts relied on Gregg, deference to legislature, and confidence in existing procedures to reject the challenges presented.
These analyses enabled the courts to sidestep the issue of wrongful convictions.
426. United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55 (D. Mass. 2003).
427. "After all, the central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty
and free the innocent." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (citing United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)).
428. Innocence in the capital context involves actual innocence and legal innocence. See generally, Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). Death penalty systems fail to ensure that the
actually innocent and legally innocent escape conviction and execution. See Clarke et al., supra
note 93 at 317-18. In the capital context, innocence has several identifiable meanings-actual,
factual, and legal innocence. Cathleen Burnett, Constructionsof Innocence, 70 UMKC L. REV.
971, 975 (2002). The three different meanings of innocence in a death penalty illustrate the
interdependence of procedural and substantive rights. A capital defendant can be actually innocent of the charge alleged by the prosecution. Id. at 975-77. In this context, the capital defendant actually did not murder the victim. Id. A capital defendant can also be innocent of a
capital crime or innocent of the death penalty. Id. 977-79. When one is innocent of a capital
crime, he is not actually innocent of the crime itself; however, the crime itself does not rise to a
statutorily defined capital defense. Id. When one is innocent of the death penalty, he is guilty of
the capital crime, but aggravation is not sufficient or mitigating factors outweigh the aggravation.
Id. at 979-82.
429. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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punishment itself eventually forecloses any chance to establish one's
actual or legal innocence. Fleshing out the relationship between sub-

stantive rights and the want of procedural protections helps illustrate
their interdependence.
One's right not to be executed when innocent creates its own procedural protections that are not present in noncapital cases. Without
these procedural protections, the right not to be executed when innocent is of limited value. 430 A cognizable claim of actual innocence has
absolutely no legal meaning without proper procedural safeguards
and the opportunity to express that claim. Additionally, a claim of
legal innocence requires increased procedural protections. 431 The

mandate for heightened reliability in capital cases must create more
expansive procedural protections that protect both the legally and factually innocent.
A core disagreement between the district court and the Second Circuit involves interpreting the scope of due process. The district court

stressed that due process is not a static concept and that it "must be
interpreted in light of evolving standards of fairness and ordered liberty. '43 2 The Second Circuit asserted that due process must be interpreted according to the fundamental rights standard.
a.

Due Process as an Evolving Concept

Specific language from Herrera provides sound support for a substantive due process argument based on a claim of actual innocence in
a capital case. 433 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor men430. See Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 Bu'. L. REv. 501, 508 (1996) ("The substantive right not to be executed if innocent is
empty unless accompanied by a procedural means of determining innocence.").
431. See also id. at 504-08 (arguing that procedures must be in place to ensure that substantive
due process right not to be executed when innocent can be demonstrated). Professor Bandes'
argument that presenting new evidence posttrial represents a fundamental procedural due process issue is similar to my proposition that a claim of actual innocence creates its own procedural
protections. In concert with the mandate for heightened reliability in capital cases, these procedural protections should ensure that no innocent individual is convicted. However, as the significant number of death row exonerations evidence, death penalty systems have failed to uphold
the requisite procedural protections and heightened reliability.
432. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
433. In Herrera Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that procedural due process was the correct
ground because the issue was "whether [due process] entitles petitioner to judicial review of his
actual innocence claim." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 n.6 (1993). It was precisely because Herrera had been convicted of a capital crime that the proper analysis was confined to
what procedures were due. Id. According to the Chief Justice, the dissent erred when it applied
substantive due process, because this analysis was only available if Herrera was innocent, which
he was not. Id. Applying procedural due process enabled Chief Justice Rehnquist to avoid
Herrera's substantive claims and also created a situation where an innocent person could never
come before the Court on federal habeas because he will always be presumed guilty. See Phae-
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tioned trademark descriptions of substantive due process standards
before concluding that executing the innocent would be constitutionally intolerable. 434 The dissent used two of these verbal formulae to
proscribe the execution of the innocent. 435 The majority applied a history-based fundamental rights standard to establish when a criminal
procedure offends due process before it analyzed Herrera's claim on
procedural due process grounds. 436 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
overtly reject Justice Harry Blackmun's substantive due process analysis. Thus, by blending the substantive due process language used by
the majority and dissent, Justice O'Connor's concurrence bridges the
4 37
gap between the majority and the dissent.

In his Herrera dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote that he would have
allowed a substantive due process challenge to the death penalty
based on a claim of actual innocence. 438 The dissent's application of
substantive due process in Herrera provides insight into its role in
Quinones. Justice Blackmun described substantive due process by
turning to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey439 and specifically, its use of the Justice John Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman.440 Quoting Justice Harlan, Justice Blackmun wrote:
The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is
dra Tanner, Herrera v. Collins: Assuming the Constitution Prohibitsthe Execution of an Innocent
Person, Is the Needle Worth the Search?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1283, 1309. Since Quinones and
Rodriguez still carry with them the presumption of innocence, they are not barred from using a
substantive due process challenge to the FDPA. The Court's explanation why substantive due
process was not available to Herrera justifies the application of substantive due process in
Quinones.
434. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Regardless of the verbal
formula employed-contrary to contemporary standards of decency, shocking to the conscience,
or offensive to a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to
be ranked as fundamental .... ") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
435. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
436. Id. at 407-08. Even though any of the verbal formulae Justice O'Connor quoted can
trigger substantive due process, it is significant that Justice O'Connor cited the same standard as
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Both Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice cited Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992), which quoted Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977).
If the Chief Justice had reached the substantive due process issue, he would have proceeded
under the same standard that he applied for the procedural due process analysis.
437. Simply put, this gap was due to the different conceptions of the core issue presented. The
majority and concurring opinions saw the issue as what process was due to a legally guilty petitioner while the dissent saw the issue as whether the "Constitution forbids the execution of a
person who has been validly convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered evidence." Herrera,506 U.S. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
438. Id. at 437 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
439. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
440. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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not a series of isolated points ....It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
441
impositions and purposeless restraints.

Justice Blackmun did not expound in great detail on the significance
of substantive due process in Herrera;442 however, Justice Harlan's explanation and application of the liberty strand of the Due Process
Clause is entirely relevant to the capital context, including
443

Quinones.

Justice Harlan clarified that the meaning of substantive due process
guarantees is a "rational continuum," which signifies that the scope of
substantive due process is determined according to evolving standards
of fairness and ordered liberty. The parameters of this rational continuum are set forth through the "reasoned judgment" 444 of a court
when it adjudicates substantive due process claims. Thus, consistent
with the district court's view, the precise scope of the protections of
the Due Process Clause cannot be confined by specific and obdurate
definitions.

44 5

Lawrence v. Texas 446 affirmed the flexible and broad scope of due
process.44 7 By declaring that laws prohibiting sodomy violate a person's substantive due process rights, the Lawrence Court demonstrated that substantive due process is not a static concept. Relying on
a line of substantive due process decisions, specifically Casey, the
Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,448 which held that there was

no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. In Lawrence,
the Court asserted that the fundamental rights standard that it
441. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 436 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 848).
442. Justice Blackmun argued that Herrera could use substantive due process in just five
paragraphs. After quoting Justice Harlan, Justice Blackmun discussed the "shock the conscious"
standard from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and then concluded that the
"[e]xecution of an innocent person is the ultimate arbitrary imposition." Herrera at 437 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
443. That Justice Harlan discussed the liberty strand of the due process clause does not disqualify his crucial perspective of due process from the capital context, which implicates both the
life and liberty strands of the Due Process Clause. All discussion of individual liberty is moot
unless the individual is alive to appreciate that liberty. Conviction and imprisonment result in a
severe curtailment of liberty interests, not a complete forfeiture.
444. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
445. In Casey, the Court drew heavily on Justice Harlan's conception of substantive due process and specifically the principle that due process is an evolving concept. The Court quoted
Justice Harlan on this point: "Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code." Id. at 849 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
446. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
447. Id.
448. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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adopted in Bowers was incorrect because, in large part, it failed to
appreciate that antisodomy laws severely intrude into the private relationships, homes, and lives of individuals. 44 9 Those intrusions were
only part of the general denial of autonomy that Casey asserted was at
the heart of liberty. 450 In applying substantive due process and asserting the primacy of liberty interests, specifically those emanating from
privacy and autonomy, the Court rejected the history-based fundamental rights analysis from Bowers.451 That rejection was due in large
part to the fact that Bowers's assertion that the proscription against
homosexual sodomy had "ancient roots" was not accurate. 452 Lawrence thus refused to bind the parameters of substantive due process
to historical grounds because: "[H]istory and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry. ' 453 According to the Court, Bowers and its overstated
reliance on historical grounds "demean[ed] the lives of homosexual
persons.

'4 54

It is significant that the district court linked its understanding of due
process with the standard for interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 4 55 These two modes of interpretation overlap. Both
the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause have the ability
to invalidate conduct and even laws when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict with evolving standards of decency or evolving standards of fairness and ordered liberty. For example, forms of
punishment, such as drawing and quartering, thumb screws, and public execution, are inconsistent with evolving standards of decency and
are thus barred by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. Similarly, mandatory death sentences and imposition of the death penalty for rape were once acceptable but are now
unconstitutional. The 113 innocent individuals who were "convicted
by due process of law" 456 in trials in which "the Constitution offer[ed]
unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent ' 457 and were
449. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2477.
450. Id. at 2481-82.
451. Id. at 2478.
452. Id. at 2478-79.
453. Id. at 2480 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
454. Id. at 2482.
455. "[I]t
is settled law that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment must be interpreted in light of evolving standards of decency." United States v. Quinones,
205 F. Supp 2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
456. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
457. Id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sentenced to death, spent years on death row, and even came within
hours of execution, signify that the Due Process Clause must take on
new meaning in capital cases. Wrongful convictions are antithetical to
any formulation of due process. The due process that convicted the
death row exonerees cannot be the same due process that is required
for heightened reliability and fairness in capital cases. A backwardlooking standard that defines fundamental rights only by what is historically acceptable does not have the capacity to incorporate the evidence of wrongful convictions, risks perpetuating manifest injustices,
and freezes the meaning of due process.
b.

Due Process Defined by History

Instead of interpreting the meaning of due process along a rational
continuum, the Second Circuit defined due process solely by precedent and history. 458 That interpretation potentially freezes the meaning of due process and frustrates its purposes. Further, the Second
Circuit's argument that Furman, Gregg, and the framers accepted capital punishment in light of the realization that innocents could be executed is only possible by ignoring the significance of recent
knowledge. While the Court in Furman and Gregg and the framers
may have been conscious of the risk of wrongful convictions, their
perspectives are not informed by the recent wave of exonerations or
the revolutionary impact of DNA testing.
The Second Circuit improperly patched together the concurring
opinions of Justices Marshall and Brennan when it asserted that the
issue presented in Quinones "was squarely before the Court in
Furman. ' 459 In Furman, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall each
discussed the risk of executing innocent persons in their concurring
opinions. 460 Justice Brennan mentioned innocence when he discussed
the ultimate severity of the death penalty and asserted that due to
human fallibility, the execution of an innocent person was an inevita4 61
ble event and an extreme instance of the degrading human dignity.
Justice Marshall argued that the fact that innocent people have been
executed is an example of information that, if known by the public,
458. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2002).
459. Id. at 65.
460. Furman v Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
461. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan couples the execution of an innocent person with the execution of someone whose conviction was later held to be unconstitutional by a subsequent opinion. Id.

2004]

DEATH DENIES DUE PROCESS

1835

would lead to widespread condemnation of capital punishment. 462
Still, the Furman Court did not pass on the precise issue presented in
Quinones. It is impossible that either the Furman or Gregg Courts
could have been "keenly aware of the argument asserted here" 463 because the shocking evidence of the extent of capital punishment's fallibility was not available in 1976. Indeed, DNA testing, which was
instrumental in first revealing the disturbing unreliability of capital

punishment systems, was not widely available prior to

1994.464

In concluding that the district court erred by interpreting due process according to evolving standards rather than locating the asserted
right in history and tradition, the Second Circuit relied on the substantive due process analysis set forth in Washington v. Glucksberg.465

The dominance of the history-based interpretation of due process 466
stems from the Court's deference to states' "considered expertise in
matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process.

' 467

Indeed,

462. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also argued that knowing that the
death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner against "identifiable classes of people"
would lead to greater criticism of capital punishment. Id.
463. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 67 (2d Cir. 2002).
464. See Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S.486, 107th Cong. (2001) § 101(a)(3) ("While
DNA testing is increasingly commonplace in pretrial investigations today, it was not widely
available in cases tried prior to 1994.").
465. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 61 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)). In Glucksberg, the Court held that a state law banning assisted suicide did not violate
substantive due process. 521 U.S. at 735. The Court observed that two primary considerations
inform a substantive due process analysis. First, the Court attempts to identify if the asserted
right is one that is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition ...and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Second, the Court requires a "careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest." Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the Court looks to the "Nation's history, legal traditions,
and practices," which "provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking." Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even under the history-based analysis applied in Glucksberg, the right that the defendants
claimed was imperiled-the right not to be executed when innocent-is deeply rooted in legal
tradition. For an analysis and discussion of the fundamental right to life, see Daniel G. Bird, Life
on the Line: Ponderingthe Fate of a Substantive Due Process Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2003).

466. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, Justice Scalia argued for a return to the
history-based approach that was first announced in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 499 U.S. 1, 29 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). No other Justice joined Justice Scalia's opinion in Pacific Mutual; however, the arguments he expressed structured the Glucksberg decision, which he authored. The relative recentness of these decisions strongly suggests that the history-based approach is not the sole,
authoritative standard and is not itself deeply rooted.
467. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Also contributing to the use of the history-based
approach is the Court's fear that the individual, subjective interpretations of individual courts
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the majority of cases the Second Circuit cited in support of the history-based interpretation of due process involved disputes over state
laws. 468 The Court's assertion in Patterson v. New York that "[d]ue
process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent
person" 469 indicates extreme deference to state criminal procedures,
rather than a proclamation on the issue of innocence. 4 70 The absence
of state law and criminal procedure in Quinones militates against a
strict application of the history-based interpretation of due process.
Affirming the district court's evolving standards due process analysis
would not require a wholesale abandonment of the standard Glucksberg articulates. Further, even proceeding under the history-based
analysis "reveals that common law courts were in fact exceptionally
concerned with the reliability and fairness of capital procedures, a
concern that was clearly driven, as it is today, by the extremity and
'4 71
finality of the death sentence.
could unduly expand or contract the scope of due process protections. See Glucksberg,521 U.S.
at 720.
468. See United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 62 (2d Cir. 2002). The Second Circuit cited
the following cases, amongst others, where the Court considered the validity of state laws or
criminal procedures and applied a history-based interpretation of due process: Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 707 (WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.26.060(l) (1994)) ("A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide"); Medina, 505
U.S. at 440 (CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1369(f) (West 2000)) (allocating the burden of proving

incompetence to the defendant) ("[I]t shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent"); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (recognizing that a state court was not required
to give jury instructions on a lesser included offense of theft); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977) (considering New York's homicide statute, NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKin-

ney 1975)), and hearing a challenge to the procedures that allocated the burden of proving the
mitigating circumstances of severe emotional distress to the defendant).
469. Patterson,432 U.S. at 208.
470. In Patterson, the Court's deference to state law and criminal procedure was explicit:
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion), and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States.
Among other things, it is normally "within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of persuasion," and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless "it offends some principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Id. at 201.
471. Thurschwell, supra note 12, at 17. Thurschwell also notes: "Indeed, it was an accepted
tenet in 17th and 18th Century England that, in favorem vitae ("in favor of life"), indictments,
statutes, and procedural rules in capital cases had to be "construed literally and strictly." The
doctrine that "death is different" has far deeper historical roots than has previously been
credited." Id. at 17 (footnote omitted, quoting SIR MATTHEW HALE, 2 HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 35 (1763)).
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History and tradition are proper guides for establishing the parameters of due process; however, ignoring current developments and recent revelations will inevitably lead to laws and principles that do not
comport with contemporary standards of procedural fairness and ordered liberty. History and tradition should serve as starting points
and not ending points in due process inquiries. 47 2 Further, the history
and tradition test is highly arbitrary, particularly when the Court
selects a specific period of history. 473 To repeat Justice O'Connor's
position, the verbal formulae applied are irrelevant; the execution of
an innocent person, which is the defendants' central argument, is repugnant to the Constitution. The Second Circuit avoided this principle by applying the Due Process Clause in an unduly formalistic
manner.

c.

474

Construing Due Process, Regardless of the Verbal Formula

Ultimately, neither the evolving standards nor the history-based approach represents the unequivocally authoritative standard for defining the scope of due process. 475 Regardless of the verbal formula a
472. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003).
473. See Peter Preiser, Rediscovering a Coherent Rationale for Substantive Due Process, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 8-18 (2003). Preiser states:
[T]hough constructed with impressive phrases, the history-and-tradition test is mere
brutum fulmen. Apart from the malleability of the test itself, it is subject to three basic
flaws. First there has not been a consistent rationale for identifying the period of history selected to serve as the reference point for the national tradition. Second, the
Court consistently has disregarded "deeply rooted" historical traditions to justify its
predilections in creating and expanding new "specially protected" liberties. Third, it
has rejected claims of modern liberty interests on the basis of blindly accepted social
taboos of past cultures. In other words, it turns the clock back and neglects to consider
a claim "in light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
474. For an argument against the "originalist" position that the Government argued and the
Second Circuit adopted, see William J. Brennan, Jr., ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Death
Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313 (1986). Justice Brennan argued that the
theory that the death penalty is constitutional because the framers did not believe it to be cruel
and unusual was "superficial." Id. at 324. Judge Rakoff echoed Justice Brennan's point that the
text of the Fifth Amendment "merely requires that when and if death is a possible punishment,
the defendant shall enjoy certain procedural safeguards, such as indictment by a grand jury and,
of course, due process." Id. The position taken by the Second Circuit resembles what Justice
Brennan called "arrogance cloaked in humility." Id. at 325. Due to its heavy and uncritical
reliance on "original intent" and precedent, the Second Circuit was able to ignore the compelling
evidence of the unreliability of capital punishment systems and ultimately sidestep the defendants' arguments.
475. The Court's recent use of the history-based approach "has hot halted the continuous
growth in due process regulation, and has not prevented the court from imposing due process
requirements invalidating practices that had been followed for many years in many states."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.7(b) (2d ed. 2003).
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court adopts, the scope of due process protections "includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. ' 476 There is nothing more arbitrary than a criminal process
that cannot distinguish between the innocent and the guilty. And the
execution of an innocent person is the "ultimate arbitrary imposition. '477 If the requirements for heightened reliability and fairness in
capital cases are to be more than mere rhetorical gestures, then the
"unacceptably high rate at which innocent persons are convicted of
capital crimes" 47 8 strongly suggests that any death sentence is the "ultimate arbitrary imposition."
The creation of a substantial risk of executing the innocent is as
significant as the execution of the innocent. In the context of capital
cases, the creation of a substantial risk is tantamount to the actual
existence of the risk. Gregg observed that Furman "held that [the
death penalty] could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. ' 479 The arbitrariness that results from death penalty systems that cannot distinguish between the guilty and the innocent is reminiscent of the pre-Furmanlandscape when there was "no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death
'480
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
2.

Innocence in the Supreme Court-Understandingthe Import of
Herrera

After rephrasing the defendants' argument and misstating Herrera's
holding, the Second Circuit concluded that Herreraforeclosed the defendants' claims. Herrera does not control the outcome in Quinones
because the two cases are procedurally distinguishable. Yet Herrera
provides guidance on the issue of innocence in capital cases. That paradoxical relationship is clear after recognizing the core holding in
Herrera.
In Herrera,Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted: "[A] truly persuasive
demonstration of actual innocence made after trial would render the
476. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
477. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 437 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
478. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
479. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
480. Id. at 188 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Furman v. Georiga, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972))
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 420 ("Today,
perhaps not surprisingly, we find ourselves in a moment not dissimilar to the one that immediately preceded Furman and its progeny.").
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Justice White con-

curred with the principle that executing an innocent person is unconstitutional. 482 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, emphasized that "the execution of a legally and factually
'483
innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.

Justice O'Connor's concurrence explicitly stated that the Court did
not hold that the execution of an actually innocent person did not
offend the Constitution. 484 Taken together, the Chief Justice's asser-

tion and the concurring opinions convey that executing an innocent
person is unconstitutional. The overwhelming concurrence on this
point suggests that it was not made for the Court's own analysis, as the
485
Second Circuit posited when it ignored the concurring opinions.
Without the assertion that there can be a showing of actual innocence,
albeit a very strong showing, that would render an execution unconstitutional, it is less likely that the two crucial votes of Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy would have sided with the majority. Herrera assumes

the right not to be executed when innocent because the Court was not
presented with a bona fide claim of actual innocence in a capital

case. 486 That the Court assumed that executing the innocent is unconstitutional strengthens rather than weakens the claim because the

Court essentially protected a right that was not in fact before it.
The second crucial aspect of Herrerais that to warrant habeas relief,

the petitioner must make a "truly persuasive" showing of actual innocence. 487 Thus, it is unconstitutional to execute the actually innocent,
but to obtain habeas relief a petitioner must meet an "extraordinarily
481. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Any doubts that this is the core holding of
Herreraare answered by subsequent courts that cite this portion of Justice Rehnquist's opinion
as the holding. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 n.28 (1995).
482. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
483. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Only Justices Scalia and Thomas, who concurred,
did not explicitly assert that the execution of an innocent person was unconstitutional. Justice
Scalia wrote that newly discovered evidence relevant to guilt or innocence did not provide
grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. Id. at 428-29 (Scalia, J., concurring). One author concluded that Justices Scalia and Thomas "clearly believe that the Constitution provides no protection whatsoever to a condemned innocent person for whom the justice system has failed-even
when the result is the taking of an innocent life." Kathleen Cava Boyd, The Paradox of Actual
Innocence in Federal Habeas Corpus After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. REV. 479, 494 (1994).
484. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
485. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2002).
486. See infra note 588.
487. Herrera,506 U.S. at 517. It is significant that the Court has never explicitly defined what
the "truly persuasive" standard actually means. The Court has not provided specific criteria for
what a petitioner must show to pass the threshold set in Herrera. Leonel Herrera failed to make
this threshold showing; however, Lloyd Schlup did make a showing of actual innocence that was
of a sufficient degree to serve as a gateway for distinct constitutional claims. See Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 315-17 (1995).
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high" threshold. 48 8 In the Court's eyes, Leonel Herrera fell well short
of this high bar.48 9 In light of the Court's position that executing the
innocent is unconstitutional, it is improper to overemphasize this second aspect of the holding. Herrera's inability to make a truly persuasive showing of actual innocence, which barred habeas relief, has no
affect on the proscription against executing the innocent.
Herreraalso explicitly stated that, by itself, "actual innocence is not
itself a constitutional claim. ' 490 The Second Circuit concluded that
this language clearly foreclosed the defendants' claim. 4 91 But taken in
context, it is clear that the Supreme Court ostensibly diminished the
value of actual innocence only because the claim was brought in a
successor petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 9 2 Limits on habeas
relief in light of finality and federalism dominate Herrera.493 Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote: "But this body of our habeas jurisprudence
makes clear that a claim of actual innocence is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner
must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered
on the merits. '4 94 The Second Circuit cited this language, including
"our habeas jurisprudence," 495 yet it failed to address the glaring procedural differences between Herrera and Quinones.496 Quinones does
488. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
489. See id. at 417-19 (Petitioner's "showing of innocence falls far short of that which would
have to be made in order to trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have assumed,
arguendo, to exist."); id. at 421-25 ("Nonetheless, the proper disposition of this case is neither
difficult nor troubling. No matter what the Court might say about claims of actual innocence
today, petitioner could not obtain relief.") (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 421
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 424 ("The conclusion seems inescapable: Petitioner is guilty.
The dissent does not contend otherwise.") (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Bandes, supra
note 430 at 505 n.20 (discussing how Herrera's claim was "extremely weak").
490. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
491. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 68.
492. One commentator has phrased the issue presented in Herrerain terms that clearly convey that the case was controlled by habeas jurisprudence: "[T]he Court was asked to decide, for
the first time, whether a death-row inmate's claim of actual innocence, not linked to any particular procedural errors that might have occurred during the inmate's state trial or appellate litigation, may serve as the basis for a grant of federal habeas corpus relief." Joseph L. Hoffman, Is
Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's Continuing Problems with Federal
Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817 (1993). See also Boyd, supra note 483, at
488 (noting that the "principal issue in Herrera was whether Leonel Herrera's claim of actual
innocence, based on newly discovered evidence, constituted grounds for federal habeas relief").
493. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400-401.
494. Id. at 404.
495. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 67.
496. Id. at 68. The Court of Appeals neglected to discuss the crucial procedural differences
between Herreraand Quinones, which is emblematic of its imposition of a process-oriented solution when the issue was substantive. See Hoffman, supra note 492, at 825 (discussing the difficulties of a process-oriented solution to substantive problems). The two problems Professor
Hoffman identifies are: procedural law can be expanded beyond its limits in an endeavor to
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not fold into the complicated "body of our habeas jurisprudence" because Quinones was decided on a pretrial motion. Motivated by the
desire to shelter federal courts497 from a deluge of "frivolous claims of
actual innocence, ' 498 the Court limited the role of a stand-alone claim
of actual innocence to that of a gateway for other procedurally defaulted constitutional claims to pass through in order to be heard on
their merits. Unlike Leonel Herrera, the defendants in Quinones ap-

499
peared before the court with their presumption of innocence intact.

Further, Herrera does not control the issue presented in Quinones
because the majority failed to reach the issue of actual innocence on
substantive due process grounds; 50 0 substantive due process was crucial in informing the decision in Quinones. Even though the core
holding of Herrera is deeply invested in actual innocence, the disposi-

tion of the case was dictated by the prevailing concerns of habeas jurisprudence. 50 1 As Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted: "The question
before us, then, is not whether due process prohibits the execution of
an innocent person, but rather whether it entitles petitioner to judicial
review of his 'actual innocence' claim. ' 502 The latter concern is not an
issue in Quinones; it is the former issue-whether the government can
execute the innocent-that is central. Herrera supplies the answer to
achieve perfect results and procedural law can become unduly complex and over regulate substantive law it is intended to facilitate. Id.
497. "Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal
habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401.
498. Id. at 426 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
499. As Justice Rehnquist described, Herrera "[did] not come before the Court as one who is
innocent, but, on the contrary, as one who has been convicted by due process of law of two
brutal murders." Herrera,506 U.S. at 399-400. See United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d
49, 75-76 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that Herreradoes not foreclose a defendant's challenge to the
FDPA because the defendant had not been convicted).
500. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 407 n.6. "The issue is properly analyzed only in terms of procedural due process." Id.
501. Failure to recognize this crucial distinction contributes to an improper view of Herrera
and issues of innocence in capital cases. For example, in United States v. Church, 217 F. Supp. 2d
700 (W.D. Va. 2002), the defendant, in a pretrial motion, urged the district court to adopt the
Judge Rakoff's analysis. The district court refused to do so and observed that "[t]he Supreme
Court's decision in Herrera thus forecloses the argument that the inherent fallibility of the criminal justice system supports a due process attack on the death penalty." Id. at 702. The district
court neglected to consider the overriding habeas corpus concerns in Herrera, which were entirely absent from the case before it. Id. at 700-02.
502. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407 n.6. See also id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) Justice
O'Connor stated:
The issue before us is not whether a State can execute the innocent. It is, as the Court
notes, whether a fairly convicted and therefore legally guilty person is constitutionally
entitled to yet another judicial proceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt anew, 10
years after conviction, notwithstanding his failure to demonstrate that constitutional
error infected his trial.
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this question: "the execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event. ' 50 3 That it would be
constitutionally intolerable to execute an innocent person provides
the starting point rather than the conclusion for Quinones. However,
Herrera is still central to the outcome in Quinones.
The Second Circuit concluded that Herreraestablished that there is
no fundamental right to a continued opportunity to prove one's innocence, which foreclosed the defendants' argument. 50 4 That conclusion
misrepresents both Herrera and the defendants' argument. The Second Circuit improperly severed the factual basis of the defendants'
argument. That factual basis recognizes that capital punishment systems create a significant risk of wrongful convictions and executions.50 5 The conclusion that the FDPA is unconstitutional because
execution prevents innocent individuals from proving their innocence
is inextricably intertwined with the recognition of an "unacceptably
high rate at which innocent persons are convicted of capital
crimes. ' 50 6 Neglecting to consider that factual predicate enabled the
Second Circuit to argue that Herreracontrolled.
Illustrative of the Second Circuit's muddling of Herrera'sproclamations on the "fundamental right" at issue in Quinones is its assertion
that "[t]he [Herrera]Court then declined to hold that 'execution of a
person who is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted'
amounts to an independent violation of either the Eighth Amendment
or the Due Process Clause. ' 50 7 The full text from which the Second
Circuit quoted demonstrates that procedural concerns significantly
impacted the Court's holding:
But the evidence upon which petitioner's claim of innocence rests
was not produced at his trial, but rather eight years later. In any
system of criminal justice, "innocence" or "guilt" must be determined in some sort of a judicial proceeding. Petitioner's showing of
innocence, and indeed his constitutional claim for relief based upon
that showing, must be evaluated in the light of the previous proceedings in this case, which have stretched over a span of [ten]
508
years.
Concerns for finality in judgments and deference to state court criminal procedures compelled the Herreradecision, not constitutional concerns for a fundamental right not to be executed when innocent.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Quinones, 313 F.3d at 67-68.
See Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
Id.
Quinones, 313 F.3d at 67 (quoting Herrera,506 U.S. at 398).
Herrera,506 U.S. at 398.
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The Second Circuit also misstated the district court's identification
of the liberty interests at stake. Failing to accurately cite the district
court opinion facilitated the Second Circuit's imposition of Herrera.
The Second Circuit asserted that "the District Court erred in recognizing a "[fundamental] right of an innocent person not to be deprived,
by execution, of the opportunity to demonstrate his [or her] innocence. ' 50 9 In the place of "fundamental," which the Second Circuit
imposed, the district court wrote, "[i]f protection of innocent people
from state-sponsored execution is a protected liberty, and if such protected liberty includes .
"...-510
The excised material was in response
to the Government's argument that Congress performed a "death
calculus" and assumed the risk of executing innocents when it enacted
the FDPA. 511 Replacing the material with "fundamental" is misleading because the full text shows that the opportunity to demonstrate
one's innocence flows directly from the protected liberty interest of
not being executed when one is innocent. The fundamental right is
the protected liberty interest of not being executed when innocent.
The right to prove one's innocence flows from this protected interest.
The Second Circuit improperly identified the right to prove one's innocence as the fundamental right at issue here. In so doing, the Second Circuit phrased the issue in Quinones in terms of the rights that
are extended to convicted persons and the opposing interests of finality and federalism. By improperly framing the issue presented, the
Second Circuit effectively allowed inapposite principles of habeas jurisprudence to trump the right not to be executed when innocent. The
5 12
Second Circuit thus evaded the core of the district court's opinions.
In response to the district court's argument, the Second Circuit transformed Herrera into an impervious blockade.
Contrary to the Second Circuit's conclusion, affirming the district
court would not require overruling Herrera. Overruling Herrera
509. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 69 (quoting Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 261) (substitution in
original).
510. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
511. See id. at 261.
512. The Second Circuit's conclusion also shows that it failed to appreciate the significance of
the evidence presented before it. In writing that it would not overrule Herrera"based solely on
a statistical or theoretical possibility that a defendant might be innocent," the court appears to
reference Liebman's A Broken System studies. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 63. A Broken System I
and II played a minor role in the district court's opinions. In Quinones l the district court used
Liebman's studies only to defend them from the government's "ad hominem" attacks. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Consistent with the Second Circuit's failure to address the factual
basis of the district court's opinion, it improperly discounted the significance of Liebman's studies, corroborating state and federal studies, and the living examples of capital punishment's failures, who represent more than a "theoretical possibility" of failure.
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would require confronting the Court's position on the habeas issues
presented in Herrera. These issues were not implicated in the district
court's opinion. Of the three bedrock principles of the Court's habeas
jurisprudence, "finality, federalism, and fairness, '5 13 only fairness is
directly at issue in Quinones. Thus, Quinones emphasizes the individual interests at stake rather than the systemic interests that dominated
Herrera. Finality and federalism only came into play after the Second
Circuit improperly phrased the district court's opinion and the defendants' arguments. Further, Quinones is consistent with Herrera'sposition that executing the innocent is unconstitutional, a position that the
Second Circuit goes to great lengths to discount.
3.

Challenging the FDPA Without Using the Eighth Amendment

The district court decided Quinones on due process rather than on
Eighth Amendment grounds, even though the defendants presented
Eighth Amendment claims. 5 14 A brief analysis of the Supreme
Court's attitude toward the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in
capital cases reveals that there may be substantial advantages in electing to use the Due Process Clause. These advantages arise from the
Court's narrowing of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Ultimately, the district court's application of the Due Process Clause
demonstrates that it is a potentially viable alternative to the Eighth
Amendment in challenges to death penalty systems.
In Gregg, the Court announced the analysis for determining if a
criminal punishment is excessive and is thus not in accord with the
"dignity of man": "First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must
not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 515 "Excessiveness" must be defined according to "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' 51 6 To determine these contemporary values, the Court looks "to objective indicia
that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction" and not to its
own subjective judgment. 51 7 The best indication of the public's attitude toward a specific criminal punishment is through state legisla513. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 697 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
514. See United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 419 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
515. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). The Court rephrased this analysis when it
stated that legislation has a presumption of validity. A punishment is valid under the Eighth
Amendment unless it is "cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved." Id. at
175.
516. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
517. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
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tures. 51 8 The other primary indication of contemporary values is the
jury. 5 19 A punishment is cruelly inhumane and excessive if it does not
"comport[ ] with the basic concept of human dignity. '520 A punishment that has no purpose other than to inflict pain and suffering is not
in accord with human dignity. The Court determined that the penological justifications of retribution 52 1 and deterrence 52 2 are acceptable
purposes for capital punishment.
In Coker v. Georgia, the Court reaffirmed the analysis set forth in
Gregg: "Under Gregg, a punishment is excessive and unconstitutional
if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to
524
the severity of the crime. '523 The Court analyzed state legislation
and the sentencing decisions of juries, 525 which both showed that imposing the death sentence for rape did not comport with evolving
standards of decency. However, the Court emphasized that the analysis did not end with the attitudes of legislatures and juries. The Court
stated that its "own judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. ' 526 The Court used its "own judgment" in an extensive analysis
and determined that the death penalty was disproportionate to the
5 27
crime of rape.
In Enmund v. Florida,528 the Court held that it was unconstitutional
to impose the death penalty when the defendant did not kill or intend
to kill. 52 9 The Court examined state legislatures, 530 sentencing habits
518. Id. at 179-81.
519. Id. at 181-82.
520. Id. at 182.
521. "Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death."
Id. at 184.
522. The Court acknowledged that the deterrent effect of capital punishment was inconclusive
and is absent from murders committed in the heat of passion; however, it concluded that "for
many [other murders] the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent." Id. at 185-86.
523. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
524. Id. at 594-96.
525. Id. at 596-98.
526. Id. at 597. Justice Powell separately concurred with this assertion: "objective indicators
are highly relevant, but the ultimate decision as to the appropriateness of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment ...must be decided on the basis of our own judgment in light of
the precedents of this Court." Id. at 603-04 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
527. Id. at 597.
528. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
529. Id. at 801.
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of juries, 53 1 and the penological interests of retribution and deterrence. 532 This latter analysis followed and folded into the Court's application of the proportionality test. The Court affirmed Coker's
assertion that it had a role in determining whether the death penalty
was grossly disproportionate to the crime: "[I]t is for us ultimately to
judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the
534
death penalty on one such as Enmund. ' '533 Thompson v. Oklahoma
cited this crucial language when it emphasized that the judge played a
fundamental role in determining when the death penalty was
535
appropriate.
The role of the judge in the proportionality analysis came under
heavy fire in Stanford v. Kentucky.536 In Stanford, Justice Scalia argued that the essential factors in determining contemporary attitudes
toward a punishment are "statutes passed by society's elected representatives. '537 For the majority, state legislation was the most reliable
indication of whether a punishment is cruelly inhumane. Justice Scalia
only briefly addressed the sentencing habits of juries. 538 He also discounted the value of socioscientific evidence that suggested that imposing the death penalty on individuals under eighteen years old has
limited effects on the penological interests of deterrence and retribution. 539 In doing so, Justice Scalia "emphatically reject[ed]" the contention that judges can use their "own informed judgment[s]" to
interpret evidence. 540 The plurality expressed its distaste for the "so530. Id. at 789-93.
531. Id. at 794-96.
532. Id. at 789-801.
533. Id. at 797.
534. The Court also reiterated that it must look to legislatures and juries to determine contemporary standards for Eighth Amendment purposes. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
823-33 (1988).
535. Id. at 833. See also id. at 823 n.8, in which the Court cited Coker to support this
proposition.
536. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the capital punishment for individuals who were sixteen and seventeen at the time the capital offense was committed is not
unconstitutional).
537. Id. at 370. Justice Scalia first annunciated a narrower Eighth Amendment test in his
Thompson dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. There, Justice Scalia argued that the meaning of cruel and unusual must be determined by "our national
society" and not by "perceptions of decency" held "by a majority of the small and unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on this Court." Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
538. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373-74.
539. Id. at 378.
540. Id.
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called 'proportionality' analysis" 541 used in Coker, Enmund, and
Thompson:
To say, as the dissent says, that it is for us ultimately to judge
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death
penalty, and to mean that as the dissent means it, i.e., that it is for us
to judge, not on the basis of what we perceive the Eighth Amendment originally prohibited, or on the basis of what we perceive the
society through its democratic processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the basis of what we think "proportionate" and measurably contributory to acceptable goals of punishment"-to say
replace judges of the law with a committee of
and mean that, is to
542
philosopher-kings.
Under this analysis, a judge should never use his or her "own judgment" 54 3 to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate for a
541. Id. at 379.
542. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
543. The reference to "philosopher kings" is telling. It is plainly meant to evoke the "Platonic
Guardian." See generally Matthew E. Albers, Note, Legislative Deference in Eighth Amendment
Capital Sentencing Challenges: The ConstitutionalInadequacy of the Current Judicial Approach,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 467, 495-97 (1999). Members of the Court have elicited the specter of
the Platonic Guardian when urging for judicial restraint in matters. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512
U.S. 874, 913 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We would be mighty Platonic guardians indeed if
Congress had granted us the authority to determine the best form of local government for every
county, city, village, and town in America."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 at 435 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court's role as the final expositor of the Constitution is well established, but its role as a Platonic guardian admonishing those responsible to public opinion as if
they were truant schoolchildren has no similar place in our system of government."); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("However, the Constitution does not
constitute us as 'Platonic Guardians' nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down
laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, 'wisdom,' or 'common
sense'."); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547 (1968) (Black, J., concurring):
This Court, instead of recognizing that the experience of human beings is the best way
to make laws, is asked to set itself up as a board of Platonic Guardians to establish
rigid, binding rules upon every small community in this large Nation for the control of
the unfortunate people who fall victim to drunkenness.
Id. Griswold v. Connecticut was the first case to make use of the "Platonic Guardians" reference. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Arguing that the concurring opinion's due process analysis unduly
invited the use of personal preferences in decision making, Justice Black quoted Judge Learned
Hand: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if
I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." Id. at 526-27 (Black, J., dissenting)
(quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958)).

That the reference to "Platonic

Guardians" in Griswold was in part an attack on the use of substantive due process does not
diminish the contention that the substantive due process argument in Quinones presents an alternative to the Eighth Amendment. There is no doubt that the mere invocation of substantive
due process would encounter as much, if not more, resistance than the Eighth Amendment proportionality test. The point of this argument is not that all the members of the Court would
accept a substantive due process challenge to the death penalty. Rather, certain members of the
Court have a confined view of the Eighth Amendment and have taken and will continue to take
opportunities to narrow the test further until what is cruelly inhumane becomes nothing more
than a survey of state legislatures and brief mention of jury sentencing habits. In light of this
trend, a substantive due process analysis will enable judges to use their "own judgment[s]" and
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particular offender, class of offenders, or crime. That argument folds
the two-step analysis announced in Gregg into a one-step survey of
state legislation. 544 The two-step analysis survived Stanford because
Justice O'Connor did not join the plurality's view that judges have no
role in conducting a proportionality analysis. 54 5 Even though Stanford's perspective of the Eighth Amendment analysis is not controlling, the members of the Court who espoused it have supported it with
increased fervor. Exemplifying this position is the dissent in Atkins.
In Atkins, Justice Stevens applied Gregg's two-part Eighth Amendment analysis and held that executing the mentally retarded violated
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 546 Justice Stevens surveyed state and federal legislation 547 and concluded that there was a
national consensus against executing the mentally retarded. 5 48 Drawing on Coker and Enmund, Justice Stevens stressed that the Eighth
Amendment analysis involved objective evidence as well as his "own
judgment, ' 549 which he used to conduct an "independent evaluation" 5 50 and to determine if there was any reason to disagree with legislation that made the mentally retarded ineligible for the death
penalty. Through its independent evaluation, the Court concluded
that executing the mentally retarded did not serve the penological interests of deterrence and retribution. 55' The majority's independent
investigation inflamed the dissenters, who argued that a narrow
Eighth Amendment analysis was the appropriate standard.
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment must be determined solely by an analysis of legislative
action and sentencing jury determinations. 552 He also labeled the mato apply scientific evidence, which to certain members of the Court is an anathema that has no
place in an Eighth Amendment analysis.
544. One student writer has described the Eighth Amendment analysis employed in Stanford
as a "crude poll" in which the Court makes the Eighth Amendment a slave to majority whims
concerning the severity and necessity of punishment. Albers, supra note 543, at 468-69. Albers
argued that narrowing the Eighth Amendment analysis in Stanford amounted to "an unconstitutional delegation of the Court's authority to decide constitutional issues" where the Court abdicated its role by showing too much deference to state legislatures. Id. at 468.
545. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
546. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)
547. Id. at 313-17. The majority did not examine the sentencing habits of juries. See id. at
324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
548. Id. at 315.
549. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
550. Id.
551. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-19.
552. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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jority opinion "a post hoc rationalization for the majority's subjectively preferred result rather than any objective effort to ascertain the
content of an evolving standard of decency." 553 The Chief Justice argued that the independent evaluation enabled the majority to use irrelevant information in determining a consensus-opinion polls,
international opinion, and the views of professional and religious organizations had no bearing on the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Scalia was more vocal than the Chief Justice in excoriating
the majority for its analysis and declaring its holding to be nothing
more than the product of its "personal views. ' 554 Justice Scalia
echoed the Chief Justice's position that the Eighth Amendment analysis is a narrow test that is limited to "objective indicia, the most impor555
tant of which is legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.
For Justice Scalia, the use of opinion polls and views from the "world
community" epitomized the majority's failure to adhere to the narrow
Eighth Amendment analysis that he argued for in Stanford.556 For the
dissenters, the majority's expansion of what should be a limited
Eighth Amendment analysis was an arrogant "pretension to a
power" 5 57 fit for philosopher kings.
The strong dissents in Atkins evidence a consistent endeavor to
limit Eighth Amendment analysis. This limited analysis closes the
door on compelling scientific evidence that legislatures have not had
time to consider, much less act upon. With the death penalty, any
lapse in time before a vast majority of legislatures can enact laws may
result in the executions of individuals who do not deserve to die. The
district court's due process analysis enables courts to avoid the restrictions and potential consequences of a narrow Eighth Amendment
analysis.
In Quinones, evolving standards of fairness and ordered liberty expand rather than narrow objective factors that determine the scope of
the due process rights of capital defendants. Because "fairness" and
"ordered liberty" are not bound to majoritarian social standards
under the due process analysis, judges may contemplate injustices and
due process deprivations that have not developed into political is553. Id.
554. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
555. Id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
556. Justice Scalia did not hide his disapproval of using public opinion polls, views of professional and religious organizations, and international opinion. He awarded that evidence the
"Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus."' Atkins, U.S. 304,
347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
557. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

1850

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1777

sues.5 58 Substantive due process addresses accuracy in the judicial system and safeguards against legislative and executive conduct that
violates recognized individual interests. The Eighth Amendment,
which is confined to what legislatures deem to be acceptable standards, may be formulated to sanction inaccurate procedures, which is
559
in direct contradiction to the core concerns of Furman and Gregg.
The increased scope of evidence available in the due process analysis
is particularly relevant because the decisionmaker has the power to
apply this information to define the scope of due process protections.
If the defendants in Quinones had brought their claim solely on

Eighth Amendment grounds, the significant evidence that death penalty systems cannot distinguish between the innocent and the guilty
would have no weight. Professor Liebman's studies are irrelevant in
an Eighth Amendment analysis. Similarly, calls for state-funded studies and even moratoriums, which unequivocally express deep concern
about the reliability of capital punishment systems, have no weight in
an Eighth Amendment analysis.
Most importantly, the undisputed fact that over one hundred individuals have been exonerated from death rows across the nation
would be irrelevant. By using the Due Process Clause, the district
court gave constitutional value and weight to these individual trage-

dies.560 These individual tragedies cannot be ignored or subsumed
into a categorical analysis. They represent more than "statistical or
theoretical" 56 1 possibilities that capital punishment is deeply flawed.
558. See Bird, supra note 465, at 1340 ("Majority rule, it would seem, is entitled to little deference when fundamental rights are at stake.").
559. Furman invalidated capital punishment statutes because their procedures did not ensure
against arbitrary results. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Gregg upheld capital punishment statutes because their procedures were tailored so as to diminish the possibility of arbitrary
results. See Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) ("The basic concern of Furman centered
on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily .... The
new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury's attention on the particularized
nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.").
560. A link between due process and preventing wrongful executions is suggested in the
American Bar Association's call for a national moratorium. The ABA called for a moratorium
until states implement procedures "intended to (1) ensure that death penalty cases are administered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due process, and (2) minimize the risk that innocent persons may be executed." A.B.A., Report with Recommendations No. 107 (1997),
available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/recl07.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
561. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d at 69. A blatant diminution of the implications of
the death row exonerations is evident in United States v. Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (S.D. Fla.
2002). In Denis, the defendant argued that the FDPA was unconstitutional based on Judge
Rakoff's findings. Id. at 1252. The district court turned aside these arguments. Id. at 1253. It
concluded that it was unnecessary to reach "the issue of whether the likelihood of executing an
innocent person automatically denies due process" because "the use of statistics that apply to
state death penalty cases cannot support a conclusion of that possibility in federal cases." Id.
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Complete deference to legislatures fails to give adequate weight to
these individuals.5 62 Further, a due process analysis provides judges
with flexibility to act within the bounds of ordered liberty and proce563
dural fairness.
The overlap between the Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendment does not end with the similar form of the evolving standards
tests. Life is a fundamental right. Substantive due process serves as a
safeguard against any arbitrary and unfair deprivations of this right.
In this sense, substantive due process addresses the core purpose of
the Eighth Amendment. As Justice Marshall acknowledged in
Furman:
The concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due
process become so close as to merge when the substantive due process argument is stated in the following manner: because capital
punishment deprives an individual of a fundamental right (i.e., the
right to life), the State needs a compelling interest to justify it. Thus
stated, the substantive due process argument reiterates what is essentially the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment-i.e., punishment may not
be more severe
than is necessary to serve the legitimate interests of
564
the State.
Here, Justice Marshall contended that substantive due process and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause are similar because they each
protect concerns that the state must have a certain level of interest in
The district court was skeptical of statistics, claiming, "they can be easily manipulated," without
any further elaboration. Id. The district court concluded that the death row exonerations and
findings of fallibility amounted to "anecdotal information reported in the media" and "statistics
or anecdotes on state convictions" that were improper bases for any legal decision and were "of
no significance" to a federal case. Id. The district court's ultimate failure to appreciate the
significance of the tragedies that each death row exoneration represents and its exuberant faith
in the federal courts epitomizes avoidance of the glaring problems wrongful convictions present.
562. Excessive deference to state legislatures is not responsive to individual rights and inherently favors upholding death sentences and death penalty statutes. See Susan Raeker-Jordan, A
Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling ConstitutionalConstruct: The Supreme Court's Evolving Standard of
Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455 (1996). Raeker-Jordan notes that
using jury sentencing behavior to determine evolving standards of decency creates "predetermined" results because "juries will have imposed death more often because of the effects of the
procedural rules" and thus, "the 'objective index' of societal standards of decency will show a
favoring of death sentences." Id. at 457-58. Raeker-Jordan also argued that the Court's "selective evaluation of legislative enactments" results in a "death-inclined" standard. Id. at 458.
Raeker-Jordan called for "additional tests [to] ensure the continuing vitality of the Eighth
Amendment and maintain its function as a bulwark against the vengeful and otherwise unrestrained impulses of the majority." Id. at 556.
563. In Furman, Justice Marshall observed that constant deference to legislatures comes at a
cost: "[T]he point has now been reached at which deference to the legislatures is tantamount to
abdication of our judicial roles as factfinders, judges, and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
564. Id. at 359-60 n.141 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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before it can regulate those concerns. 565 For substantive due process,
the state's interest must be compelling because the individual concern,

life, is a fundamental right. Thus, by deciding Quinones on substantive due process grounds, the district court addressed the purposes of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The district court also incorporated essential evidence that would have been precluded under
an Eighth Amendment analysis.
United States v. Sampson 566 illustrates the limits of the Eighth

Amendment evolving standards analysis in the context of the FDPA.
In Sampson, the defendant based one of his challenges to the FDPA
on Quinones and argued that the FDPA is unconstitutional because
'567
"it will inevitably result in the execution of innocent individuals.
The defendant raised that claim on substantive due process and

Eighth Amendment grounds. The court recognized that substantive
due process and the Eighth Amendment overlap, 568 but only ad-

dressed the defendant's Eighth Amendment claims. 569 The court's
discussion of the risks of executing the innocent closely mirrors the
analysis in Quinones, especially with respect to the dramatic impact of
DNA evidence. 570 After considering the high risk of error and coordinate risk of executing the innocent, the court even concluded that "the
FDPA . . . will inevitably result in the execution of innocent people. '571 Then the court turned to the Eighth Amendment and observed that "evolving standards of decency must be ascertained from
objective factors to the maximum possible extent. '5 72 Using the
broader analysis from Atkins, the court noted: international opinion
565. The Second Circuit cited this passage in support of its proposition that substantive due
process extends no protections beyond the scope of the Eighth Amendment. Quinones, 313 F.3d
at 70 n.18. The Second Circuit reasoned that because Gregg established that the death penalty is
not per se unconstitutional, a claim based on substantive due process could not invalidate capital
punishment per se. Id. The language the Court cited does not support the contention that the
scope of the Eighth Amendment demarcates the ultimate scope of substantive due process protections. However, the language does support the applicability of substantive due process in
capital cases. Justice Marshall's observation merely establishes that the government must have a
compelling interest to take a life because the right to life is fundamental. Further, the district
court never declared that the FDPA was per se unconstitutional, which the court of appeals
persistently claimed it did. Id at 69-70.
566. 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 62 (D. Mass. 2003).
567. Id. at 62.
568. Id. at 63 ("[T]he Supreme court essentially treats the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process standards as interchangeable.").
569. Id. at 63-64.
570. Id. at 76-78.
571. Id. at 81.
572. Id. at 83 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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was strongly opposed to the death penalty; 573 public opinion polls; 574
jury decisions showing almost a unanimous rejection of the death penalty; 575 and even the moratoriums in Illinois and Maryland. 576 But
then the court turned to state legislatures and, based on the fact that
thirty-eight states use the death penalty, it concluded: "The objective
evidence is not now sufficient to demonstrate that contemporary standards of decency have generated a national consensus that the death
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because of the risk
of executing the innocent. '577 Thus, the district court cannot translate
its recognition that execution of the innocent is inevitable under the
FDPA into a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim because a majority
of state legislatures have not abolished their death penalties. Using
substantive due process, Judge Rakoff used the inevitable execution
of innocents as a constitutional claim without the strictures the Eighth
Amendment analysis imposes.
In Graham v. Connor578 the Court warned against adopting substantive due process analyses when another constitutional provision
"provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection"
against a specific government behavior. 579 However, the Eighth
Amendment, as Sampson illustrates, fails to address the issue of
wrongful convictions and executions. Substantive due process does
not share the Eighth Amendment's disconnect with those issues.
Thus, Graham does not conclusively require the Eighth Amendment
to control every capital case. The numerous capital cases decided on
due process, rather than on Eighth Amendment grounds, further support that assertion. 580
Quinones was not the product of wanton judicial activism; it was a
"reasoned judgment," based on incontrovertible and shocking evidence that a system wrought with infirm procedures fails to provide
573. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 83.
574. Id. at 84.
575. Id. at 84-85.
576. Id. at 85.
577. Id. at 86.
578. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
579. Id. at 395.
580. See supra notes 385-421 and accompanying text. Graham also specifies that the Eighth
Amendment is the primary source of protection in cases where the punishment is challenged as
excessive and unjustified, not substantive due process, which offers protections that are "at best
redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment." Graham,490 U.S. at 395 n.10. Graham
is thus distinguishable on two grounds. First, Quinones involves a pretrial motion, not a postconviction appeal. Second, due to the different "evolving standards" analyses, the scopes of the
Eighth Amendment and substantive due process are distinct. For additional arguments distinguishing Graham from the capital punishment context, see Bird, supra note 465, at 1376-81.
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the innocent individuals it convicts with sufficient opportunities to

prove their innocence. The district court properly applied the Due
Process Clause as a check on executive and legislative authority. 58 1 In
doing so, the district court emphasized the individual interests at

stake, which is entirely consistent with the origins of the Due Process
Clause. 582 The Second Circuit applied the improper analysis, ignored
crucial evidence, and misstated the defendants' arguments and the
lower court's opinions so that it could fall back on precedent that was

not informed of the extent of capital punishment's fallibility. Declaring the FDPA unconstitutional was the appropriate response to the
evidence presented and the necessary step to ensure "freedom from
' 583
all substantial arbitrary impositions.
C. Fell
Fell acknowledged Quinones,584 but unlike Quinones, it concentrated on a specific procedural aspect of the FDPA. Fell held that the
FDPA violated procedural due process by allowing a death sentence
to be imposed without the protections of the Federal Rules of Evidence. While Fell adopted a different due process analysis than Quinones used, as with its predecessor, the mandate for heightened
reliability in capital cases exerted a substantial influence and guided

its outcome. 585

In many ways, Fell is a natural outgrowth of Ring, which in turn is
the progeny of Jones and Apprendi.586 However, this line of cases
does not conclusively predetermine Fell. The Sixth Amendment guar581. "Due process has always been considered a limitation on all the powers of government,
legislative as well as executive." Morr, supra note 7, at 602.
582. See Morr, supra note 7, at 74. As Mott points out:
Some scholars see in chapter thirty-nine of the Great Charter from the very first protection of general justice and right. According to such an interpretation, this article was
the general norm of all governmental actions and should prove valuable at least as a
moral precept controlling the government in all its dealings with individuals.
Id.
583. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 436 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992)).
584. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. Vt. 2002). Also, Fell's first ground for
relief resembled the Quinones argument: the FDPA "fails to avoid sentences of death for the
factually and legally innocent." Id. at 473.
585. See id. at 491 (Relaxing the evidentiary standards at sentencing "significantly undermines
the reliability of decisions to impose the death penalty."); United States v. Quinones, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (The 68% rate of error noted in A Broken System suggests
that capital cases are less reliable than other cases.).
586. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 490 ("The instant case raises the next issue implicated by the
Apprendi-Ring logic ....").
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antee of trial by jury is the central issue in these cases. 587 The FDPA
conforms to a literal reading of that line of cases because it requires
juries to pass on facts that would lead to the death penalty. 58 8 The
Second Circuit foreclosed any extension of Ring when it asserted that
Ring only required a jury to hear all elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. And because the FDPA provides this, Ring requires no
more. 589 Fell answered the question that the line of cases does not
reach: When the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury and not a
judge sitting alone consider certain information that has specific implications, what other fair trial guarantees are required? 590 Fell concluded that due process requires the presence of the rules of evidence
and the recognition of the rights to confrontation and cross-examination. To gauge the validity of that conclusion, it is important to analyze the role of due process in Fell, the character of statutory
aggravating factors, and the precise nature of the FDPA sentencing
hearing. The Second Circuit failed to address adequately these aspects of the district court's decision.
1.

Due Process in Fell

Due process challenges to infirm procedures are not novel to death
penalty jurisprudence; 59 1 however, successful challenges are few in
592
number and have generally attacked only specific death sentences.
593
By citing Chambers v. Florida, Judge Sessions indicated that procedural due process guided his scrutiny of the FDPA. 594 Chambers also
asserted that the rights to confrontation and cross-examination are
"essential to due process. '595 Procedural due process is the proper
vehicle for challenging statutes that have procedures that create a substantial risk that a defendant's sentence will not be based on accurate
587. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 587 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 471
(2000).
588. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000).
589. Fell, 360 F.3d at 142.
590. See Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
591. The Court has used both the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause protect the
same interests: nonarbitrary sentences, reliability, and enabling the defendant to present a defense. See Christopher K. Tahbaz, Note, Fairness to the End: The Right To Confront Adverse
Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 89 COLUM. L. REV 1345, 1358-1359 (1989).
592. See supra notes 384-422 and accompanying text.
593. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
594. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 485-86. Judge Sessions's conclusion also sounds in procedural due
process: "If capital punishment is to be a part of our federal law, Congress must also determine
the procedure by which the death penalty is to be imposed, consistent with Constitutional standards." Id. at 491.
595. Id. at 486.
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information. 596 The absence of the rules of evidence enables a capital
defendant to be sentenced to death without receiving a fair trial, in
597
violation of procedural due process.
Fell's primary antecedent, Ring, does not apply procedural due process. 5 98 In Ring, the Court ruled that Arizona's death penalty statute
was unconstitutional on Sixth Amendment grounds. 599 Even though
the role played by the Due Process Clause is not immediately clear in
Ring, it was an important factor in Apprendi.60 0 Apprendi's core hold-

ing, which was first announced in Jones, depends as much on the Due
Process Clause as it does on the Sixth Amendment. 601 The Court
framed the constitutional issue in Apprendi as one that implicated the
Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment: "At stake in this case
are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without 'due process of law,' and the
guarantee that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."' 60 2 Apprendi reiterates the principle that due process requires that every element of an offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 60 3 Under
that principle, due process guarantees control the procedures that a
596. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (A sentence based on inaccurate information violates due process.). The sufficiency of a substantial risk is relevant here as it is in Quinones. Gregg's assertion that Furman held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied based
on a substantial risk of infirm sentencing procedures applies to Fell, where the abrogation of the
rules of evidence creates a substantial risk of introducing untrustworthy and unreliable information that could lead to arbitrary sentences.
597. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Mo-rr, supra note 7, at 71 ("[T]here is no doubt that the Englishman considered that judgments not made according to some recognized form of legal procedure were not
due process of law.").
598. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596-97 (2002).
599. Id. at 609.
600. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 243, 249 (2001) (observing that Apprendi is a "modern recognition that due process must apply in some measure in sentencing").
601. The rule, first announced in Jones, and then affirmed in Apprendi, is:
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
602. Id. at 476-77 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (citations omitted).
603. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) ("The Due Process Clause requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.") (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 210 (1977)) (emphasis and external quotation marks omitted).
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sentencing jury uses to find statutory aggravating factors. As the
Court in Apprendi observed:
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute
when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not
others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the
defendant should not-at the moment the State is put to proof of
those circumstances-be deprived of
protections that have, until
60 4
that point, unquestionably attached.
The protections of the rules of evidence "unquestionably attached" up
to the FDPA sentencing hearing. The Government intended to use
the otherwise inadmissible hearsay testimony to prove the aggravating
factors that exposed Fell to a punishment beyond that authorized by
the jury. Due process requires that Fell, or any other FDPA defendant, not be deprived of the rules of evidence at the moment when
they are the most crucial procedural protections at the most signifi60 5
cant stage of the capital proceeding.
Another advantage that the Due Process Clause provides is that as
with Quinones, Fell could not have been decided solely on Eighth
Amendment grounds. The challenge in Fell is to a specific procedure
of the FDPA and not to the punishment itself.6° 6 Addressing the challenge to the FDPA's relaxed evidentiary standard is properly within
the scope of procedural due process, 60 7 but not the Eighth Amendment. 60 Further, the Jones, Apprendi, and Ring line of cases that Fell
relies on is not the objective indicia that the Eighth Amendment re604. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
605. Applying the rules of evidence at the FDPA sentencing hearing honors the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination because the rules would bar the hearsay testimony of Fell's
codefendant. Rights of confrontation and cross-examination stem in part from the Due Process
Clause. See David A. Hoffman, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation
Rights, 42 DUKE L.J. 382, 383-84 (1992).
606. See Thurschwell, supra note 12, at 16 ("The fundamental Eighth Amendment question is
simply whether the individual and crime merit the death penalty, and not whether the procedures by which that question is answered are adequate-which is the question asked under the
Due Process Clause.").
607. "The whole evolution of procedural due process has been in the direction of insisting on
fair procedures." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 242 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
608. "The prohibition of the Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment,
and not to the process by which it is imposed." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court's reluctance to hold that the Eighth Amendment requires
that general evidentiary rules apply at sentencing is further support for the application of due
process, rather than the Eighth Amendment in Fell. As the Court stated in Romano v.
Oklahoma:
Petitioner's argument, pared down, seems to be a request that we fashion general evidentiary rules, under the guise of interpreting the Eighth Amendment, which would
govern the admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing proceedings. We have not
done so in the past, however, and we will not do so today. The Eighth Amendment
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quires. But like the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause re-

quires heightened reliability, especially with reliable procedures.
Judge Sessions makes that point by citing Beck, Gardner, and Simmons, which together show that death penalty statutes that lead to

unreliable and inaccurate results may violate due process. 60 9 Specifically, Gardner recognizes that due process applies at sentencing in
'610
part because of the "interest in reliability.
Williams v. New York 611 is an obstacle to applying additional proce-

dural safeguards at a traditional sentencing hearing, but it does not
prevent applying the rules of evidence at the FDPA sentencing hear-

ing. The Second Circuit relied on Williams when it rejected the district court's call for the rules of evidence at the FDPA sentencing

hearing. 612 In Williams, a capital case, the Supreme Court held that
due process did not require that a capital defendant have the opportu-

nity to confront and cross-examine witnesses during the sentencing
proceeding. 613 The ability of the sentencer to consider all relevant information was significant to the holding. 6 14 The sentencing proceeding in Williams was indeterminate and provided the sentencer with
nearly unbridled discretion. 615 The Williams Court concluded that redoes not establish a federal code of evidence to supersede state evidentiary rules in
capital sentencing proceedings.
512 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1994). The Court implied that the Due Process Clause, not the Eighth
Amendment, was the bulwark against unduly prejudicial evidence when it held that the prosecution could use victim impact evidence at the selection phase. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
825 (1991).
609. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (D. Vt. 2002).
610. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 359.
611. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
612. Fell, 360 F.3d at 143-44.
613. Williams was decided before the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was incorporated into the sentencing process in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
614. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
615. Several commentators have questioned the validity of Williams after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were imposed. See Mark Harris, Note, An Argument for Confrontation
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1886 (1992) (None of the
rationales behind Williams is relevant under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.). Harris notes
that the Williams Court concluded that the right to confrontation was not required at the sentencing proceeding because the sentencing proceeding was not adversarial in nature. Id. at 1885.
The FDPA sentencing hearing is clearly adversarial in nature. The Government has the burden
to prove statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense has the burden of
establishing mitigating evidence by a preponderance of the evidence. In light of the adversarial
nature of the FDPA sentencing hearing, the relevance of Williams' further diminishes. See also
Hoffman, supra note 605 at 411 (noting that Specht limited Williams and that the application of
the "Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing under the Guidelines should be considered independent of Williams"); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated FactFinding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 317-21 (1992) (contending that Williams is "almost wholly inapplicable" in federal
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quiring confrontation rights would be highly impractical. 6 16 Citing
Williams, the Second Circuit concluded that rules of evidence would
prevent sentencing bodies from "consider[ing] a defendant's whole
'61 7
life and personal make-up.
Contrary to the Second Circuit's conclusion, Williams' bar on due
process at sentencing and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the sentencing hearing does not control the relaxed
evidentiary standard at the FDPA sentencing hearing. 6 18 The "elements rule" distinguishes the FDPA sentencing hearing from the sentencing proceeding in Williams.619 Further, Williams does not
preclude the conclusion in Fell because the Williams Court primarily
considered the right of confrontation in light of historical sentencing
620
practices; due process concerns were relegated to the far periphery.
In contrast, Fell used the Due Process Clause to ensure that the right
to confrontation was honored. 621 The Second Circuit relied on historical sentencing practices and did not address the role played by the
statutory aggravating factors in creating a distinct trial at the FDPA
sentencing stage. The following sections analyze those issues.
2.

The Elements of the Capital Crime

The FDPA sentencing hearing is unlike a traditional sentencing
hearing in large part because the statutory aggravating factors function as elements of an aggravated, capital crime. A brief analysis of
the statutory aggravating factors illustrates that point. The FDPA
enumerates twenty-seven aggravating factors for three separate catecourt with Guidelines sentencing, is limited to a "discretion-oriented, indeterminate sentencing
system in state court," and is "undercut" by Gardner).
616. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
617. Fell, 360 F.3d at 143 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
618. Courts frequently cite Williams to deny claims for more procedural rights at sentencing.
See Mark David Harris, Raising the Quality of Evidence at Sentencing, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP.
102 (1992). See Herman, supra note 615, at 316-17, 349 (observing that Williams is "cited more
for its attitude than its law" and listing cases).
619. See Tahbaz, supra note 591, at 1365. Tahbaz notes that arguments for extending fair trial
rights, such as the right of confrontation, that are predicated on the due process clause involve
"likening the penalty phase to the guilt phase of trial." Id. This observation supports the use of
due process in Fell where the sentencing hearing need not be merely likened to the guilt phase of
the trial because the sentencing hearing has the effect of a trial on the issue of the defendant's
guilt of the capital crime.
620. See id. at 1352; Herman, supra note 615, at 321 ("The Williams Court was mce interested
in the ancient history of sentencing procedure than in due process considerations.").
621. One commentator also noted the strong role that federalism played in shaping the
Court's opinion. Herman, supra 615, at 319-21. With the FDPA, there is no need to pay deference to state sentencing procedures.
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gories of offenses. 622 Prior to the sentencing hearing at which the jury
considers aggravating and mitigating factors, the maximum punishment that can be imposed is life imprisonment. A death sentence may
not be imposed unless a unanimous jury finds at least one aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 623 In essence, if the sentencer fails
to find at least one aggravating factor, the Government does not
prove the requisite elements of the alleged capital crime. Donald Fell

is not eligible for the death penalty unless a unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder occurred during a kidnapping; 624 that the murder was done in an especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner; 625 or that he intended to kill or attempted to kill
multiple persons in a single criminal episode. 626 If no aggravating factor is found, the harshest punishment Fell could receive is life in

prison.627 The statutory aggravating factors are elements of a crime

because they expose Fell to a punishment greater than the maximum
punishment that is available prior to the sentencing hearing. As ele-

ments of a crime, the statutory aggravating factors must be proven to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 628 Thus, the statutory aggravating
factors are unlike facts that only enhance a sentence and do not alter

the maximum penalty for a crime.
The FDPA blurs the once distinct line between the guilt and sentencing phases by imposing traditional aspects of a trial at the sentenc-

ing hearing, which suggests that the statutory aggravating factors are
elements of a crime. 629 To further complicate matters, the FDPA stip622. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b)(1)-(3) (2000) lists the aggravating factors for espionage and treason.
Section 3592(c)(1)-(16) lists the aggravating factors for homicide. Section 3592(d)(1)-(8) lists the
aggravating factors for the drug offense death penalty.
623. Id. § 3593(d) (2000).
624. Id. § 3592(c)(1).
625. Id. § 3592(c)(6).
626. Id. § 3592(c)(16).
627. Not finding a statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt must be distinguished from the comparative and independent balancing tests described in § 3593(e). Id.
§ 3593(e). In the comparative balancing test, the sentencer determines if the established aggravating factor(s) sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor(s). 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). If the
sentencer determines that the mitigating factor(s) are not sufficiently outweighed by the aggravating factor(s), it has the discretion not to impose the death penalty. Id. The individual balancing test transpires when there are no mitigating factors. Id. In this situation, the sentencer has
the discretion to determine if the established aggravating factors independently warrant a death
sentence. Id. In each of these contexts the defendant has been convicted of a capital crime,
unlike the situation when no aggravating factors are found and the defendant is only convicted
of the underlying charge, not the capital offense. Id.
628. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
629. To establish an aggravating factor, a unanimous jury must find it to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c)-(d) (2000)). See Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 482. These procedural requirements distinguish Fell from pre-Apprendi cases that held due process does not require
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ulates that the rules of evidence do not apply at the sentencing hearing, which suggests that the statutory aggravating factors are
sentencing factors. The schizophrenic nature of the FDPA is not due
to rogue legislative drafting. Ironically, the confusion stems from the
endeavor to adhere to Furman, Gregg, Woodson, and Lockett. The
trial characteristics, such as enumerated aggravating factors, the requirement for a jury, and stated burdens of proof, address the need
for limited sentencing discretion. The abrogation of the rules of evidence encourage particularized treatment of the capital defendant and
the circumstances of the crime by permitting the sentencer to consider
more information about those issues. Judge Sessions correctly determined the true nature of aggravating factors by looking at their effect. 630 Because the aggravating factors have the effect of exposing
Fell to the death penalty, which is beyond the maximum penalty he
faced prior to the sentencing hearing, they have the effect of elements
of a greater offense. A brief analysis of the Court's most recent distinctions between sentencing factors and elements of an offense sup631
ports this conclusion.
To distinguish sentencing factors from elements, Ring and Apprendi
instruct that the relevant inquiry or dispositive question "is one not of
form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to
a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" 632 Ring emphasizes that any factor that exposes a defendant
"to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished
according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone" was the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense. 633 In contrast, a
sentencing factor "supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense. ' 634 Traditionally, judges "have always considered
the right of confrontation at sentencing. See United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1990). These cases debate the
effect the Sentencing Guidelines had on the defendant's rights at sentencing and ultimately rely
on pre-Guideline sentencing law to reach their conclusions. Castellanos, 904 F.2d at 1494-95;
Beaulieu 893 F.2d at 1180-81. For a discussion of these cases and others that debate the effect of
the Sentencing Guidelines on sentencing, see Hoffman, supra note 605, at 392-93. Together, the
procedural protections already present in the FDPA, Apprendi's "elements rule," and viewing
the FDPA sentencing hearing as a separate trial under Specht and Bullington represent a clear
break from those cases that rely on pre-Guideline sentencing cases.
630. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
631. For a discussion of the Court's debate over elements and sentencing factors, see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110
YALE L.J. 1097, 1102-23 (2001).
632. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
633. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483).
634. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19 (emphasis in original).
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uncharged aggravating circumstances that, while increasing the defendant's punishment, have not swelled the penalty above what the law
has provided for the acts charged. ' 635 In Fell, as in Ring, a statutory
aggravating factor is a "sentencing factor that did swell the penalty
above what the law has provided [and] function[s] more like a tradi'636
tional element.
Harris v. United States instructs that a "judge may impose a sentence within a range provided by statute, basing it on various facts
relating to the defendant and the manner in which the offense was
committed. '637 Sentencing factors are used to base a sentence within
a range provided by statute and not beyond the statutory maximum.
Sentencing factors need not "be alleged in the indictment, submitted
to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. '638 Harris also sets
forth an analysis to determine if statutory terms are elements of a
crime or sentencing factors. That analysis demonstrates that the
FDPA statutory aggravating factors are elements rather than sentencing factors. The first step of the analysis involves asking if the legislature made the disputed term an element or a sentencing factor. 639 In
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,640 congressional intent was plain on the
face of the statute. 641 Neither the FDPA nor the statutes at issue in
Harris contain explicit indications of congressional intent. 642 If congressional intent is not clear, the analysis proceeds to the structure of
the statute. 643 In analyzing the statute at issue in Harris, the Court
observed: "[Flederal laws usually list all offense elements in a single
sentence and separate the sentence factors into subsections. '644 The
word "shall" often divides the elements of the statute and the sentencing factors. 645 For example, "shall" often follows a paragraph or sentence of elements and precedes subsections describing sentencing
factors. "Shall" functions in this manner in Harris. That structure and
635. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 562 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
636. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999)) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
637. Id. at 549.
638. Id. at 549-50.
639. Harris, 536 U.S. at 552.
640. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
641. Id. at 82 n.1 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b) (1982)) ("Proof at sentencing-Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime .... ").
642. See Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 483 n.7 ("A review of the legislative history of the FDPA
reveals no information concerning whether Congress intended to create sentencing factors when
it enumerated the mental culpability factors and statutory aggravating factors.").
643. Harris, 536 U.S. at 553.
644. Id. at 552 (quoting Castino v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
645. Id. at 552-54. See also Jones, 526 U.S. at 233.
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language create the presumption that the statute's "principal paragraph defines a single crime and its subsections identify sentencing

factors.'646 On its face, the FDPA appears to create this same presumption; however, close scrutiny reveals that this is not the case.
The FDPA is unique because it essentially imposes the death penalty on other crimes in the U.S. Code.647 The elements of the underly-

648
ing crime are not set forth in the FDPA itself but in other statutes.

Section 3591 sets forth three categories of crimes for which the death
penalty can be imposed: espionage and treason, 64 9 "any other offense
for which a sentence of death is provided,' 650 and a drug related of-

fense.651 The elements for espionage 652 and treason 653 appear in the
respective statutes for the crimes, not in the FDPA itself. Similarly,
the elements for "any other offense for which a sentence of death is
provided" appear in the other offenses, not in the FDPA.654 In addi-

tion to setting forth the elements of the crimes, each of the statutes
contain penalty provisions when death is an available sentence. 65 5
One would be mistaken to conclude that the aggravating factors in

§ 3592 were sentencing factors by relying simply on this structural
analysis. Jones and Harris considered factors beyond "critical textual
clues. ' 656 Jones also observed that the word "shall" does not "invariably" separate "offense-defining clauses from sentencing provisions"

"elements of the offense [may appear] on either side of
and that
' '657
'shall.'

Indeed, the structural analysis is a starting point that, at
most, leads to a presumption of the character of specific statutory
646. Harris, 536 U.S. at 553.
647. See Little, supra note 183, at 540-41 (discussing how the FDPA "overlays" substantive
federal crimes and is triggered not by the underlying federal offense, but the phrase "if death
results").
648. This is unlike 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2000), which was in dispute in Harris.
649. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1) (2000). The FDPA specifies 18 U.S.C. § 794 ("Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government") and 18 U.S.C. § 2381 ("Treason") as the
statutes that contain the elements of espionage and treason, respectively.
650. Id. § 3591(a)(2).
651. Id. § 3591(b)(1)-(2). The offense must be a violation of § 408 (c)(1) of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 848 (c)(1) (2000)).
652. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
653. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000).
654. Donald Fell was charged with carjacking resulting in death (in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119(3) (2000)) and kidnapping resulting in death (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1201(a) (2000)).
The elements of the crimes are not contained in the FDPA but in the carjacking and kidnapping
statutes.
655. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) ("if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any
if the death of any
number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death."); § 1201(a) ("...
person results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment.").
656. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 536, 553 (2002).
657. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 234 (1999).
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terms. The structural analysis was not solely dispositive in Harris.
The crucial determinative aspect of the factors in Harriswas their effect. 658 Because it seems that the primary purpose in Harris was to
affirm McMillan after Apprendi, it is only logical that the central language in the opinion would relate to sentencing factors that increase
mandatory minimum sentences rather than the dimensions of the
structural analysis. 659 In both McMillan and Harris, brandishing a
weapon was only a sentencing factor that did not alter the maximum
penalty. Instead, those factors "'up[ ] the ante' for the defendant only
by raising to five years the minimum sentence which may be imposed
'6 60
within the statutory plan.
The statutory aggravating factors in § 3592 have the same effect as
the elements in Apprendi and Ring. The "functional equivalents" of
elements are essentially elements. 661 The statutory aggravating factors in the FDPA "swell the penalty above what the law has provided
for the acts charged. '' 66 2 Even though the underlying crimes authorize
the death penalty, 66 3 the aggravating factors in § 3592 "expose [Fell]
to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed" and
are thus elements of a "separate legal offense. ' 664 The availability of
the death penalty in the underlying crimes is not tantamount to the
658. Harris, 536 U.S. at 554.
659. The "shall" structural analysis that was applied in Jones was not used in McMillan.
660. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
661. In United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Va. 2002) and United States v. Regan,
221 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Va. 2002), Judge Gerald Bruce Lee of the Eastern District of Virginia
incorrectly concluded that the statutory aggravating factors were not elements of an augmented
substantive offense. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 680. Judge Lee applied the same analysis verbatim in Lentz and Regan. Because Lentz was the first of the two cases to be decided, the discussion of Judge Lee's analysis will cite to it. Judge Lee concluded that Ring only mandates that a
jury finds the facts required to impose the death penalty. Id. at 675. The district court held that
Ring did not create elements of an aggravated crime. Id. The district court argued that Ring
held that the statutory aggravating factors were the functional equivalents of elements, rather
than "actual elements of a new substantive offense." Id. at 679. United States v. Davis, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5745, at *13-15 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 2003) and United States v. Johnson, 239 F. Supp.
2d 924, 939 (N.D. Iowa 2003), similarly draw a nonexistent distinction between functional
equivalents of elements and elements. That unnecessarily formalistic reading of Ring ignores
that the controlling inquiry is one of effect, not form. The difference between the functional
equivalents of elements and actual elements is purely semantic. In describing the statutory aggravating factors in the Arizona statute as "functional equivalents," the Court did not assign
them a lesser status than elements. It labeled those facts "functional equivalents" because Congress did not formally designate those facts as elements of the crime; however, those facts have
the same effect as elements. United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)
properly recognizes that Lentz, Regan, and Johnson "posit a distinction without a difference."
662. Harris, 536 U.S. at 561-62.
663. The statutes for treason, espionage, and drug related offenses all make the death penalty
available. Section 3591(a)(2) only applies to offense "for which a sentence of death is provided."
18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(2000).
664. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10.
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imposition of the death penalty. That distinction is crucial to understanding how the statutory aggravating factors actually impose a penalty that is greater than what was previously legally prescribed.
Authorization of the death penalty only occurs after the sentencing
hearing. 665 Statutes that trigger the FDPA by making the death penalty available thus do not establish the maximum penalties. Again,
the death penalty can only be imposed because the statutory aggravating factors expose the defendant to it.666
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania667 provides persuasive evidence that the
statutory aggravating factors are elements of a new offense. In the
context of discussing Ring, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas
and Chief Justice Rehnquist in a plurality opinion noted: "for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the underlying
offense of "murder" is a distinct, lesser included offense of "murder
plus one or more aggravating circumstances": Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the
latter increases the maximum permissible sentence to death. ' 668 The
dissenters supported the assertion that statutory aggravating factors in
capital proceedings are elements. 66 9 A majority of the Court thus espouses the view that statutory aggravating factors are not sentencing
factors or functional equivalents of elements that are qualitatively dif670
ferent than elements of an offense.
The Second Circuit did not analyze these issues in the section of its
opinion entitled "Flaws with the District Court's Reasoning."'67 1 In
failing to address the role of the statutory aggravating factors, the Second Circuit did not recognize that those factors effectively make the
§ 3593 sentencing stage a separate trial.
665. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000) explicitly stipulates that the statutory aggravating factors are
elements and not sentencing factors: "If no aggravating factor set forth in section 3592 is found
to exist, the court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law."
666. Concurring in Apprendi, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote: "One need only look to the
kind, degree, or range of punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given set
of facts. Each fact necessary for that entitlement is an element." Apprendi 530 U.S. at 503
(Thomas, J., concurring). Under this analysis, the government is not entitled to seek the death
penalty prior to the sentencing hearing because it has not yet proven any statutory aggravating
factors.
667. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
668. Id. at 111.
669. Id. at 126 n.6 ("capital sentencing proceedings involving proof of one or more aggravating factors are to be treated as trials of separate offenses, not mere sentencing proceedings.")
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
670. See Adam Thurschwell, After Ring, 15 FED. SENT. R. 97, 98 (2002).
671. Fell, 360 F.3d at 143-46.
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A Trial on the Issue of Capital Guilt

Bifurcated capital proceedings, which are comprised of eligibility
and selection phases, are central features of constitutionally valid
death penalty statutes. 672 At the eligibility phase, the prosecution
seeks to convict the defendant "of a crime for which the death penalty
is a proportionate punishment. ' 673 At the selection phase, the sentencer evaluates the offense and the defendant's character and determines if the death-eligible defendant should receive the death
penalty. 674 The jury's decision at the selection phase is more akin to a
moral judgment. 675 Because that evaluation transpires at the sentencing hearing, that stage resembles a selection phase. But characterizing
the FDPA sentencing hearing as a selection phase fails to appreciate
that the sentencing hearing is, in effect, an eligibility phase and is, in
essence, a trial on the issue of capital guilt.
As in Apprendi and Ring, the elements in Fell create a distinct aggravated crime. Prior to the FDPA sentencing hearing, a defendant is
not convicted of a capital offense and the death penalty is not an available punishment. That punishment may only be imposed if the sentencer finds statutory aggravating factors at the sentencing hearing. 676
Thus, the statutory aggravating factors are "element[s] of the aggravated crime. '6 77 Further, the trademark trial procedures support the
characterization of the FDPA sentencing hearing as an eligibility
phase. 6 78 Because the sentencing hearing is the functional equivalent
of a trial, the absence of vital fair trial guarantees, specifically the federal rules of evidence, violates the Due Process Clause.

672. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-95 (1976). The Court concluded that a bifurcated proceeding best addressed the concerns of arbitrary sentencing; however, it also asserted
that bifurcation was not the only procedure that could ensure guided discretion. Id. Nevertheless, bifurcated capital proceedings quickly became the norm after Gregg.
673. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 970 (1994).
674. Id. at 972-73. An individual determination is not possible if the sentencer is precluded
from considering any relevant circumstances of the offense or the offender. Penry, 492 U.S. at
317-18; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Eddings, 405 U.S. at 604.
675. See Robert Alan Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing
Proceeding: Theoretical & PracticalSupport for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information,
60 UMKC L. REV. 411, 433 (1992).
676. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d)-(e) (2000).
677. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 503 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
678. Section 3593 establishes burdens of proof, allows the government and defendant to rebut
any information presented, and provides each side with a "fair opportunity to present argument
as to the adequacy of the information." 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000).
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Fell cited Specht v. Patterson6 79 and Bullington v. Missouri680 in support of its portrayal of the FDPA sentencing hearing as a trial. 681 In
Specht, the trial judge based the defendant's sentence on evidence not
presented to the jury at trial because the defendant was convicted of
indecent liberties under one statute that had a maximum sentence of
ten years but was sentenced under another statute that carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 682 Because the sentencing statute
served as a new charge, the Due Process Clause required that the defendant have access to counsel, confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and offer evidence on his own behalf. 683 Consistent with
Specht, the FDPA requires that a defendant at a sentencing hearing
benefit from counsel, have the opportunity to be heard, and present
evidence. But the statutory abdication of the rules of evidence prevents the defendant from confronting and cross-examining witnesses.
684
Bullington is even more relevant to the FDPA.
Bullington instructs that a separate sentencing hearing in a capital
trial may be the functional equivalent of a trial on the issue of guilt
and innocence. 685 In Bullington, the defendant was convicted of murder at the guilt or innocence stage, 686 but the jury returned a verdict of
"imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole for
50 years"6 8 7 after a separate sentencing hearing. 688 After the defendant obtained a new trial, 689 the prosecution filed notice that it would
seek the death penalty again and use the same aggravating factors that
it attempted to prove at the first trial. 690 But the Double Jeopardy
Clause 691 barred the prosecution from seeking the death penalty a second time because the sentencing hearing at the first trial was "like the
trial on the question of guilt or innocence. ' 692
679. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
680. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
681. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 486-89 (D. Vt. 2002).
682. Specht, 386 U.S. at 607.
683. Id. at 610.
684. Fell emphasizes the relevance of Bullington, stating that the FDPA is "indistinguishable
from Missouri's statute in any meaningful way, [and] warrants the same due process protections." Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
685. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 444.
686. Id. at 435.
687. The Missouri death penalty statute provided two "possible sentences for a defendant
convicted of capital murder: (a) death, or (b) life imprisonment without eligibility for probation
or parole for 50 years." Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
688. Id. at 436.
689. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
690. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436.
691. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
692. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.
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Both the FDPA sentencing hearing and the death penalty statute in
'693
Bullington share "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence.
Those statutes require that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt "additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence"
of the death penalty. 694 As with the FDPA, if the Missouri jury failed
to agree unanimously to impose the death penalty, it could not impose
that punishment. 69 5 Bullington explains that these statutory require'696
ments "afford procedural safeguards to the convicted defendant.
Those safeguards transform the sentencing hearing into "a trial on the
'697
issue of punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes.
But there is one significant difference between the FDPA and the
statute in Bullington. Missouri's death penalty statute subjected the
sentencing hearing to the "laws of evidence," 698 which arguably characterizes the Missouri statute more like a trial than the FDPA sentencing hearing. However, the fact that the sentencing hearing was
"subject to the laws of evidence" was not central to the Bullington
holding and that dissimilarity is not fatal to Fell's reliance on that case.
Bullington shows that the presence of the rules of evidence in the Missouri sentencing statute had little bearing on its holding. Bullington
begins with an extensive summary of the key elements of the death
penalty statute. That description does not mention that that the sentencing hearing was subject to the laws of evidence. Further, all the
other crucial characteristics identified in that passage are present in
699
the FDPA.
In addition to the procedural and substantive factors that the Missouri death penalty statute and FDPA sentencing hearing share with a
trial, the sentencing stages exert pressures on defendants that are similar to the pressures faced at trial.700 Prior to the FDPA sentencing
hearing, the most severe penalty the defendant faces is life imprisonment; however, at the sentencing hearing, the defendant faces the
death penalty, which exponentially augments any "anxiety and
ordeal." These additional emotional factors are unique to death penalty proceedings and are especially pronounced at sentencing hear693. Id. at 439.
694. Id.
695. Id. at 435.
696. Id. at 433.
697. Id. at 438 (citations omitted).
698. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 433 n.4.
699. Id. at 432-35.
700. Id. at 445 ("The 'embarrassment, expense[,] ... ordeal[,].., anxiety and insecurity' faced
by a defendant at the penalty phase . . . surely are at least equivalent to that faced by any
defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial.") (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117, 136 (1980)).
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ings.70 1 Because the sentencing hearing is the functional equivalent of
a trial, due process requires that fair trial guarantees, particularly the
rules of evidence, protect the rights of the defendant.
4. Fixing the FDPA's Fatal Flaw
Not addressing the role of statutory aggravating factors after Apprendi and Ring enabled the Second Circuit to emphasize Gregg and
Williams. The court's assertion that "[f]acts relevant to sentencing are
far more diffuse than matters relevant to guilt for a particular
crime" 70 2 may be true, but does not accurately depict the FDPA sentencing stage. At that stage, the statutory aggravating factors are not
diffuse, but are instead relevant to a particular crime-the capital
crime alleged by the Government.
If a defendant were tried for a crime in a trial in which the rules of
evidence were explicitly renounced, fair trial rights and due process
safeguards would diminish to the point of empty gestures. By not imposing the rules of evidence at the sentencing hearing, the FDPA
makes admissible evidence that would have been excluded prior to
the sentencing hearing. Requiring that the government unilaterally
abide by the rules of evidence at sentencing may remedy that deficiency. That solution would safeguard against unreliable evidence at
sentencing and not restrict the jury's broad discretion to consider miti70 3
gating evidence.
Fell faced a death sentence based on hearsay testimony that was
inadmissible at trial. 70 4 Instead of observing the mandate for heightened reliability at capital proceedings, the FDPA lowered the reliability of Fell's possible sentencing hearing. For Fell, that lowered
reliability encumbered his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation
and cross-examination. 705 Because the declarant of the hearsay testimony, Fell's codefendant, was dead, Fell could not confront and test
the reliability of the evidence that could potentially have led to the
death penalty. Just as the fair trial guarantees are no more than as701. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994) (refusing to extend Bullington's depiction of
the capital sentencing proceeding as the functional equivalent of a trial for Double Jeopardy
purposes to noncapital sentencing proceedings).
702. Fell, 360 F.3d at 143.
703. One potential conflict that arises under a sentencing scheme that requires the government, but not the defendant to follow the rules of evidence is in the context of victim impact
evidence, which the FDPA authorizes in § 3593(a). See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
See also Thurschwell, supra note 670, at 100-01.
704. As the government conceded, this hearsay met no exception. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
705. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").

1870

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1777

pirational notions under the FDPA, the mandate for heightened reliability is gossamer. 70 6 Further, abrogating the rules of evidence inhibits
the jury's discovery of truth and thus impedes the defendant's right to
receive a sentence based on accurate information. 70 7 To prevent the

complete renunciation of the mandate for heightened reliability, due
process requires that the rules of evidence apply at the FDPA sentencing hearing. Applying the rules of evidence would likely prevent the

violation of Fell's rights of confrontation and cross-examination and

70 8
increase the reliability of the sentencing proceeding.
The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge70 9 applied a three-prong balancing test to determine if due process requires particular procedures.
Even though the Mathews test is not the default analysis for all due
process claims, 710 it illustrates when the rules of evidence should apply
706. See Tahbaz, supra note 591, at 1367-71 (discussing how the right to confrontation is essential to ensure reliability and a fair adversarial proceeding); Herman, supra note 605, at 309-10
(Decreased procedural safeguards at sentencing are "undesirable" because defendants are exposed to punishments "on the basis of facts that have not been found in the careful way the
Constitution requires in a criminal trial when significant periods of liberty are at stake.").
707. See Kelly, supra note 675, at 414-19 (discussing the history, policies, and objectives of the
Rules of Evidence). See also Harris, supra note 615, at 1899 (admitting hearsay at sentencing
also undercuts uniformity in sentencing and violates the defendant's right to receive a fair
sentence).
708. For more on the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and reliability, see Maryland v. Craig,497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) ("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to
ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous
testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."). Craig,quoting Dotton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970), also notes: "The mission of the Confrontation Clause is to
advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials
by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony]'". Id. See also Harris, supra note 615, at 1889 (arguing that defendants should have the
right to confront adverse witnesses under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to help ensure reliability and accuracy of the sentencing proceeding.). The informal procedures at sentencing and
the fact-driven determinations that must be made create "problematic" results. Id. at 1880. Harris also argued that under an originalist interpretation, the Confrontation Clause should apply at
the post-Guidelines sentencing hearing, which strongly resembles a "criminal prosecution." Id
at 1889.
709. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
710. The Mathews test is not "an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims."
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002). But see Burns v. United States, 501 U.S.
129, 148 (1991). In Burns, the Court held that a defendant's due process rights were violated
when a federal district court did not provide advance notice of its intent to depart from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Due process required notice of this upward sentencing departure. Id. at 132. To arrive at the conclusion that a federal court could not sua sponte upwardly
depart from the sentencing guidelines without providing notice, the Court interpreted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the requirements of FED. RULE CRIM. P. 32(a)(1). Id. at 135-36.
In dissent, Justice Souter, who was joined in relevant parts by Justices O'Connor and White,
described the Mathews test as having broad applicability: "The Mathews analysis has thus been
used as a general approach for determining the procedures required by due process whenever
erroneous governmental action would infringe an individual's protected interest, and I think that
Mathews provides the right framework for the analysis here as well." Id. at 148 (Souter, J.,
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at the FDPA sentencing hearing. Before announcing the contours of
that analysis, Mathews noted that due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances" 711 and "is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands. '7 12 That analysis involves balancing
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; ... the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that 713
the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Balancing the interests at stake in the FDPA sentencing hearing
weighs heavily in favor of the capital defendant's interest in applying
7 14
the rules of evidence.
At the sentencing hearing, nothing less than the defendant's life is
at stake. After the guilt or innocence stage, the capital defendant's
liberty interests diminish because he may receive a sentence of up to
life in prison. Only after the sentencing hearing may a capital defendant receive a death sentence. That private interest is unparalleled in
significance.
Mathews next requires consideration of the risk of error that is created by the government's chosen procedure. Renouncing the rules of
evidence at the sentencing hearing increases the risk of admitting unreliable evidence and thus greatly augments the risk of error.7 15 That
increased risk of error is also contrary to the mandate of heightened
dissenting). Justice Souter did not indicate any doctrinal barriers that would prevent him from
applying the Mathews test to a federal sentencing issue. Id
711. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
712. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
713. Id. at 335.
714. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), adopted the history-based approach announced in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), instead of the Mathews analysis, when it
concluded that a defendant's due process rights were not violated when California criminal procedure allocated the burden to prove incompetence to the defendant. Medina relied on Patterson over Mathews because at issue was state procedure. Consequently Medina deferred to the
state's "considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process." Medina, 505 U.S. at 445. Medina should not be interpreted to preclude the application of the Mathews test to the FDPA. Such a reading imports an analysis tailored to concerns that are not
germane to an examination of a federal criminal law. See Herman, supra note 615, at 340 (arguing that Medina did not explicitly extend to federal criminal proceedings).
715. The underlying purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to promote "growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. Evin. 102.
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reliability at capital proceedings. Fell illustrates how the relaxed evidentiary standard allows the prosecution to use unreliable, or at least
unverifiable, testimony to prove an element of the capital offense.
Fell could not directly confront his accuser. At best he could collaterally attack the evidence brought against him. Those limitations increased the risk of error and reduced the reliability of the sentencing
7 16
hearing.
To overcome the strong private interest and the substantial risk of
error, the Government's interest in maintaining a sentencing proceeding free of the rules of evidence must be significantly high. Williams v.
New York 7 17 identified the efficiency and practicality of sentencing
hearings as important interests. Williams rejected an argument for allowing cross-examination at sentencing and warned that allowing that
trial right at sentencing would "endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues. ' 718 Specifically, Williams cautioned that cross-examination of probation reports that "draw[ ] on
information concerning every aspect of a defendant's life" would spin
out of control. 719 Contrary to those predictions, the rules of evidence
will not adversely affect the efficiency of the FDPA sentencing hearing. These rules would apply to statutory aggravating factors, not collateral issues. Further, no "retrial" exists because the FDPA does not
require that these statutory aggravating factors be litigated during the
guilt or innocence stage. Also, the trial judge may control the introduction of any collateral matters if the rules of evidence apply. 72 0 Ultimately, the basis for rejecting additional procedures at sentencing
that Williams articulates is not persuasive in respect to the FDPA. In
additional support of that position is the fact that several states re716. The proposal of increasing reliability by imposing more procedural safeguards at the trial
level finds an interesting analogue in a more dramatic suggestion offered by Professor Liebman.
See James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (2002).
Professor Liebman proposed a trade-off where capital defendants exchange existing state postconviction review rights and federal habeas review for higher quality defense counsel, a series of
reforms targeted at the prosecution's decision-making process to seek the death penalty, better
substantive direct review, and improved data collection services. These reforms are "comprehensive, self-evaluative, and self-correcting." Id. at 334. One goal of this proposal is to force the
trial courts to internalize the costs instead of creating errors that create costs, which are absorbed by appellate courts. Id. at 325. In a similar manner, imposing the rules of evidence at the
FDPA sentencing hearing requires the trial court (federal district court) to internalize costs of
error by imposing a procedural regime targeted at minimizing those errors.
717. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
718. Id. at 250.
719. Id.
720. Because FED. R. EVID. 611(b) limits the scope of cross-examination to that of direct
examination, that rule should diminish fears that cross-examination on collateral issues would
create an unwieldy and impractical sentencing proceeding.
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quire the rules of evidence at capital sentencing hearings. 721 Com-

pared to the significant interest at stake and the risk of error present
in the absence of the rules of evidence, the government's interest in
efficient sentencing proceedings is not substantial enough to bar the
rules of evidence.
Applying the rules of evidence will not impose rigid constraints on
the sentencer's ability to make moral judgments at sentencing, an-

other important government interest. After a unanimous jury finds at
least one statutory aggravating factor to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt, it then balances the statutory aggravating factors against mitigating factors. 722 At that stage, the jury determines if the aggravating
factors found to exist outweigh all the mitigation evidence the defense
presents. Death, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,

or a lesser sentence are all punishments that the sentencer may impose. 723 Evaluating the weight of aggravation and mitigation necessarily involves subjective and moral decision making. As the broad
range of sentencing alternatives suggests, the jury's discretion at the
weighing phase is broad. Due to that broad discretion, the jury may

express the moral values of its community regardless of the sentence it
actually imposes.
The Second Circuit reasoned that the rules of evidence would impermissibly prevent the sentencer from considering the maximum
amount of relevant information. 724 But applying the rules of evidence
to the FDPA sentencing hearing would not violate the Court's re-

peated assertion that the sentencer should not be prohibited from
considering a broad scope of information. 72 5 Gregg and Williams are
commonly cited by courts that have upheld the relaxed evidentiary

standard in § 3593.726 But that reliance is misplaced. 727 After Ap721. Louisiana, Missouri, and Virginia apply the rules of evidence at the sentencing hearing.
See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2(A) (West 2002) ("The hearing shall be conducted

according to the rules of evidence"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (B) (Michie 2002) ("Evidence
which may be admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility, may include
the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of the defendant, and
any other facts in mitigation of the offense."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2001) ("Evidence in
aggravation and mitigation of punishment ... may be presented subject to the rules of evidence
at criminal trials.").
722. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2000).
723. Id.
724. Fell, 360 F.3d at 143-44.
725. "[T]he sentencer may be given unbridled discretion in determining whether the death
penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made
eligible for that penalty." Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 979-80 (1994) (quoting Zant v.
Stephens, 463 U.S. 862, 875 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
726. See, e.g., Fell, 360 F.3d at 143-44; United States v. Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435-36
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (contending that Gregg reaffirmed the principle announced in Williams, which
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prendi and Ring, a sentencer should not have unbridled discretion

when it considers statutory aggravating factors that are the functional
equivalents of elements of a capital offense. Broad discretion at sentencing is appropriate under capital punishment statutes when the defendant is eligible for the death penalty after all of the requisite
elements are proved at the guilt or innocence stage. But under the
FDPA, the defendant does not become death-eligible until after the

prosecution proves statutory aggravating factors, which must be
proved at the sentencing hearing. Just as it would be wrong to allow a
jury to find the element of bodily harm in a battery case without the
rules of evidence, it is equally incorrect to encourage a jury to find the
element of "substantial planning and premeditation" 72 8 during an
FDPA sentencing hearing.

Resolving whether the Government must abide by the rules of evidence when it attempts to prove nonstatutory aggravating factors is a
trickier issue. The nonstatutory aggravating factors do not serve the
same purpose as statutory aggravating factors under Apprendi. Non-

statutory aggravating factors are not essential to establishing the existence of the capital crime. 729 In a situation in which the Government

establishes a statutory aggravating factor, it need not prove a nonstatutory aggravating factor in order for the death penalty to become an
authorized punishment. Section 3593(d) stipulates that only the aggravating factors "set forth" are required to be found before the death
penalty is authorized. 730 Nonstatutory aggravating factors are not "set
states that the rules of evidence not preclude the sentencer from considering all "relevant information"); United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682-83 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citing Gregg for
the proposition that the jury must have unbridled discretion and arguing that Williams precludes
the use of the due process clause to apply the rules of evidence at sentencing); United States v.
Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97-98 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing Williams and Gregg for the proposition
that strict evidentiary rules do not apply at sentencing); United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 495
(8th Cir. 2001) (Williams and Gregg support the relaxed evidentiary standard.); United States v.
Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that Williams established that the rules
of evidence traditionally do not apply at sentencing and that, under Gregg, the unnecessary
restrictions should not be imposed on evidence at sentencing).
727. Further, citations to Williams's restrictive view of the due process clause are improper
because that case dealt with a reluctance to impose the due process clause on state criminal
procedures. United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142-43 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Lentz, 225
F. Supp. 2d at 683.
728. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9) (2000).
729. Under §§ 3593 and 3592, the jury in a penalty phase must find at least one of the statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt in order to recommend the death penalty. The
statute does not permit the jury to recommend death based only "upon non-statutory aggravating factors." Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 432. See also Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 682 ("[T]he
Defendant could not be sentenced to death based solely upon the jurors' finding of non-statutory aggravating factors.").
730. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000).
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forth" in § 3592. Nonstatutory aggravating factors are relevant at the
"weighing" stage of the sentencing proceeding. Allowing the nonstatutory aggravating factors to be proved without the rules of evidence
presents a host of practical problems. Many nonstatutory aggravating
factors may blend into statutory aggravating factors. For example,
one of the most powerful nonstatutory aggravating factors is a victim
impact statement. Evidence supporting the victim impact statement
may overlap with evidence of the statutory aggravating factor, "vulnerability of [the] victim.

' 731

Further, it may be unduly burdensome

for the Government, defense, and court and confusing for the jury if
the rules of evidence both applied and did not apply for ostensibly
similar (but fundamentally different) information. Also, the mandate
of heightened reliability seems appropriate for nonstatutory aggravating factors. The apparent solution to this predicament requires applying the rules of evidence to nonstatutory aggravating factors.
However, because Apprendi does not control nonstatutory aggravating factors, this conclusion finds support only in pragmatism and the
interest of heightened reliability.
Providing the jury with a broad scope of information at sentencing
enables it to comprehend the nature of the offense and the offender
so that it may make an individualized sentencing determination. Thus
a tension exists due to the need to restrict evidence, which serves the
mandate of heightened reliability, and the need to allow a broad scope
of evidence, which is conducive to individualized sentencing determinations. That tension resonates the strain between Furman v. Georgia's732 guided discretion

requirement

and Lockett v.

Ohio's733

mandate for individualized sentence determinations. 734 That strain
"demands sentencer discretion that is at once generously expanded
and severely restricted. '735 To alleviate that tension, the rules of evi736
dence should be unilaterally applied to the government.
731. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c)(11).
732. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
733. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
734. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia recognized the tension between guided discretion and individualized sentencing and argued that reconciliation is impossible. Id.
735. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1151 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
736. This proposition is developed in Kelly, supra note 675, at 438, 461 ("With regard to the
enumerated aggravating elements of the enhanced offense of capital crime, the rules of evidence
should be strictly applied .... [W]ith regard to evidence offered in mitigation of death and in
support of mercy, the rules of evidence should not be applied."). Kelly's proposal antedated the
FDPA. Still, he observed that if the required elements of the death sentence are not proved, the
death penalty cannot be imposed. "The aggravating circumstances listed are basically elements
of any "capital" crime to be proven, just as "every fact necessary to constitute the crime" must
be proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, at trial." Id. at 459 (citations omitted).
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Cases that have refused to bar otherwise inadmissible evidence at
the FDPA sentencing hearing have not considered the unilateral application of the rules of evidence. Dual evidentiary standards at the
FDPA sentencing hearing find support in the underlying policies behind the constitutional requirement of individualized consideration at
sentencing. Individual consideration benefits the defendant, not the
prosecution and, more specifically, is a mandate that facilitates effective mitigation. 737 Cases such as Woodson and Lockett illustrate those
points. Woodson teaches that a mandatory death sentence is unconstitutional because it precludes the sentencer from considering mitigating circumstances that weigh against the imposition of the death
penalty. 738 Lockett shows that the sentencer's consideration of "any
information" means that it must consider "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
'739
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
Also, in Parker v. Dugger,740 the Court overturned a death sentence
after determining that the trial court failed to provide adequate attention to mitigating circumstances. The Parker court linked individualized consideration with mitigation evidence: "After striking two
aggravating circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
Parker's death sentence without considering the mitigating circumstances. This affirmance was invalid because it deprived Parker of the
individualized treatment to which he is entitled under the Constitution. ' 741 Applying the rules of evidence to the Government and allowing the defendant to present evidence and information
unconstrained by those rules is thus consistent with the original construction of individualized consideration at sentencing.
In cases that accept the FDPA's relaxed evidentiary standard and
even find it constitutionally required, there is a recognition that individualized sentencing determinations are constitutionally required,
but a failure to appreciate that individualized sentencing determinations exist for the defendant's benefit. For example, the Second Circuit cited Gregg and Williams to support its conclusion that more
evidence was required for an individualized determination of the "de737. "[T]he Constitution also requires that the sentencer be able to consider "any relevant
mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's character or background, and the circumstances of
the particular offense."" Callins, 510 U.S. at 1151 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 583, 544 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
738.
739.
740.
741.

428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991).
Id. at 322.
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fendant's whole life and personal make-up. '742 According to the Second Circuit, more evidence was required to achieve heightened
reliability. 743 But allowing evidence that cannot be tested for reliability, such as the hearsay statement of Fell's deceased codefendant, does
not increase reliability at sentencing. Rather, that evidence dramatically decreases reliability. Further, that evidence does not benefit Fell
by serving a mitigating purpose and "proffer[ing] . . . a basis for a
'744
sentence less than death.
In United States v. Chong,745 the defendant claimed that the mandate for heightened reliability required that evidence that was inadmissible under the rules of evidence be inadmissible during the FDPA
sentencing hearing. 746 The district court acknowledged that the
FDPA's admissibility standard "require[s] information particularized
to the individual defendant, '747 but it then concluded that otherwise
inadmissible "other crimes" evidence offered by the Government to
prove a statutory aggravating factor was admissible. 748 By admitting
the "other crimes" evidence and other information over the defendant's hearsay objections, the district court improperly interpreted the
requirement for individualized treatment to apply to information submitted by the Government. Despite frequent citations that assert individualized treatment is for the defendant's benefit,74 9 the district
court admitted a broad range of evidence offered by the Government.
Similarly, in Minerd, the court denied the defendant's claim that the
relaxed evidentiary standard rendered findings unreliable. 750 The district court held that the relaxed evidentiary standard was necessary for
providing the jury with "all possible relevant information about the
individual whose fate it must determine. ' 751 The district court failed
to consider that the plain meaning of this quoted language refers to an
expansive consideration of the defendant's character. 752 Unilaterally
742. Fell, 360 F.3d at 143-44.
743. Id. at 143.
744. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (internal citations omitted).
745. United States v. Chong, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Haw. 1999).
746. Id.at 1115.
747. Id.at 1116. In this section of its opinion, the district court cited the "unbridled discretion" language from Gregg. Id.
748. Id. at 1117.
749. Barring evidence from the sentencing hearing "would severely hamper compliance with
the Supreme Court's mandate to particularize sentencing proceedings to each individual defendant." Id. at 1115.
750. United States v. Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435-36 (W.D. Penn. 2001).
751. Id. at 435 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
752. At issue in Jurek was the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty statute. Specifically, the Court considered if the jury could make an individualized sentencing determination by

1878

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1777

applying the rules of evidence would rectify the convolution of the
purpose behind individualized determinations.

Courts that refused to impose the rules of evidence at the sentencing hearing often emphasize that the trial judge had the discretion to
ensure the reliability of evidence. 753 That argument acknowledges
that trial judges have discretion to exclude unconstitutional evidence,

but it does not instill uniform standards of heightened reliability that
capital cases require. The Second Circuit relied on the discretion of
trial judges to screen out unconstitutional evidence when it observed:

"The FDPA does not eliminate [the] function of the judge as gatekeeper of constitutionally permissible evidence. ' 754 In Matthews, the
court offered two additional arguments that justified the absence of
the rules of evidence from the sentencing hearing. First, the Due Process Clause's protection of matters of fundamental fairness applied
regardless of the presence of the rules of evidence. 755 Second, the jury
would ensure reliability by "filtering out the believable from the unbelievable. ' 756 In United States v. Haynes, the court relied on Matthews
and concluded that in light of Jones, Apprendi, Ring, and Harristhat
"the mens rea and aggravating factors required to qualify a defendant
for the death penalty must be proven by evidence that would pass
constitutional muster. ' 757 But the Haynes court rejected the defendant's argument that abdication of the rules of evidence rendered the
FDPA unconstitutional because the rules of evidence are not constituconsidering "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272. The Court
upheld the Texas statute and concluded that it allowed the defendant to elicit relevant mitigating
evidence and provide the jury with information necessary to make an individualized sentencing
determination. Id. at 274-76. Jurek's citations to Woodson and Roberts demonstrate that the
concept of an individualized sentencing determination was intended to serve the defendant
rather than the prosecution. Id. at 271. In rejecting Fell's argument to affirm the district court's
decision, the court of appeals cited Jurek for the proposition of maximum admissibility of relevant information, but failed to acknowledge that that standard endeavors to accomplish a complete picture of the defendant for mitigation purposes. Fell, 360 F.3d at 144.
753. United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1487 (D. Colo. 1996) (recognizing that
section 3593(c) "raises the specter of violations of the Confrontation Clause and other fundamental protections contained in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments" but the statute was saved
because the trial judge had "considerable discretion in controlling the presentation of the 'information' to the jury in both content and form"); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (describing the role of the district court as that of "gate-keeper"). United States
v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing that the evidentiary standard in place enabled the judges to ensure that the defendants constitutional rights, including
confrontation, were not violated).
754. Fell, 361 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2004).
755. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
756. Id. at 145 n.4.
757. United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 985-86 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
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the authority to
tionally mandated and because the trial court retained
758
ensure that evidence is not unreliable of unfair.
Unilaterally applying the rules of evidence will lead to more consistency and reliability than these cases offer. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court emphasized that confrontation is paramount: "Where
testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of
the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of "reliability"
.... Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. ' 759 The rules of evidence
contain ascertainable standards that help the trial judge determine the
admissibility of evidence. A uniform standard will also better achieve
heightened reliability at the capital sentencing stage. Further, under
Matthews' second proposition, exposing the jury to prejudicial evidence with the expectation that it can sift through unreliable evidence
may have devastating affects on a defendant's case. These concerns
are more pronounced when the prosecution offers evidence to prove a
statutory aggravating factor.
Imposing separate standards for the Government and the defense at
the FDPA sentencing hearing is not a novel concept. At that stage,
the Government must prove an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 760 But the defendant must only prove a mitigating factor
by a preponderance of the information. 76 1 Further, in order to estab762
lish an aggravating factor, a unanimous jury must find it to exist.
But the existence of a mitigating factor depends on the finding of at
least one juror. A unilateral application of the rules of evidence is
consistent with the heightened procedural requirements that the Government already follows and the relaxed standards the defendant
abides by at the FDPA sentencing hearing. Requiring the prosecution
to submit information that is reliable or that may be tested for reliability guides the sentencer's discretion by not exposing it to unreliable
and untrustworthy information. Operating under a relaxed evidentiary standard, the defendant may marshal mitigation evidence that
758. Id. at 986-87.
759. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370 (2004).
760. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000). Another argument for applying the rules of evidence at sentencing hearing that is not fully explored here is addressed in Kelly, supra note 675, at 418. Kelly
argues that the rules of evidence have historically applied at proceedings that use the reasonable
doubt standard. Id. Under this historical analysis, the rules of evidence should apply at the
FDPA sentencing hearing because the government must establish the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
761. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000).
762. Id. § 3593(d).
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enables the sentencer to make an individualized sentencing determination. 763 Thus, evidence at a FDPA capital sentencing hearing may
be simultaneously broad and narrow according to who offers it and for
what purpose.
Providing additional support for the proposition that the unilateral
imposition of the rules of evidence is feasible and proper for the
FDPA sentencing hearing are capital sentencing procedures of several
states that apply the rules of evidence to the prosecution but not the
defendant. 764 Also, in United States v. Bass, a federal capital case,
District Court Judge Arthur J. Tarnow of the eastern district of Michigan ordered the Government to abide by the rules of evidence, but
not the defendant:
The Government is further advised that it may only proffer evidence that meets the requirement of heightened reliability as reflected by, at a minimum, the Federal Rules of Evidence both at
trial and sentencing for the reasons stated on the record. However,
Mr. Bass is not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence or any
765
heightened standard as it relates to the penalty phase of the trial.

763. More support for not applying the rules of evidence to the defendant comes from traditional notions of mercy toward the capital defendant. See Kelly, supra note 675, at 458.
764. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, and New Jersey unilaterally apply the rules of evidence
at sentencing. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-703(B) (2002) ("the admissibility of information relevant
to any of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection F of this section shall be governed
by the rules of evidence applicable to criminal trials."); ARK. CooE ANN. § 5-4-602 (Michie
2002):
Evidence as to any mitigating circumstances may be presented by either the state or the
defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but mitigation evidence must be relevant to the issue
of punishment, including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime,
and the defendant's character, background, history, and mental and physical condition
....
The admissibility of evidence relevant to the aggravating circumstances.., shall
be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in trials of criminal
matters.
Id.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (c) (2001):

Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state
or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of
evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to
any of the aggravating factors ... shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials.
Id.
N.J. STAT. § 2C:11-3 (c)(2)(b) (West 2002):
The admissibility of evidence offered by the State to establish any of the aggravating
factors shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal
trials. The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of
evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors.
Id.
765. United States v. Bass, No. 97-CR-80235-DT-01 (E.D. Mi. filed May 5, 2003), available at
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdflibrary/81378.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2004). Bass was convicted of
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Judge Tarnow's order and the unilateral application of the rules of
evidence practiced in several states show that requiring the Government to follow the rules of evidence at the FDPA sentencing stage is
not an unreasonable or impracticable proposition.
Apprendi and Ring endeavor to create fair trial procedures. Consistent with that concern and spurred by procedural due process mandates, Fell extended Apprendi and Ring beyond requiring a jury trial.
Insisting that the jury find evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is fundamentally important for a fair trial, but a jury cannot guarantee a fair
trial if the potentially unreliable evidence presented deprives the defendant of other constitutional rights. Not applying the rules of evidence denies the defendant a fair trial on the issue of guilt of the
capital crime and violates procedural due process. In reversing the
district court, the Second Circuit failed to address that statutory aggravating factors effectively transform the FDPA sentencing hearing into
a trial on the issue of capital guilt. By erroneously viewing the FDPA
sentencing hearing to be a traditional sentencing hearing, the Second
Circuit undermined instead of achieved heightened reliability.
Except for the rules of evidence, the FDPA sentencing hearing has
all the trademarks of a trial. In effect, the sentencing hearing is the
only exception to the requirement that the rules of evidence apply in
all trials. 76 6 When the Woodson Court observed that death was different, that difference did not signify such an extraordinary idiosyncrasy.
IV.

IMPACT

The implications of Quinones and Fell begin rather than end with
holding the FDPA unconstitutional. The cases are significant for their
applications of the Due Process Clause. Quinones is the first case to
strike down a death penalty statute on due process grounds. 767 The
cases also emphasize glaring errors in the death penalty. Addressing
these errors is a complicated but necessary task that requires courts
and legislatures to consider fully the consequences of their efforts to
first-degree murder and the jury rejected the death penalty and sentenced him to life in prison
without parole. Jury Chooses Life Sentence Over Death Penalty in Bass Case, DETROIT NEWS,
Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://www.detnews.com/2003/metro/0308/15/metro-245171.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2004); Murderer, Trafficker Is Spared Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 2427585.
766. See Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
767. See United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4: CR-01-00277, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25845, at *56 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2002). See also Bird, supra note 465, at 1340 ("[T]he Court has never
squarely faced the issue of whether the Due Process Clause affords substantive protection to
life.").
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create systems that are more just, fair, and reliable than those that
now exist.
In the federal system, the immediate impact of Quinones and Fell

has not deterred the Government from aggressively pursuing the
death penalty. Under the FDPA, the Attorney General decides
whether to seek the death penalty. 768 Attorney General Ashcroft's
decisions to reverse decisions of local U.S. Attorneys and even to
override plea agreements; 769 to seek the death penalty in jurisdictions
that have no death penalty or almost never use it if one exists; 770 and
to seek the death penalty against individuals whose conduct did not
warrant the ultimate sanction77 1 have given him the reputation of be' '772
ing "on an execution bender" with "an almost biblical bloodlust.
The near unanimous rejection by jurors of the death penalty indicates
773
a schism between the Attorney General and jurors in FDPA cases.
In context, the government's aggressive use of the death penalty does
not diminish the impact of Quinones and Fell.
A.

The Due Process Alternative

Quinones and Fell each apply the Due Process Clause to honor the

mandate of heightened reliability in capital cases. Their distinct analy768. See United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60 (D. Mass. 2003) (describing Department of Justice procedures for selecting capital cases).
769. See William Glaberson, Ashcroft's Pushfor Executions Voids Plea Deal,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2003, at Al; William Glaberson, Absent Ashcroft Is a Presence at Murder Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2003, § 6 (magazine) at 52.
770. J.M. Lawrence, Sampson to be Executed, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 24, 2003, available at
2003 WL 3046916. See also The Demandsfor Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 24, 2003, availableat
2003 WL 66484283. That editorial commented that the federal
death sentence lodged against [Gary Lee] Sampson yesterday in Boston represents one
more scalp for the Bush administration and one large step backwards for the rule of law
in Massachusetts ....
While President Bush preaches federalism-giving each state
broad latitude in its own affairs-he has allowed Ashcroft to target the 12 states that
have no death penalty and override those local policies.
Id. Benjamin Weiser & William Glaberson, Ashcroft Pushes Executions in More Cases in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at Al; Editorial, Death Penalty Fervor, HARTFORD COURANT,
Feb. 24, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12322214.
771. See, e.g., Josh Meyer, Would-Be Spy Won't Face Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003,
at A15 (noting that the jury's refusal to impose the death penalty against Brian Patrick Regan
was a rebuke to the justice department, which did not seek the death penalty in eleven other
espionage cases, most of which involved more serious violations of national security than those
Regan attempted to commit).
772. Richard Cohen, Ashcroft's Mission Unconscionable,WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2003, at A27.
773. See Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 59; Don Plummer, Rudolph Lawyers To Pleadfor Time;
Death Penalty Committee To Hear Attorney's Arguments on Monday, ATLANTA JOURNALCONST., Nov. 16, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66528044 ("Federal juries have rejected the death
penalty for 20 of the last 21 defendants who have completed trial and for 38 of the last 43 since
2000.").
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ses exemplify a flexible Due Process Clause that is specially attuned to
the interest at issue during capital proceedings-the individual defendant's life-and protects that interest from excessive legislative and
executive authority. 774 The due process challenges in Quinones and
Fell reallocate the inquiry in capital punishment cases from the concerns of the system to those of the individual. Recognizing heightened reliability and protecting the individual's interests will have a
reciprocal effect on the system's interests. A system that is proven to
be unreliable or forces capital defendants to submit to inaccurate proceedings loses its integrity. An unreliable death penalty has questionable legitimacy.
Eighth Amendment challenges concentrate on the nature of the
punishment. Individual human dignity is subsumed into institutional
considerations of the validity of that punishment. Current applications of the Eighth Amendment exhibit undue deference to these institutional considerations. By not focusing on the punishment itself,
the due process challenges in Quinones and Fell dedicate proper attention to human dignity in relation to the legal regimes that potentially threaten its posterity. 775 One of the most significant threats to
human dignity is the risk of wrongful convictions. The recognition
that "the FDPA will inevitably result in the execution of innocent individuals" 776 must be a cognizable legal claim. Due process is an appropriate mechanism for preventing that ultimate deprivation. 777
Using the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment
represents a shift from challenging the death penalty on its morality to
challenging it on grounds of individual fairness. 778 Still, due process
challenges inherently address moral issues by focusing on the human
dignity of each capital defendant. It is impossible to sever moral issues from an evaluation of an individual's rights in matters of life and
death. In his commutation address, Governor Ryan stated that capital

774. See Morr, supra note 7, at 129 n.23. ("John Adams declared that due process of law 'if
properly attended to might be sufficient even to make a parliament tremble."').
775. Similarly, in Lawrence, the Court used substantive due process to recognize and protect
the dignity of individuals, a dignity that Bowers and its blind reliance on an inaccurate historical
basis demeaned. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
776. United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 76 (D. Mass. 2003).
777. Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). (stating that
the function of the legal process is to minimize erroneous decisions and "the quantum and quality of the process due" depends on the need to minimize the risk of error).
778. See Kirchmeier, supra note 59, at 21 (noting that the "modern [moratorium] movement is
primarily concerned about certain aspects of the process of imposing the death penalty, not
necessarily about the morality of killing convicted murderers").
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779
punishment "is arbitrary and capricious-and therefore immoral.
70
Further, a system that permits wrongful convictions is immoral.
In order to ensure that the individual interests at stake at capital
proceedings receive the protections that are due, courts should consider due process challenges raised by capital defendants. Mere recognition of due process challenges is not sufficient. Courts should
define the meaning of due process in terms of evolving standards of
procedural fairness and ordered liberty. Such an analysis will remain
loyal to the often repeated, but rarely recognized, principle that due
process is not a frozen concept.
By reversing Quinones, the Second Circuit exemplified how treating
due process as a historical relic freezes it and shackles it to assumptions that are no longer tenable. As Lawrence asserts, the authors of
the Fifth Amendment did not intend it to have a limited and finite
scope because "[t]hey knew times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress. ' 781 Determining the meaning of due
process by referencing evolving standards does not entail the abrogation of the fundamental rights standard because the concern for reliability and fairness in capital procedures is deeply rooted in the Due
Process Clause, perhaps even more so than in the Eighth Amendment.782 Gauging the evolution of standards by relying on the conduct of political majorities may doom the fundamental interests at
stake at capital proceedings because of the controversial and highly
politicized nature of the death penalty. Death penalty politics counsel
against legislative action and other attempts to reform the death
78 3
penalty.
Contending that the Due Process Clause offers a viable alternative
to the typical Eighth Amendment challenge to capital punishment systems is not "due process romanticism. ' 78 4 The due process analyses in
Quinones and Fell are not quixotic exercises. The "reasoned judg779. Northwestern Speech, supra note 49.
780. For a discussion on how executing of innocent individuals raises substantial moral concerns, see Logan, supra note 31, at 1369-71.
781. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
782. See supra note 471 and accompanying text. See also Thurschwell, supra note 12, at 18.
783. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759
(1995).
784. Brennan, supra note 474, at 318 (quoting Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983
Sup. Ct. Rev. 305, 311) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Justice Brennan recalled that his
argument that unbridled jury discretion at capital sentencing violated due process was criticized
as overly idealistic.).
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ment" in those decisions creates alternative arguments for realizing
the meaning of heightened reliability in capital cases.
B.

Evaluating the Reform Responses

Analyzing the distinct reforms that Quinones and Fell necessarily
entail sheds light on the impact of each case. Even though both cases
are ultimately concerned with achieving heightened reliability in capital cases, the remedies the courts provide for the lack of heightened
reliability differ. In Quinones, Judge Rakoff addressed the systemic
problems and risks created by the FDPA with a remedy of equal proportions. In Fell, Judge Sessions identified a particular aspect of the
FDPA that failed to ensure heightened reliability. Amending the
FDPA would rectify that infirmity.
One of the more significant aspects of Quinones is that it recognized
the problem of wrongful capital convictions, and that recognition may
have an impact on the public's awareness of the widespread tragedies
of wrongful convictions. Educating the public about the issue of
wrongful convictions is essential for an objective and rational discourse on the administration of capital punishment. 785 In reversing
the district court, the Second Circuit neither denied nor rebutted the
evidence of wrongful convictions and exonerations; instead, it stated
that the risk of executing the innocent has been traditionally assumed. 786 Future discourse on capital punishment must not neglect to
give proper weight to the costs of wrongful capital convictions. 787
To facilitate the consideration of the costs of wrongful capital convictions, state and federal governments should embark upon projects
similar to the A Broken System studies. Determining whether innocent individuals have been executed must be a goal of these
projects. 788 The costs of such studies would not be significant. Biological evidence still exists and may be tested to ensure that the individual executed was not innocent. The major impediment to this testing
785. See Gerald Kogan, Errors of Justice and the Death Penalty, 86 JUDICATURE 111, 113-14
(2002) (recognizing that executing an innocent person is inevitable is the first thing the public
must know in order to be informed about the current administration of the death penalty);
Clarke et al., supra note 93 (noting that public is generally under informed as to aspects of the
death penalty, namely the problem of wrongful convictions).
786. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir. 2002).
787. Upon hearing of the exoneration of Ray Krone, the one-hundredth death row inmate to
be exonerated, Gary Gauger, a death row exoneree himself, observed, "[W]e all have to bear
responsibility for this conduct. There's no place for it in a civilized society." Kris Axtman, US
Milestone: 100th Death-Row Inmate Exonerated, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 2002, at 1-2.
788. See James S.Liebman, Rates of Reversible Errorand The Risk of Wrongful Execution, 86
JUDICATURE 78, 79 (2002) (recognizing that there is no "systematic effort to determine whether
executed individuals were innocent").
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has been the reluctance of states and prosecutors to release this evi-

dence. Such action is in itself an indication of a lack of confidence in
the reliability of capital punishment. 789 A perfect illustration of a
state's refusal to subject biological evidence to DNA testing is the

conduct of Virginia prosecutors in the Roger Keith Coleman case.
Coleman was convicted of a 1981 rape-murder and his attorneys failed
to meet a filing deadline for their notice of intent to appeal. 790 The
Supreme Court held that Coleman's claims were procedurally de-

faulted and it denied habeas relief.7 9 1 Coleman proclaimed his innocence until he was executed in 1992.792 By refusing to test the
available evidence and clinging onto the quasi-closure brought about
by Coleman's execution, Virginia has demonstrated a shocking com7 93
fort with the possibility that it has executed an innocent person.

Events in Minnesota demonstrate that prosecutors can and should undertake review of convictions when new technology may reveal
wrongful convictions. Susan Gaertner, the Ramsey County Attorney,
examined 116 pre-1995 convictions. The study revealed one wrongful

conviction. The Minnesota action demonstrates that the costs of comprehensive reviews of convictions can be borne by the states and local

municipalities. Further evidence of this fact is action undertaken by
San Diego district attorneys, who reviewed more than seven hundred
convictions. However, in each of these prosecution-initiated studies,
794
biological evidence was available in only a minority of cases.
789. See id. at 80 (observing "[t]he fact that [prosecutors] usually refuse to permit tests that, at
no fiscal cost to the state, could categorically confirm the reliability of their work if it was reliable is explicable only if they have some reason to worry that their work was not reliable.").
790. Coleman's attorneys filed the notice of intent to appeal thirty-three days after entry of
final judgment and state law required that all notices of intent to appeal must be filed within
thirty days of final judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 728 (1991).
791. Id. at 756.
792. John Aloysius Farrell, Court Bars DNA Test in 1981 Killing Bid To Investigate Va. Execution Fails, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101981695.
793. See generally JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT (1997). See also John Aloysius Farrell, Judge Denies Bid for DNA Test to

Verify Guilt of Executed Man, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 3936129. (The
forensic scientist who had stored the biological data predicted that the state would destroy the
evidence: "The whole purpose of the state getting this back is so they can flush it" to destroy
proof of a wrongful execution). Also discussed in this article is the case of Frank Lee Smith, who
was sentenced to death for a rape-murder. Smith died from cancer in prison. Posthumous DNA
testing proved that he was wrongfully convicted. See also Lois Romano, When DNA Meets
Death Row, It's the System That's Tested, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003, available at 2003 WL
67893205; Alisa LaPolt, Convicts Could Get More Time for DNA, FLA. TODAY, Dec. 8, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 7155722.
794. Jodi Wilgoren, ProsecutorsUse DNA Test to Clear Man in '85 Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2002, at A22; Paul Gustafson, DNA Exonerates Man Convicted of '85 Rape, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 14, 2002, at 1A available at 2002 WL 5386808.
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Another lesson implicit in Quinones is that we cannot rely on the
system to remedy its own errors. Capital review procedures will not
catch wrongful convictions. 79 5 As Herreraestablished, substantive errors that do not have the fortune of being accompanied by procedural
errors must meet an extremely high threshold before being entitled to
a forum.
Quinones may also serve as a catalyst for reforms that attempt to
address wrongful convictions. Increased access to DNA testing is typically the centerpiece of these reforms. The purpose of these reforms
is both laudable and overdue; however, it is a great error to believe
that DNA testing can rectify the unreliability and inaccuracy of capital
punishment systems. Moreover, DNA testing will not be able to uncover all wrongful convictions. DNA is not the sole solution to
wrongful convictions; it only affects a small number of cases that have
biological evidence to test. 7 96 Indeed, only thirteen of the 113 death
row exonerations were due to exculpatory DNA evidence. 797 This relatively small number of DNA exonerations undercuts the belief that
7 98
DNA testing proves that the system works.
Related to this improper reliance on DNA testing is the concept of
legitimation, which occurs when reforms "do very little to change the
underlying practice but may offer the appearance of much greater
procedural regularity than they actually produce, thus inducing a false
or exaggerated belief in the fairness of the entire system of capital

795. See Liebman, supra note 788, at 82 ("More than 60 percent of the 101 people released
from death row since 1973 because they were not guilty were initially approved for execution by
one, two, or even a full complement of three levels of judicial review.").
796. See The Future of Capital Punishment, Cm. TRIB. Oct. 3, 2002, at § 1, at 22 ("As for the
magic of DNA, it figures in only a small fraction of all crimes. Most criminals don't leave DNA
material behind, particularly in armed robberies and shootings."); See Coleman Blackerby, supra
note 67, at 1193-01 (discussing that DNA evidence is rarely available and in the cases in which it
is present, there are numerous hurdles individuals must overcome to have that evidence actually
tested).
797. DPIC, Innocence: Freedfrom Death Row, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last visited Jan. 6, 2004). See also Reducing the Risk of Executing
the Innocent: The Report of the Illinois Governor's Comm'n on Capital Punishment: Hearing
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) available at 2002 WL 20317982 (Statement of Professor Lawrence C. Marshall, Legal Director, Center on Wrongful Convictions,
Northwestern University Law School) (stating that exonerations through DNA evidence is "the
exception, not the norm").
798. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Do Exonerations Prove That "The System Works?", 86 JuDI
83, 88 (2002) (noting "DNA highlights problems in the system, it does not solve those
problems and most certainly does not prove that the system works."); Kirchmeier, supra note 59,
at 104 (describing how DNA is used by death penalty proponents to show that the system
works).
CATURE
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punishment. ' 799 Relying on DNA reforms as the solution to capital
punishment's problems will inevitably draw attention away from the
underlying causes of wrongful convictions. The IPA is a perfect example of a well intentioned reform that fails to address all the causes of

error and may legitimate the underlying unreliability and inaccuracy
in capital punishment systems. 8°° The IPA endeavors "to reduce risk
of mistaken executions" by "improving the availability of DNA test-

ing, and ensuring reasonable minimum standards and funding for
court-appointed counsel." 80 1 While praiseworthy in many ways, 02 the
IPA fails to safeguard against the unreliability identified in Quinones
and could "foster an unjustified confidence in our ability to avoid such
errors.

8 0° 3

The IPA fails to address one of the leading causes of mis-

taken executions, mistaken eyewitness identifications, which is con80 4
trary to its stated goal of reducing the risk of mistaken executions.

Except for the call for increased investment in the defense bar, the
IPA is an example of an over-allocation of resources onto appellate
procedures that will normalize underlying errors by creating the im-

pression of real change.
The issue of wrongful capital convictions cannot be overemphasized; however, phrasing capital punishment reform solely in terms of
protecting the innocent may have devastating effects in achieving systemic changes that lead to a fairer and more accurate criminal justice
799. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 422. The authors discuss that DNA testing is of
"extremely limited applicability" because of the rarity of biological evidence in capital crimes
and that while it may be able to determine an individual's guilt or innocence, it cannot establish
whether an individual deserves the death penalty. Id at 423. Ultimately, DNA reforms "send a
message of certainty that does not correspond to the actual reliability they can plausibly secure."
Id.
800. See Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It
Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 269 (2002); George C.
Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. Par. L. REV. 263, 274-75 (2003) (describing the IPA as a "salutary first step" but as
"too narrow to satisfy due process).
801. Leahy, supra note 73, at 1115.
802. The requirement that jurisdictions preserve biological evidence is of significant import
because of the pervasive problem of the destruction of biological evidence. Barry Scheck noted
that in 75% of cases in the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law where
DNA would demonstrate innocence, the biological evidence was either lost or destroyed. See
Barry C. Scheck, Preventing the Execution of the Innocent: Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2001). Also, it is a positive sign that some statutory
language frames the issues in due process terms: "It shocks the conscience and offends social
standards of fairness and decency to execute innocent persons or to deny inmates the opportunity to present persuasive evidence of their innocence." Leahy, supra note 73, at 1126.
803. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 423.
804. See Koosed, supra note 800, at 271-87 (discussing causes and types of misidentifications);
Editorial, When Believing Isn't Seeing, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2002, § 1, at 16 (Erroneous eyewitness testimony is the leading contributor to wrongful convictions in the United States.).
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system. 80 5 The legitimating effects of reforms such as the IPA may
shroud existing causes of unreliability. An improper response to the
concerns identified in Quinones could thus diminish the progress that
has been and continues to be made in efforts to achieve true reform
through efforts such as the Illinois moratorium. 80 6 If the general population is induced into believing that the capital punishment system is
reliable because of legitimating reforms, wrongful capital convictions
will continue to mount and the risks of wrongful convictions and executions will not subside.
While Quinones presents extreme, yet perhaps necessary, reforms
that must be taken in order to address the issue of wrongful convictions,807 statutory amendments may remedy the issues that Fell identifies.80 8 As it did when it reversed Quinones, the Second Circuit relied
heavily on precedent, namely Gregg, and as a result, failed to address
adequately the issues before it. If the Second Circuit would have recognized statutory aggravating factors as elements, it would have acknowledged that more procedural protections were warranted at the
FDPA sentencing hearing. Unilaterally applying the rules of evidence
to the Government would supply those protections. The unilateral
approach will better honor the mandate of heightened reliability by
ensuring that the defendant's sentence is based on reliable information. Not requiring the defendant to submit evidence according to the
rules of evidence will allow in a broader range of information regarding the particular circumstances of the offense and the offender. An
amended evidentiary standard could track the language of the Arizona, Connecticut, or New Jersey capital sentencing statutes.
A revised § 3593(c) evidentiary standard could be structured in this
manner: Evidence offered by the Government to establish the exis805. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 422 (issues involving wrongful capital convictions
embody the "new 'moment' in American death penalty politics").
806. See generally Kirchmeier, supra note 59, at 77 (observing that if concerns about the execution of the innocent "continue[ ] to be the main focus of the Moratorium Movement and if
states were to address this concern, then the movement would suffer a setback on a scale similar
to that suffered by the 1960s Death Penalty Abolition Movement after Gregg") (internal citations omitted).
807. Wrongful convictions and executions have historically been primary justifications for abolition of death penalty regimes. See Clarke et. al, supra note 93, at 323 (noting that Michigan's
decision to abolish the death penalty in 1846 was due in large part to the execution of an innocent man, Patrick Fitzpatrick).
808. Judge Sessions' conclusion that "Congress must ... determine the procedure by which
the death penalty is to be imposed, consistent with Constitutional standards," Fell, 217 F. Supp.
2d at 491, seems to be an invitation to the legislature to redraft a constitutional FDPA. See Carol
S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1481 n.23 (2002) (listing fourteen states that explicitly bar the rules of
evidence at capital sentencing hearings).
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tence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in § 3592(b)-(d)
that is necessary for the imposition of the death penalty is governed
by the rules of evidence that govern the admission of evidence at
criminal trials. Evidence offered by the Government that is not a prerequisite to the imposition of a death sentence or any evidence offered
by the defendant is admissible, regardless of its admissibility under the
rules of evidence at criminal trials, except that this information may
be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
This revised version of the § 3593(c) evidentiary standard incorporates Apprendi's elements rule. Statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors are distinguished so that the rules of evidence do not apply
to the nonstatutory aggravating factors because they are not essential
elements of the capital crime. The prejudice standard applies to nonstatutory aggravating factors and any evidence presented by the defense in order to remain consistent with the FDPA's current structure.
If the rules of evidence apply to both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors, the § 3593(c) evidentiary standard could look like
this: Evidence offered by the Government is governed by the rules of
evidence that govern the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Evidence offered by the defendant is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence at criminal trials except that this
information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by
the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
That version implicitly recognizes Apprendi's elements rule, yet it
applies the rules of evidence to all information offered by the Government. Each version unilaterally applies the rules of evidence and
should meet the goals of accurate sentencing, heightened reliability,
guided discretion, and individualized sentencing determinations.
Similar to the legitimating effects that the IPA and DNA testing
may have on the issue of wrongful convictions, these statutory reforms
may have popular appeal yet only have superficial ramifications.
Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker have used the term "entrenchment" to describe this form of legitimation. 80 9 Entrenchment occurs
when incremental changes in procedures "induce at least some satisfaction in the real improvements achieved, and thus, will make people
more comfortable than they otherwise would be with the underlying
practice, thereby dissipating continued scrutiny of the death pen809. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 424.
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alty." 8 10 Imposing the rules of evidence at the FDPA sentencing hearing does not create the same false impression of institutional reform
that DNA reforms instill. Because the rules of evidence may bar untrustworthy evidence and ensure that the defendant has the opportu-

nity to confront and cross-examine the Government's witnesses, the
rules may better address these underlying causes, such as misidentifications. However, the rules of evidence cannot adequately address

systemic constitutionally offensive inequities in capital punishment,
811
such as racial bias.
Further proof that the proposed evidentiary standards are not sufficient bulwarks against the underlying causes that lead to wrongful
convictions are the records of the states that unilaterally apply the
rules of evidence to the Government. Since 1973, Arizona has had six
death row exonerations. 812 According to A Broken System, Arizona's
overall error rate is seventy-nine percent. 8 13 These statistics indicate
that wrongful convictions cannot be prevented with mere procedural
reforms such as imposing the rules of evidence. The application of the
rules of evidence may lead to a "false aura of rationality. 8 14 The true
effect of procedural protections and guidelines is more symbolic

rather than substantive.
The false aura of rationality also shields moral issues from critical
inquiry.8 15 Gregg is one of the first and most influential examples of
using procedural mechanisms to address substantive and moral issues.
In Gregg, the Court made clear that "morally inappropriate death
810. Id.
811. See Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1611 (2001) ("[T]he legal rules designed to ensure heightened reliability
have increased the perceived legitimacy of capital punishment.").
812. DPIC, Exonerations by State, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.phpdid=412&
scid=6#state (last visited Jan. 6, 2004). Connecticut and New Jersey have had no exonerations
and A Broken System did not include these states in its tabular data. Relative to other capital
states, New Jersey and Connecticut has used the death penalty sparingly. Connecticut last executed an individual in 1960. Since 1976, seven individuals have been sentenced to death. See The
Death Penalty in Connecticut-an Update as of October 2002, at http://www.nodp.org/cnadp/
ctupdate.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004). New Jersey's last execution was in 1963. There are
currently sixteen individuals on New Jersey's death row. See http://www.nodp.org/nj/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
813. Liebman, et. al, supra note 104, at 74. The average overall rate of error is 68%. Id. at 75.
814. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 433 (1995).
815. See id. at 433-36. The authors discuss how the Court's death penalty law legitimates capital punishment by insulating courts from making "the necessarily moral task of deciding life or
death." Id. at 433. Instead, neutral legal principles guide the courts' inquiries, the attorneys'
arguments, and the juries' discretions. Id. Because regulation of death penalty procedures
rarely address "core issues," "sentencing judges and juries [are left] with a false sense that their
power is safely circumscribed." Id. at 435
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sentences in the states could be solved simply by improving the procedures of capital sentencing. ' 816 The subsuming of substantive issues
into the realm of procedural doctrine is also seen in the Second Circuit's opinion. There the court cites Gregg and Herrera to delineate
the parameters of what process is due to capital defendants. By doing
so, the court effectively ignored the substantive issues, namely the
substantial risk of executing the innocent, which demand consideration on moral and substantive grounds and are thus located outside
the scopes of Gregg and Herrera. When the death penalty is perceived to be fair, inaccuracies and inequities become acceptable. The
normalization of inadequacy exacerbates the shortcomings of the prevailing analyses for determining the constitutionality of death penalty
regimes. The widespread legislative reform that predicates the Eighth
Amendment evolving standards test is less likely to occur when the
infirmities underlying the death penalty are normalized.
Applying the rules of evidence at the FDPA sentencing hearing is a
necessary measure, but we must consider if any amount of procedural
protections can ever create a fair and accurate capital punishment system. Such an inquiry may lead us to conclusions similar to those Justice Blackmun reached in his Callins dissent. Justice Blackmun
recognized that no "legal formulas and procedural rules" could address the "arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake" that
plague capital punishment. 8 17 Procedural rules displace problems
throughout the capital punishment system, rather than solving
them. 818 Rational decisions cannot be made during capital sentencing
because the choice whether an individual should live or die is a subjective choice that procedural rules cannot effectively harness.8 19 Consideration of the true effects of judicial reforms must not lose sight of
the intended purpose of these reforms: to rid capital punishment of
unreliability, inaccuracy, arbitrariness, and discrimination. These issues deserve substantial consideration rather than the superficial
treatment that procedurally oriented solutions provide.
Reforms that will flow from Quinones and Fell may not adequately
address the underlying causes of unreliability and unfairness in capital
punishment systems; however, they are necessary steps if more encompassing and appropriate measures are not taken. In addition to
evaluating the legitimacy of Quinones and Fell reforms, the benefits of
due process challenges to capital punishment systems must be utilized.
816.
817.
818.
819.

Hoffmann, supra note 605 at 823.
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1152-53.
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Due process challenges may be inherently nonentrenching because
their flexibility and focus on individual rights do not easily lead to the
conclusion that capital punishment is fixed. Due process challenges
will thus perpetuate the "reforming impulse. '820 Even though possible efforts to reform the FDPA's flawed evidentiary standard may
normalize the underlying causes of inaccuracy in capital proceedings,
subsequent due process challenges that posit other individual interests
will continue the impulse to reform, suspend, or even abolish capital
punishment. 82 1 But these complicated issues involving potential reforms may be moot if courts follow the lead of the Second Circuit and
avoid difficult questions by relying on precedent that is becoming
more detached from issues that are constantly evolving.
V.

CONCLUSION

Judge Sessions did not exaggerate when he observed that "[c]apital
punishment is under siege. ' 822 Declining public support reflects increasing discomfort with the unreliability and inaccuracy of capital
punishment. These concerns resonate in federal and state legislation.
Studies focusing on the reliability and fairness of capital punishment
have revealed that gross inequities and inaccuracies plague a system in
which the mandate of heightened reliability should reign supreme.
Governor Ryan's momentous decisions to pardon four wrongfully
convicted death row inmates and to commute the remaining 164 death
sentences to life without parole has been the most significant indicator
of the mounting concern that surrounds capital punishment.
Quinones and Fell addressed the lack of reliability and accuracy in
capital punishment by applying the Due Process Clause to declare the
FDPA unconstitutional. Those cases demonstrate that the Due Process Clause may be used to honor the mandate of heightened reliability in capital proceedings. In the capital context, the Due Process
Clause shifts the relevant inquiry from what is institutionally pragmatic and historically accepted to what the individual's rights demand.
Each case recognizes that the meaning of due process in a given situation cannot be frozen in place and that due process is a flexible concept that must be interpreted according to evolving standards of
fairness and ordered liberty. Rather than having a clearly defined
content, the Due Process Clause is a general safeguard for human
820. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 421.
821. See generally Thomas P. Sullivan, Repairor Repeal-Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, 90 ILL. B.J. 304 (2002).
822. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. Vt. 2002).
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rights.8 23 Recognizing that the meaning of due process is not a stag-

nant formula enables courts to reevaluate it in light of recent revelations. 824 Quinones properly considered that over one hundred
exonerations evidence capital punishment's fallibility. In reversing
Quinones, the Second Circuit applied a rigid interpretation of due
process and showed undue deference to institutional concerns at the
cost of the imperiled individual interests. Fell correctly viewed the

statutory aggravating factors as functional equivalents of elements
that require the rules of evidence. In reversing Fell, the Second Circuit failed to acknowledge the true effect of the most critical stage of a
federal death penalty proceeding-the FDPA sentencing hearing. In
each decision reversing the lower courts, the Second Circuit imposed
Eighth Amendment standards and avoided the due process issues

presented.
Quinones and Fell necessarily entail reform; however, these reforms
should be thoroughly evaluated to prevent the normalization of the
underlying causes of error. Future application of a flexible and evolving Due Process Clause may help prevent a "false aura of rationality"
from deluding the participants in capital punishment proceedings and
the general public into believing that capital punishment is administered reliably and accurately.
Quinones and Fell remind us that we must recognize our own fallibility and realize that our devices are equally, if not more, subject to
error.8 25 Recognizing our fallibility and conceding that capital punishment is broken are essential steps that we must take in order to have a
rational discussion on the death penalty. 82 6 Quinones and Fell address
the question that guided Senator Leahy's support of the IPA: "[W]hat
823. Mo-rr, supra note 7, at 142 (noting that colonists considered the "law of the land" to be a
"catch-all phrase" for "human rights").
824. Due process "is thus not a stagnant formulation of what has been achieved in the past but
a standard for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institutions of a free society." Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
825. "It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer
it, is fallible." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993).
826. U.S. District Judge Michael A. Ponsor presided over United States v. Gilbert, a federal
capital trial where a jury convicted Kristin Gilbert of three counts of first-degree murder, but
was deadlocked as to sentence. Michael A. Ponsor, Life, Death and Uncertainty, 14 FED. SEr.
R. 60, 63 (2001). Due to the deadlocked jury, Judge Ponsor sentenced Gilbert to life imprisonment without possibility of release. Id. Reflecting on this experience, Judge Ponsor observed:
I love our judicial system, and I am proud to serve in it. As I believe this trial demonstrated, no structure of law, anywhere or at any time, has tried so earnestly to protect
the rights of those involved in it. But I have a hard time imagining anything as complicated as a capital trial being repeated very often, even by the best system, without an
innocent person eventually being executed.
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kind of society [do] we want America to be in the 21st Century [?]"827
Some envision a society in which subjecting individual lives to unreliable and inaccurate systems is an acceptable practice.8 2 8 Quinones and
Fell envision a society in which such conduct is intolerable.
Joshua Herman*

827. Leahy, supra note 73, at 1115.
828. See Steve Mills, Texas Defies Drift Against Executions; Death Chamber Runs at Record
Clip, CHI. TRIB. Feb. 23, 2003, § C at 1; Bill Murphy, Death Row: Status Quo; Texas Undeterred
by Illinois' Ripple Effects, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 3231523
(noting that "the Lone Star state's death penalty system churns forward with machine-like efficiency" in light of Illinois' dramatic actions to address the inequities and inaccuracies in its death
penalty regime).
* I am grateful for Professor Andrea Lyon's comments on an earlier draft and for her lessons
in advocacy.
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